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NORTH & SOUTH

THE MAGAZINE OF CIVIL WAR CONFLICT

ISSUE #1 • NOVEMBER 1997

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

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

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

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



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EDITORIAL

by Keith Poulter

There are already a number of popular magazines devoted to the Civil War, so a natural question to ask is "How will *North & South* differ from the others?" Before launching the magazine we asked a panel of 500 Civil War enthusiasts what they would like to see from a new publication. 90% said they wanted *fresh* material, 85% said they wanted *accurate* history, 73% expressed a wish for more in-depth treatment, and 45% said they wanted "more balanced coverage." And this is precisely what we intend to give you.

The articles in *North &South* will be fresh because they will be based in most cases on ongoing research. In these pages you will get a preview of what will be in next year's books, not a rehash of what was in last year's. You'll get accurate history because our writers are in most cases professional historians, rather than professional writers with little background in history. The myths of the Civil War will find no place *North & South*. You will not be told (again!) that Anna Ella Carroll was the unsung strategic genius of the Civil War, or that Rose Greenhow won the battle of Manassas. What you will get *in North & South* is real history for real history buffs.

As for "balance" you will find that *North & South* is a magazine in which many perspectives find a place. That is not to say that each article will strive to achieve some anemic "middle ground." Many of them in fact will be written from a very definite point of view. But overall there will be a balance. It has truly been said that in war, truth is the first casualty, and the Civil War was no exception. A good deal of wartime propaganda, north and south, still lurks within the pages of our history books. It will be one aim of *North & South* to expose this for what it is, and to get at the historical truth. A good example of this will be our article in issue #2, "What *Really* Happened on the Nueces River?"

We want *North & South* to be uniquely your magazine. To this end every issue will have a *Feedback Card* on which you can record your opinion of that issue's contents, as well as let us know what topics you'd like to see covered in future issues. Your ratings of each article will appear in the following issue, and your feedback will be used by me to shape the magazine. As publisher-editor I am in the happy position of not being responsible to some faceless corporation, so when you tell me what you want, I will be able to deliver. Incidentally, if you want some insight into how I personally feel about the Civil War, read the last few paragraphs of my article on the 2nd Illinois Cavalry; but only *after* you've read the article!

On a shamelessly commercial note, I encourage everyone reading this magazine to take out a 6 or 12 issue subscription. The Charter Subscription Rate (see feeback card) is not only $5.00 less than the standard subscription rate, it also guarantees you a *lifetime* 20% discount. As publisher-editor of *North & South* I am excited about the new magazine. I hope you too will find it exciting, enjoyable, informative, stimulating, and at times moving.



CROSSFIRE

On a Sense of New Direction

Welcome *North & South!* I hope to see you emphasize the less easily researched aspects of the war, rather than rehashing the "overplowed" major battles and personalities. Please concentrate on the accurate details of military operations which are so important to students of military history, rather than on more speculative historical revisionism.

I would also like to enter a plea for professionally produced maps, rather than computer generated maps of questionable scale, orientation and significance to the subject matter at hand.

A fresh and accurate publication is long overdue.

William R. Scaife
Immediate Past President, Atlanta Civil War Round Table

Congratulations on the exciting plans for *North and South;* I wish the magazine a long and healthy life. As one who is entrenched in both science and history, I applaud your efforts to bring a sense of precision and beauty to the field of Civil War history. Few other areas have witnessed such an explosion in the literature, mostly popular, and few places are so clearly infected with tall tales, embellishments, half-truths, rehashed old stories, and out-and-out lies—even dating back to the official reports.

I therefore greatly look forward to *North and South's* coverage of the vast array of absorbing material on the war, presented with the documented precision of top-notch historians and scholars. You will undoubtedly provide a sharper, clearer view of many wartime personalities and events, and supporting such scholarly work with four-color graphics will empower your readers to enjoy and understand the war better than ever before.

Well documented articles on a variety of subjects could help fill gaps or weakly treated areas in the literature; battles and campaign studies on the war in the west, causation, the common soldiers, medical aspects, naval warfare, the origins and evolution of Civil War battlefields and historic sites, prisons, the role of railroads and other logistical and supply issues, and war's aftermath, and women and the war.

Certainly this period is the most exciting to be involved with Civil War history in quite some time, and it seems clear the *North and South* will now play a role in increasing the quality of our understanding of this fateful, dramatic period of the past.

Dave Eicher
Waukesha, Wisconsin

Congratulations on the new venture. As a civil War enthusiast of many years, let me say that I hope *North & South* fill the void that has existed for the serious student of the Civil War. First, rather than simply recounting events, I hope your articles will offer insight and new views. Rather than simply reciting minutia and skimming the surface, I hope you will provide an environment where writers feel free to delve deeper into their subjects than the current "popular" magazines allow. I want the whys and the wherefores, not just the whos and the whats. If you can do that you will carve out for yourself an area not filled by the existing magazines—and area where substance rather than glitzy style is expected and encouraged.

All the best wishes for your success,
Rob Markham
New Milford, CT

We welcome your comments and opinions. Letters are often edited for length so that we can include as many as possible. Write: North & South Crossfire, 33756 Black Mountain Road, Tollhouse, CA 93667

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KNAPSACK by Al Nofi

FROM THE GRAPEVINE

During the Civil War, Norwich University, a small military college in New England, furnished the Union with 12 generals, 25 colonels, 90 majors and lieutenant colonels, and 198 company officers, a record exceeded only by that of West Point.

◆◆◆

At least one woman was killed serving in the Confederate ranks at Gettysburg during "Pickett's Charge" on 3 July 1863, her body being discovered by a Union burial detail shortly after the battle.

◆◆◆

The last Civil War officer to fall at the head of his troops was Arthur MacArthur, whose son Douglas later also gained some fame as a soldier, who collapsed and died at a banquet in 1912, having just given a toast to the assembled veterans of the 24th Wisconsin, which he had led up Missionary Ridge on 25 November 1863.

◆◆◆

Notified that some Rebel raiders had just captured a brigadier general and 110 horses, President Lincoln expressed concern about the loss of horseflesh, observing "I can make a brigadier general in five minutes, but it's not easy to replace 110 horses."

Musician Richard Enderlin, of B Company, 73rd Ohio, received a Medal of Honor trying to rescue a mortally wounded comrade north of the Union lines on the evening of 2 July at Gettysburg, Private George Nixon, who was the great-grandfather of Richard M. Nixon.

◆◆◆

Frederick Grant, son of the general, was wounded at Vicksburg in 1863, while serving as his father's orderly, he being only 13 years old at the time.

◆◆◆

Charles Francis Adams, Jr., son of the ambassador to Britain, grandson of one President and great-grandson of another, was an officer in the 5th Massachusetts Cavalry, a black regiment.

◆◆◆

Famed Union cavalryman Phil Sheridan was only about 5'6" tall, and for much of the Civil War never weighed more than about 115 pounds, hence his nickname "Little Phil."

◆◆◆

Having just had a tall tale of the war debunked by one of his erstwhile comrades, an old Confederate veteran commented *"Another good story ruined by an eyewitness."*

SHORT ROUNDS

Who Served? Soldiers' Occupations During the American Civil War

The Civil War imposed the greatest strain on American manpower in the nation's history, particularly in the South, where perhaps 80% of military aged white men served, mostly in the Confederate Army, but with significant numbers (c. 100,000) in Union forces as well. Yet in neither the Union nor the Confederacy was the burden of service distributed evenly throughout all strata of society, as the accompanying table demonstrates.

Occupation Patterns and Recruiting in the Civil War

	UNION		CONFEDERACY	
Occupation	*All*	*Troops*	*All*	*Troops*
Farm Workers	42.9%	47.5%	57.5%	61.5%
Skilled Workers	24.9	25.1	15.7	14.1
Unskilled Workers	16.7	15.9	12.7	8.5
White Collar Workers	10.0	5.1	8.3	7.0
Professionals	3.5	3.2	5.0	5.2
Others	2.0	3.2	0.8	3.7

"Confident language by a military commander is not usually regarded as evidence of competency."

-Joseph E. Johnston

Figures for farm workers include plantation owners. Those for white collar workers include commercial service personnel. Note that the number of "professionals" in the South appears to have been proportionally greater than in the North. These figures should be taken with caution, as statistical sampling techniques of the day were by no means accurate. Figures for both sides are taken from a relatively small number of regimental rolls that happened to list pre-war occupations. Moreover, the figures omit consideration of the large number of men who rendered labor service, totaling several hundred thousands, primarily black slaves in the South and free blacks and "fugitive slaves" in the North, none of whom were regularly enlisted.

All in the Family: The Lee Clan and High Command During the Civil War

By one accounting during the Civil War there were at least 52 families with two or more generals numbered among their kinsmen, accounting for well over 10 percent of the generals in the war, both sides taken together. Consider the ties of blood and marriage which linked Robert E. Lee with many of the other prominent political and military leaders of his times.

Lee himself, of course, was a full general in the Confederate Army. His sons George Washington Custis Lee and William Henry Fitzhugh Lee, were both Confederate major generals, and his nephew, Fitzhugh Lee, was a lieutenant general. A cousin, Richard L. Page, the son of Lee's maternal aunt, was a Confederate brigadier general. Samuel Cooper, the seniormost Confederate general, was Fitzhugh Lee's father-in-law. Union Brigadier General Frank Wheaton was married to another daughter of Samuel Cooper's, and hence Fitzhugh Lee's brother-in-law.

Confederate Brigadier General Edwin G. Lee, another cousin of Robert E. Lee, was the son-in-law of Confederate Brigadier General William N. Pendleton, Lee's chief of artillery. Union Rear Admiral Samuel P. Lee was yet another cousin. Robert E. Lee was also a cousin, at some remove, to Confederate Brigadier General James Terrill and his brother Union Brigadier General William R. Terrill, both of whom died in the war.

Confederate Lieutenant General Richard P. Taylor was a fourth cousin to General Lee: his father, the late President Zachary Taylor, and his uncle, Union Brigadier General Joseph P. Taylor, being kin to Lee's mother. Confederate Major General Lafayette McLaws, one of Longstreet's ablest subordinates, was Zachary Taylor's nephew by marriage, and hence Dick Taylor's cousin-in-law, and thus tied to Robert E. Lee as well. Confederate Brigadier General Allen Thomas was a brother-in-law of Dick Taylor's uncle, Union Brigadier General Joseph P. Taylor. And, of course, Dick Taylor's sister had been Jefferson Davis' first wife. In addition, Kentucky Senator John J. Crittenden was also a cousin of the late President Taylor, and had two sons attain brigadier generalcies, Thomas L. Crittenden and George B. Crittenden, respectively a Yank and a Reb.

"... It Seemed Necessary"

Union Colonel Clinton Bowen Fisk was a deeply religious man. When he was given command of the Unionist 33rd Missouri Volunteers in September of 1862 he made an agreement with his men. It was quite simple; he would do all the swearing in the regiment, on such occasions that it seemed necessary to take the Lord's name in vain.

The arrangement worked well, and the colonel was several times known to have uttered extraordinary oaths and profanities in desperate or trying moments. Then, one evening in February of 1863, while camped at Helena, Arkansas, Fisk, by then a brigadier general, heard the most fearsome oaths emanating from the lines of his old regiment. He strolled over to discover one of his teamster's "cussin'" up a storm as he tried to encourage some mules to extract a forage wagon from the mud in which it had become mired.

Knowing the man well, Fisk asked, "John, did I not just now hear someone swearing most terribly ... ?"

"I think you did, General."

"Do you know who it was?"

"Yes, sir, it was me, General."

"Do you not remember the covenant entered into ... that I should do all the swearing for our old regiment?"

"To be sure I do General," came the reply, "but then you were not here to do it, *and it had to be done right off!*"

Source:
Edward P. Smith, *Incidents of the United States Christian Commission* (Philadelphia, 1869).

So Robert E. Lee appears to have been linked by ties of blood or marriage to nearly a score of men who attained generalcies during the war, both sides taken together, as well as to the President of the Confederacy and one of the most prominent senators of the time.

PROFILE

Black Rebels: Men of Color in the Confederate Army

At the outbreak of the Civil War there were over 3.5 million black slaves in the Confederacy and Border States. Of these, approximately 550,000 were men of military age. In addition, there were some 130,000 free blacks in the Confederacy, of whom perhaps 20,000 were men of military age.

While most of the free blacks in the Confederacy, as in the North, were poor, some had attained a measure of success in society. Indeed, a handful were wealthy enough to themselves own slaves, some as a means of protecting their kinsfolk from slave stealers, and some because they had bought into the prevailing socio-economic system. The South was home to all of these people, free and slave. Though most disliked slavery, many were almost as ardent secessionists as their white neighbors, some because of their attachment to the system, and others because they were well aware Northerners were no more committed to an egalitarian society than Southerners. As a result, at the start of the Civil War numbers of blacks, both slave and free, volunteered for service in the Confederate armies.

Thus, in April of 1861 companies of free blacks volunteered for Confederate service at Nashville and Memphis. In Louisiana the turn-out was impressive, for the state, with its legal system rooted in the *Code Napoleón*, had a large, relatively prosperous, and active free black population with a military tradition reaching back into the eighteenth century: A "Battalion of Free Men of Color" had served with Andrew Jackson at the Battle of New Orleans in 1814. At the onset of the Civil War the free black citizens of New Orleans raised, organized, and equipped the Louisiana Native Guards. This regiment was accepted as part of the state militia and on 23 November 1861, it took part in a militia parade in the city, 1,400 strong, to a warm, friendly reception from the white populace. Blacks were also permitted to enroll in state militia units in Tennessee and Alabama, on the same terms of enlistment and pay as whites. But no black volunteer organizations were ever accepted into the "Provisional Army of the Confederate States." Despite this, state militia and volunteer units that included blacks remained active.

Perhaps the most interesting of these units was the Louisiana Native Guards. When, in April of 1862, Admiral David G. Farragut and the U.S. Navy undertook an attack on New Orleans, the local Confederate military authorities failed to call the regiment to active duty, and, indeed, even failed to order it withdrawn from the city. As a result, soon after the city fell to the Union, the regiment reorganized under Federal auspices, and eventually became the first black regiment accepted into the United States Army. But the story of black troops in the Confederate Army does not end there.

Many individual black men fought for the South. When some Southern militia regiments marched off to war in 1861 the white "gentlemen privates" were accompanied by their slave body servants, men who had in many cases been the companions of their masters since childhood. These men often wore the same uniforms as their masters; The 3rd Alabama went to war with about a thousand white rank and file, plus "several hundred" black servants. The bonds of loyalty —and sometimes friendship— forged over a lifetime were strong, and stronger still those of blood which often linked master and slave. As a result, it was not unknown for the black orderlies of Confederate officers to engage in combat. In addition, slaves sometimes took up arms to defend popu-

Blacks in the South, 1860

	Total Population	BLACK POPULATION			
		Total	*Percent**	*Free*	*Slave*
Alabama	964,041	437,770	45.4	2,690	435,080
Arkansas	434,402	111,259	25.6	144	111,115
Florida	140,423	62,677	44.6	932	61,745
Georgia	1,057,248	465,698	44.0	3,500	462,198
Louisiana	707,829	350,337	49.5	18,611	331,726
Mississippi	791,303	437,404	55.3	773	436,631
North Carolina	991,464	361,522	36.5	30,463	331,059
South Carolina	703,620	412,320	58.6	9,914	402,406
Tennessee	1,109,741	283,019	25.5	7,300	275,719
Texas	603,812	182,921	30.3	355	182,566
Virginia	1,596,206	548,907	34.4	58,042	490,865
TOTAL —>	9,100,089	3,653,834	40.0	132,724	3,521,110

* Of total state population, white and black. In no seceding state was the proportion of blacks less than 25.5%, nor was it greater than that in any loyal state. The proportions of blacks, free or slave, in the three principal loyal slave states, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, were 24.9% (of whom 49.1% were free), 20.4% (4.5% free), and 10.0% (3.0% free).



Library of Congress

"Storming Fort Wagner"

Union troops of the 54th Mass. (colored) Rgt. The role of the Confederate colored troops is less well known.

lar masters from the depredations of Union troops or Confederate deserters. As one slave put it, "We would rather fight for our own white folks than for strangers." In the decades after the war these men often received pensions from some erstwhile Confederate States, such as Mississippi, and were usually welcome at meetings of the United Confederate Veterans: William Mack Lee, who had been Robert E. Lee's personal body servant throughout the war, was a fixture at Confederate reunions until his death in the 1930s.

More formal service by black men could also be found. Several states permitted blacks to serve in the militia and home guard units through to the end of the war. Many of these men saw active service against deserters, draft dodgers, and Union raiders. Alabama recruited blacks to help man the coast defenses of Mobile Bay, and they were still there when Farragut steamed into the bay in mid-1864. Blacks even served formally in the Provisional Army of the Confederate States, under an Act of Congress of 1862 which permitted their enlistment as field musicians on essentially the same terms as whites. This was essentially a matter of making a virtue of a necessity, since many regiments already had black musicians. For example, the 18th Virginia mustered into Confederate service in the spring of 1861 with a black drummer, Old Dick, a freeman who had served in the Mexican War as a field musician in South Carolina's famed Palmetto Regiment. When the Civil War broke out Old Dick enlisted in the 18th Virginia. At First Bull Run Old Dick picked up a musket, joined the firing line, and was credited with the capture of several Union prisoners, including Col. Alfred M. Wood of the 14th New York Militia (Wood was later mayor of Brooklyn, the 14th's native city). Dick served with his regiment for some time. Though apparently well-regarded by his comrades in arms, away from his regiment he was subject to the normal abuses which were inflicted upon blacks, and was once even arrested for being armed.

Similarly, there was Peter Vertrees, a Kentuckian of about 21 in 1861. Vetrees served throughout the war in the 6th Kentucky Infantry as cook and bodyguard to his half-uncle, John Luther Vertrees, being several times engaged in combat at his side. The 6th Louisiana Cavalry, recruited in late 1862 appears to have had at least eight free men of color in the ranks, serving as combatants, and there were also black men in the 8th and 29th Louisiana Infantry, and the 34th Texas Cavalry as well, and in many other

regiments; An unknown number of black troops took part in "Pickett's Charge" at Gettysburg, one of whom was killed carrying a battle flag, while others ended up among the prisoners taken by defending Union forces.

Of course service by individuals was different from the mass recruiting of blacks for combat. The idea of large scale enlistment of blacks appears to have first been aired in Alabama, where free blacks had an unusually good existence due to an old treaty with France. A few newspapers were the first to raise the question publicly, amid considerable furor. By mid-1863, with the war growing longer and casualties mounting, the notion grew more popular. Several people began to openly ask that more systematic use be made the pool of military aged male slaves, possibly as labor troops, to relieve white manpower for combat. The idea was taken up in a couple of state legislatures, and in January of 1864 Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne considered that it had merit. Indeed, so enthusiastic was he about it that he expressed a willingness to raise, train, and command a division of blacks himself, a sentiment which appears to have been shared by many of the officers in his division. But the implications of using slaves for military duties were too complex: After all, the principal Southern war aim was the protection of property in slaves, and the conscription of slaves would clearly run counter to that objective. In the end, Cleburne's enthusiasm for the proposal probably prevented his promotion to lieutenant general, a post for which he was highly qualified.

Nevertheless, the idea did not lay dormant long. As the manpower crunch became increasingly desperate, the Confederacy began to look to its black population. Early in 1864 the Confederate Congress enacted a law which authorized the compensated conscription of blacks, both free and of slave, as labor troops. Later that year, a conference of governors studied the question and made a number of recommendations, including the use of black troops in combat units. Several military leaders, Robert E. Lee, among them, expressed support for their proposals. Meanwhile the Confederate government was moving cautiously in the same direction. That November, even as the Confederate Congress strengthened the black labor conscription bill, Jefferson Davis proposed that the Confederacy purchase 40,000 slaves for service as laborers, with the promise of freedom at the end of the war. By then, many other Confederate political leaders had begun to come around to the idea of arming blacks for combat, despite the implications such a move would have on Southern society even if the Confederacy achieved its independence.

The South's enlistment of black troops caused little concern in the North. Indeed, Lincoln appears to have been amused by the measure.

Early in 1865 the manpower situation of the Confederacy had become desperate. That February a bill to enlist blacks as soldiers was defeated in the Confederate Congress, despite strong sentiment from the ranks: Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon, of the II Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, hardly a champion of racial equality, observed that his men were "decidedly in favor of the voluntary enlistment of negroes." The proponents of enlisting black troops tried again the following month with the backing of Robert E. Lee, who, however, observed that the men so recruited ought to be given their freedom. And on 13 March 1865 the Confederate Congress authorized President Davis to enlist as many as 300,000 slaves, some 60% of the pre-war military aged black male slave population, with the permission of their owners if possible, but by conscription if necessary.

Recruiting of black troops began almost immediately. Two battalions of four companies each were authorized to be raised in Virginia, another in South Carolina, and separate companies in Florida and Alabama. The first two companies of black troops were mustered into the Confederate Army at Richmond on 23 March 1865, within ten days of the act. Although the numbers were small, the two companies totaling less than 100 men together, it seemed a promising beginning.

The South's enlistment of black troops caused little concern in the North. Indeed, Lincoln appears to have been amused by the measure. On 26 March 1865, Lincoln —who had just received word that the Confederacy had enlisted its first black troops— was reviewing elements of the Army of the James when a black division marched by "well-aligned and keeping good step to the music." The President turned to one of his aides and remarked "I wonder how Jeff Davis would like to have such colored troops in his army?"

The principal service the new black units rendered to the "Cause" was a public display of their drilling prowess in Capitol Square. Many of the onlookers cheered and the Richmond Dispatch wrote that the black men had drilled with "aptness and proficiency." But there still remained those who opposed the idea. For if many in the crowd of onlookers cheered, others jeered at the black soldiers in Confederate gray, who were splattered with mud by some citizens, as well as by Unionist sympathizing fellow-blacks.

A little more than a week later the Army of Northern Virginia evacuated the city. Although in the end the Confederacy had come around to recruiting black men, the measure was far too late to be of help in averting defeat, and was, indeed, an admission of defeat. ■

Ron Moore

HISTORICAL PAINTINGS AND SCULPTURE



Gary Canada — Co. A, 19th Texas Volunteer Infantry

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North & South INTERVIEW with Shelby Foote



Some weeks before we went to press, Ed Frank, one of our Associate Editors, interviewed noted historian and literary figure Shelby Foote at his Memphis home.

Frank: First of all I'd like to thank you for giving the readers of *North & South* this opportunity to share your views.

Foote: You are most welcome.

Frank: Let's start with a big one. What caused the war?

Foote: The best definition that I ever heard of the war was given by Robert Toombs. He said "I consider it a conflict between two forms of society."

Frank: By which I guess he meant two socioeconomic systems with very different bases. Is it accurate to say, or to what degree is it accurate to say, that slavery caused the war?

Foote: It's accurate to a degree. But that way overstates the attitude of many who fought in the war. I firmly believe, in fact I know from reading their letters, that the huge majority of the Union army soldiers didn't give a damn about slavery, or anything concerning slavery. And similarly on the southern side, I don't believe there were many southern soldiers who thought they were fighting for slavery. So the whole slavery issue is not to be underestimated, but it ought not to be overestimated either.

Frank: I believe Professor McPherson has recently written a book based on soldiers' letters, both north and south, and concluded that very few seemed to think the war had much to do with slavery. But let's switch gears a little bit. Can you give us some insight into how the Confederacy might have won?

Foote: I do not believe there was any chance whatever for the South to win that war. Any chance whatever. The one chance, which was no chance, was if England had come in on the side of the Confederacy, in the way the French came in on the American side in the Revolutionary War. But anyone who knows anything about the English knows they don't go around pulling anyone's chestnuts out of the fire. Even more important, they could look back to the War of 1812 when the British merchant marine came close to being wiped off the sea. If the British had entered the war on the Confederate side, northern privateers would have done away with British shipping.

Frank: That's a very good point, considering the damage that the southern naval forces were able to do to the United States merchant fleet.

Foote: Which was nothing compared to what United States ships would have been able to do to the British.

Frank: Obviously the Southern leadership believed at the beginning of the war that they controlled a crucial commodity in terms of world trade, cotton. Is there anything that they could have done with that commodity that might have led to a better result?

Foote: Well, they looked back again to the War of 1812 when the tobacco embargo was enormously effective, and they thought they had every reason to believe that a cotton embargo would have an even greater effect. It didn't. For a number of reasons. One was there'd been a tremendous cotton crop the year before, so that the mills over there (in Europe) were pretty well stocked with cotton. Another was that by the time cotton was begin-

ning to get scarce, Lincoln had issued the Emancipation Proclamation, which gave the workers in Manchester and other places a feeling that they were involved in a great crusade.

Frank: So you don't believe there was a chance, perhaps through a wiser or a better strategy ?

Foote: It's very tempting to point to various times during the war when things seemed to tremble in the balance. But any notion of that is way off . I don't care what victories were won by the South, it would not have changed the outcome of the war. The reason I think that so much, is that the North was able to fight the war with one arm tied behind its back.

Frank: What then do you consider the chief weakness of the Confederate state? Are you suggesting that underlying economic reasons were the cause of its defeat?

Foote: It's not only that. The men who attempted to lead the south attempted to launch a conservative revolution. Which is a spooky kind of thing. It's not unknown, but it's very hard to do. Particularly with regard to the attitude of the rest of the world. You mentioned earlier the question of slavery bringing on the war. I think that is tremendously overrated. But once Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation that really did mean that any pro-Southern interference would have been identified as a defense of slavery, and such a position would have been indefensible in most parts of the world. The Russians freed the serfs the year our war began. So slavery was going fast. That is another indication to me that slavery would have disappeared from the South before too long. Another fifty years I'd give it if I had to put a figure on it, probably not even that long. Many people in the south in responsible positions knew that the maintenance of slavery was impossible in the modern world. In spite of all the talk of the southern planters, I'm pretty sure that they would have had to give it up.

Frank: Eventually it would have been realized that the profits of the system were restricted to a relatively few members of the society.

Foote: Yes, and not only that. The slaves were in competition with the working men of the South. There were a lot of factors at work.

Frank: Some recent scholars have argued that Confederate nationalism, such as it was, was shallow. Do you buy that?

Foote: Yes, I think there's some truth in that. One group of people made the argument that to allow the South to win the war was to invite or encourage the potential for the Union to split up into various countries and be balkanized. But I don't like "what ifs" or "might have beens". To use those terms once you start, where do you stop? I don't think there's any profit in it.

Frank: Then this might not be a good question to ask. But do you think that if Nathan Bedford Forrest had been greater responsibility earlier, it could have made a difference?

Foote: All that is certain about Forrest is that he measured up to the tasks that he was given. I'm a great admirer of Forrest. But I have some doubts about him as even a corps commander. I don't think he had the temperament to put up with the foolishness going on among the leadership, and I'm not too sure how those high ranking men serving under him would have reacted to his strict methods of enforcing discipline.

Frank: I know that you are an admirer of Jefferson Davis. Can you imagine some other politician of the south serving in the role of President?

Foote: I can't imagine anyone else doing a better job than Davis did. I can imagine *Davis* doing a better job than Davis did! (laughter) But I can't imagine anybody doing a better job. Incidentally, I'm backed up in my belief, by Robert E. Lee, who said that he did not know of anyone else who could have done a better job, and he did not know of anyone who could have done as good a job."

Frank: That's a pretty good quote. How realistic is the concept of a Confederate emancipation of the slaves? Could it have been forced through? Could it have had an influence on the outcome of the war?

Foote: It certainly could have if it had been possible, but it was scarcely possible. In fact, when Cleburne made his proposal (to that effect) it was hushed up as quickly as possible, lest the whole Confederacy go up in flames of resentment. I don't think it would have been possible to do it in the heat of the situation.

"I have some doubts about Forrest even as a corps commander."

Frank: The Confederacy obviously suffered considerable social strain during the war, partly tied in with the blockade. Do you find the Union blockade of the South to be a decisive factor?

"I can imagine *Davis* doing a better job than Davis did."

Foote: Very much so, and in ways which are not commonly thought of. The South did not suffer in any battle for a lack of munitions or equipment for war. But there were other sufferings, which had a huge effect on everyone, both soldiers and especially those back home. When they took the shoes off dead Northern soldiers that isn't all they were looking for. They were also looking for what they called housewives. That was a mending kit northern soldiers had with needles and thread. The shortage of needles was a severe thing in the South. There was also a shortage of nails. Houses all over the South were falling to pieces because they didn't have any nails. Many such things added to the discomfort and denial that people suffered in the South during the war.

Frank: Do you think the Southerners from Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee on down had a fixation with the Virginia theatre?

Foote: Yes I do, and I think that fixation has continued right on to the present day. There are a lot of things which are misconceived about the war, by people who leave the West out of their calculations. The best example I know of is the kind of quite serious, quite good historians, who conceive of Lee's Gettysburg Campaign as just a snatched out of the air conception, "we'll go up north and win the war. " Lee went up into Pennsylvania in an attempt to threaten Washington, and force Lincoln into recalling Grant from Vicksburg, far fetched though that is. But that is what happened. And until we understand how these theatres linked up with each other, we cannot understand the war. Specifically on that, when Grant crossed the river (the Mississippi) that May Day and was about to lay Vicksburg under siege, the people in Richmond knew exactly how grievous that danger was. Especially Davis, Post Master General Reagan, and some others. And so they got in touch with Lee and asked him pointedly if he would be willing to go out there and take command and defeat Grant. Lee said he didn't know the country out there, didn't know the various commanders out there, and he thought the people who did should be left to run it. So then they said, in that case would he be willing to detach Longstreet's corps to go out there and help stop this thing? And Lee said, if it comes down to that, if you take Longstreet's corps away from me, it means the loss of Virginia. So you have to choose between Virginia and the Mississippi River. Anyone who knows anything about Lee knows what side of that he came down on. So they gave up that notion, and said "Quite frankly, general, what then can we do?" And Lee said, "I could invade the north and threaten Washington." He based that on what had happened against McClellan, when Stonewall Jackson in his Valley campaign seemed to threaten Washington and Lincoln withheld troops from McClellan and stalled McClellan. Lee thought there might be a repetition of that. Lee was wrong about that and he was even wronger in something else he said. He said also that this was May, and that by June the weather itself will have obliged Grant to withdraw. That shows two things. One he doesn't know Grant. And second he doesn't know the tenacity of the northern soldier.

Frank: He did, however, know the climate down the Mississippi, from his service there.

Foote: Right. I've often wondered about those northern soldiers in those wool clothes in Mississippi in July and August. Even if I didn't have to shoot and be shot at, I would have wanted to get out of those wool clothes.

"... a Virginia fixation?"

Frank: You have been quoted previously as naming the two natural geniuses of the war as Nathan Bedford Forrest and Abraham Lincoln. Yet I also believe you do not rate Lincoln's geostrategic ability very highly. Would you elaborate on this?

Foote: I think that he learned—in the course of wearing out five or six generals in command of the army of the Potomac—that the thing to do was to find the right man and let him alone, which is exactly what he did with Grant. This business about geniuses had better be understood. I do not mean by that, that Forrest was as great a general as Lee, or Sherman for that matter. I mean to say that he had all the qualities of genius. His ability on the field of battle to read an opponent's mind, to view a piece of ground the way that he did, his insight into the psychological moment to go over to the offensive. That kind of thing was sheer genius. Of course, with Lincoln there's no doubt. Lincoln's genius was political, but it was also other things. He knew exactly what buttons to push at certain times, and he did it. He learned in a very skillful way that amounts in my mind to genius.

Frank: He was a master of propaganda, a master of public relations, a master of rhetoric.

Foote: He was all those things. And yet he could pose as simple, good, honest Abe Lincoln. He managed all those things at the same time. He could throw people in jail freely, and be declared the Great Emancipator. He was a true genius, and I absolutely agree with the general assessment of Lincoln as our greatest President, I do think that's the absolute truth. People talk about Clinton squirming this way and squirming that. The two greatest Presidents we've had, so far as I know, are Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt. And they could give you their solemn word on

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

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Wednesday and break it on Thursday. It was characteristic of them to handle a difficult situation that way. Lincoln would absolutely give you an assurance, "you have my word," and he would break it because he'd perceive two days after giving it that breaking it would be better for the Union. Davis on the other hand, if he gave his word, not even the fall of the Confederacy would make him break it. In other words, Lincoln did not labor under the handicap of being a gentleman. (laughter) That had absolutely nothing to do with his calculations.

Frank: Nicely put. In your opinion did States Rights die in 1865?

Foote: By no means. They still have some pretty solid rights. Though they have been reduced enormously, especially the requirements for voting, and such things as the legislators electing Senators. Many, many things have eroded what we call States Rights. But as anybody who tries to deal with the government knows, States do have rights.

Frank: You mentioned in an earlier conversation the Harvard and Yale sculling crews, and that no member of either team volunteered for service. It puts me in mind of the saying that it was rich man's war and a poor man's fight. Do you think that's a fair assessment of both sides?

Foote: I think it's a *fairer* assessment of the northern side, where you could pay three hundred dollars to stay out. On the southern side the women wouldn't let you stay out. In the North there was no stigma attached to refusing service or buying your way out. Take all the big operators after the war. Doesn't matter which ones you name. Those big men, not a one of them even as a young man was in the war.

The thing about the war that grieves me, is that they had these various things like First Manassas and so on, and they were bloody and people got shot. Then came Shiloh. Two days of fighting. One hundred thousand men on the field, forty thousand each for Johnston and Grant, and another twenty thousand under Buell coming up. And the casualties were about twenty four thousand. By coincidence that's the same percentage of casualties as at Waterloo. And people were shocked. But I'm amazed that they then didn't say, wait a minute now fellahs. Those twenty four thousand casualties, north and south, there's something a bit unfair about the comparison I'm a fixing to make, because that's men on both sides. But those were American casualties, blue or gray. Whereas in all three of the previous wars, Revolutionary War, War of 1812, and the Mexican War, American casualties had been lower than those two days of casualties at Shiloh. So they should have said at that point, "My God, what have we done? Let's find some kind of a way to resolve this thing." Including giving up *anything*, instead of a slaughter which went on four years and cost well over a million casualties. But what it did was the exact opposite. It made each side more determined to continue this thing. And that's sad. That's very sad that they didn't at that point say "Hold up! Wait! Let's figure some other way to settle this thing."

"Lincoln did not labor under the handicap of being a gentleman."

Frank: Well, of course, as the war went on, individuals did make the decision to stay out of the war, by deserting.

Foote: They did indeed. I read that desertions on both sides, and towards the end especially on the southern side, were in the hundreds of thousands.

Frank: Do you attach any moral opprobrium to a deserter in 1864?

Foote: I do, at least by contrast to men who stayed. But they were different from us. They were men who could be pointed at close on a mile of open ground, defended by other men with rifles and artillery, and told to go take that position, and they'd go. Some of that is not too hard to explain, once you make the transference back to the mid nineteenth century. It was a lot easier to go, than it was to say " I ain't going. "You just couldn't do that. That was the tradition of the time.

Frank: The social structure was entirely different.

Foote: Right. And those men all came from the same region. A company would be from a particular county in Mississippi, say, or Alabama, and they'd be going home after the war, and any man who ran under fire would be known for the rest of his life as somebody who ran under fire. That was an element too. I know that from having been in a National Guard battery of field artillery. We all grew up together and went to war together. And there was a strong inclination in that case especially after becoming close knit through training, to trust each other because you've been through a couple of things together. You know that you have to stand by the fellow alongside you.

Frank: The flip side, of course, was that a whole town might be depopulated of young men.

Foote: They were. Clarksville, Tennessee had that happen to it. They sent nine hundred and some men off, and at the time of Gettysburg I think there was sixty five, and when Gettysburg ended there was four or five. The whole town gone. It's a heartbreaking thing to look at the suffering, but it only adds to the

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



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glory. It's a fascinating thing, the whole Civil War. Any historical event has its highly romantic and lurid side to it, but the Civil War is loaded with it. It's a marvelous opportunity for a writer, because what you have to do is to hold it down or it would be unbelievable. Here you've got men firing eight inch guns at each other at a range of eight feet. It becomes almost impossible to believe, so you have to hold it down or it will be unbelievable. It's an interesting thing when you write about the Civil War; one of your biggest problems is what to leave out. You ask yourself, "How can I leave this out?" But you have to leave a lot of things out, or the thing will just become a grab bag. It's a fascinating business. Maybe I'm overstating this, and it's more due to the fact there's so much more material available on it. The Napoleonic wars are sort of a rival in that sense. But we did publish the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, one hundred and twenty eight volumes of the orders and reports, so that you can follow the war almost day to day.

Frank: Right. In fact it was one of the first wars with a high percentage of literates participating.

Foote: Right.

Frank: So as I find out in my job practically day to day, there are still letters and diaries that surface. No sign of that ending.

Foote: What's more, after the war the men would talk about it. I grew up among veterans of the First World War. They would never talk about the war. I guess that trench warfare is not something you sit down and talk about. But the Confederate soldiers, boy, they were eager to talk about the war.

Frank: Bruce Catton made the same comment about talking to veterans in his town square.

Foote: Yes, he overstated that. I saw about two thousand veterans in my life. I was ten years old, and Bruce Catton wasn't any older. (Ed. He was actually 15 years older) And I didn't know what to ask those old men. I just saw them. I didn't get much out of seeing them. They'd mostly have been drummer boys. Finally they were reduced to talking to one another about it. And, you know, those veterans were funny. Even as very old men way up in their eighties, they had some of that quality which I think characterizes the Confederate soldier. I was told the story about something that happened at a ceremony attended mostly by ladies at an old soldiers' home. Two of the veterans were sitting against the wall on chairs. Two of the ladies stopped by them, and one of the men had lost his leg above the knee in the Civil War. And one of the women said to him, "Oh, my poor man! You've lost your leg." And he looked down, and he said "Damn it, so I have!" But that was the quality of the Confederate soldier, and the northern soldier had a lot of it too.

Frank: A few weeks ago a colleague, a German who teaches American literature in Germany, came through to attend a Civil War reenactment. I find it interesting that the Europeans now are beginning to draw on the Civil War.

Foote: They're not only drawing on it, they're reenacting it too. They have a particularly interesting problem in Germany, in England and elsewhere too. In Germany all the re-enactors want to be Confederates; probably because of the romantic thing of having lost, and also perhaps because of the handsome uniform. They solved the problem by saying in order to be a re-enactor you had to do two years as a federal! (prolonged laughter)

Frank: Which seems as good a place as any to wrap this interview up, again with our thanks for sharing your thoughts with us this way.

Foote: You are surely welcome, and I wish your new publication every success. ■

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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



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

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

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

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In Defense of Fighting Joe Hooker

by Stephen W. Sears

Major General Joseph Hooker gets a uniformly bad press from Civil War historians. "Fighting Joe" invariably lags toward the bottom of any ranking of commanders of the Army of the Potomac, clumped together with John Pope and Ambrose Burnside. . .

The old whispers that he was drunk at Chancellorsville, his one battle as army commander, are whispered anew. Alternatively, if it is allowed that in fact he was sober at Chancellorsville, his fault was going teetotal upon assuming his new responsibilities; better for the army had he downed a few whiskeys when the fighting began in the Virginia Wilderness. As T. Harry Williams puts it, "The sudden shutting off of his familiar stimulant was bad for Hooker. He depended on whiskey to brace his courage."

Waud's Lee at "Chancellorsville"

"Like a rabbit mesmerized by the gray fox, Hooker was frozen into immobility ...." But was he?

But the historians' primary charge against Joe Hooker is that, drunk or sober, when he was confronted by Robert E. Lee at Chancellorsville, he lost his nerve and thereby lost the battle. James McPherson describes the scene metaphorically: "Like a rabbit mesmerized by the gray fox, Hooker was frozen into immobility ...." Authorities point to firm documentation for their case—an admission of his loss of nerve by Hooker himself. In their acclaimed studies, Shelby Foote, Bruce Catton, and Kenneth P. Williams all quote the general's confession. Hooker's biographer Walter Hebert adopts the confession as a chapter title—"Hooker Loses Confidence in Hooker." A profile of Hooker in *American Heritage* trumpets, "He was close to winning the Civil War when he suffered an almost incredible failure of nerve." In final sanctification, Hooker's words are given voice in Ken Burns's 1990 television epic, "The Civil War."

Is it any wonder, then, that Fighting Joe Hooker's military reputation has fallen into low repute? What could be worse than an army commander losing his nerve in the midst of a battle? In fact, there is something worse—that general confessing his failing. For the historian seeking to document how the Union lost the Battle of Chancellorsville, here is the clear and simple answer, in the clear and simple words of the commanding general himself. And so in the books and the articles and the biographical studies—and on television—Joe Hooker has become fixed forever, as if in amber, as the general who lost his nerve.

"A day of reckoning however is close at hand, and that is all that I want."

It was not always thus. The revelation of Hooker's confession came nearly half a century after the occasion for it, May 1863, and not all that many of his wartime comrades were still alive then to hear of it. Joe Hooker was always tremendously popular with his men—a popularity at least the equal of McClellan's—and he was well known and admired as the general who fed his troops just as well as he led them. When he assumed command of the Army of the Potomac in January 1863, Hooker was regarded, and deservedly, as the fightingest general in that army. On the Peninsula, in the Seven Days, at Second Bull Run and Antietam and Fredericksburg, he had proved to be a leader who showed no fear of going in with his men (he was wounded at Antietam), and revealed no lack of decision in the heat of the fighting. Nor did the Chancellorsville defeat drive Hooker off the Civil War stage. In the Chattanooga campaign that fall he seized Lookout Mountain in spectacular fashion, and on the road to Atlanta the following spring his Twentieth Corps did more hard fighting for Sherman than any other outfit.

Hooker remained popular and admired and respected after the war. Although crippled by strokes suffered in 1865 and 1867, he was active in veterans' affairs and visited the old battlefields and closely followed the early efforts at compiling histories of the war. He died, just shy of his sixty-fifth birthday, in 1879. A quarter century later, on Boston's Beacon Hill, an equestrian statue of Joseph Hooker, native son of Massachusetts, was unveiled with appropriate ceremony. Naysayers did not interrupt the proceedings.

Theodore A. Dodge, a fledgling historian of the war, was made uncomfortably aware of the admiration in which Hooker was held after he delivered a lecture on the Battle of Chancellorsville to a Boston audience in 1885. On that occasion, Dodge found not a few faults with Hooker's generalship at Chancellorsville—although he did not accuse him of drunkenness or of losing his nerve. Not long afterward, at a reunion of veterans of the Third Corps, Hooker's old outfit, Dodge found himself the object—indeed the victim—of an angry resolution: "Loyalty to the memory of our beloved commander, Major-Gen. Joseph Hooker, makes it a duty, on this occasion, to protest against unjust and uncalled-for criticisms on his military record as commander of the Army of the Potomac." In the words of poor Dodge, who was in attendance, "the bulk of the time devoted to talking on this occasion was used in denunciation of the wretch, in other words, myself," who had had the temerity to find fault with Fighting Joe.

This is not to say that military historians of the late nineteenth century tip-toed around the subject of Chancellorsville. Theodore Dodge's attack was the sharpest delivered against Hooker, but certainly it was not the only one. After all, there was no gainsaying that he had been soundly defeated, despite having a two-to-one manpower edge over Lee, and that Jackson's surprise attack—Stonewall's last march—had victimized him in dramatic fashion. As general commanding, the responsibility for the defeat was undeniably his. Therefore, undeniably, Hooker had been outgeneraled by Lee—in which category, of course, Hooker had plenty of company. Chancellorsville was General Lee's fifth campaign in less than a year, a brief span indeed to have taken the measure of four Union army commanders.

Although not recognized at the time—and not recognized by latter-day historians, either—Joe Hooker managed to have his say in the nineteenth-century debate over his generalship at Chancellorsville. He did so in an indirect way. Hooker wrote little after the war—there was no memoir, for example—and not a great deal during the war. Although he claimed that his report on Antietam (as printed in the *Official Records*) was written within two months of the battle, it was in fact only written fifteen years later. He filed no reports for Second Bull Run or Fredricksburg—and none for Chancellorsville. As to Chancellorsville, he liked to point out that his extended testimony before the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, in 1865, was to all intents and purposes his official report of the battle. Since his testimony, in today's parlance, was a "prepared statement," 39 pages long, we can grant him his point.

Hooker opened his second Chancellorsville campaign in 1876 with a letter to a Pennsylvania professor named Samuel Penniman Bates, who the year before had published a history of the Battle of Gettysburg. He "rejoiced to learn," said Hooker, that Professor Bates was "at present engaged in writing a history of the campaign of Chancellorsville," and he felt "extremely anxious that its narrative should be made up *impartially* to all concerned *and truthfully* as it concerns history." At the time, the only published study of Chancellorsville was the view from the Confederate side, by Jedediah Hotchkiss

Henry W. Halleck

According to Hooker, neither the Army of the Potomac nor its commander expected justice at his hands.

and William Allan—a book that Hooker volunteered to correct in detail for Bates's benefit. The general explained that he had "some manuscripts in my possession which I should like to lay before you before your work is completed." These dealt in particular with "the part Gen. Howard and his command played in the battle...." As Professor Bates was soon to discover, mention of the name Oliver Otis Howard, who had commanded the Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville, invariably caused General Hooker to see red.

This letter was the first of fifty-six that Hooker wrote Bates over the course of the next three years, the last one written just three weeks before Hooker's death in 1879. Bates had responded eagerly to Hooker's overture, especially to his offer of documents. The *Official Records* volumes on Chancellorsville were a dozen years in the future, and so what the general was offering just then was a Civil War historian's dream come true. Having thus set the hook, the general reeled in his catch. He sent Bates long discourses defending his role in all the controverted points of the campaign. He traveled to the battlefield in company with him, a visit that Bates would later record for the readers of *Century* magazine's "Battles and Leaders" series. He read and carefully critiqued each of Bates's chapters as he finished them, making sure, among other things, that the professor was clear on Joe Hooker's acerbic views of such of his battlefield lieutenants as the Eleventh Corps' Otis Howard, the Sixth Corps' John Sedgwick, and the cavalry's George Stoneman.

While modern-day reviewers have characterized Bates's writing as turgid and discursive, his book is acknowledged to be "not uninformed." In point of fact, it offers the only clue we have to Joe Hooker's thinking and his decisions at several crucial points in the fighting. Hooker did not live to see the book into print—it was not published until 1882—but he seems to have been satisfied that his view of the Chancellorsville struggle would be represented. "So much *twaddle* has been written about this battle," he complained in one of his last letters to Bates, but he remained hopeful: "A day of reckoning however is close at hand, and that is all that I want." Perhaps at last Fighting Joe Hooker's day of reckoning is upon us, but the path from then to now has been long and very rocky.

What in due course would send Joe Hooker's military reputation plummeting was nothing more sinister than a footnote in John Bigelow, Jr.'s The Campaign of Chancellorsville. Bigelow (as it has come to be known) meets the description of a weighty tome. Published in a limited edition of 1,000 copies by Yale University Press in 1910, it is an oversized, imposing volume containing 528 pages, 47 maps and plans, and the draping of Authority. The footnote, giving Major E.P. Halstead as source, appears in Bigelow's concluding chapter titled "Comments," where he is describing what he terms "Hooker's irresolution in this campaign"; clearly Bigelow intended it to document that irresolution. The footnote relates an incident that took place "a couple of months" after Chancellorsville, during the march toward Gettysburg. The Army of the Potomac had just crossed the Potomac in pursuit of Lee, and army commander Hooker was riding with Abner Doubleday, who headed a division in the First Corps, when Doubleday turned to him and asked, "Hooker, what was the matter with you at Chancellorsville? Some say you were injured by a shell, and others that you were drunk; now tell us what it was." Hooker answered, frankly and good-naturedly: "Doubleday, I was not hurt by a shell, and I was not drunk. For once I lost confidence in Hooker, and that is all there is to it."

Since 1910, it is safe to say, virtually every author writing about Chancellorsville, or about Joe Hooker, or about the change of command in the Army of the Potomac just before Gettysburg, or indeed writing any general military account of the period, or any study of the Union high command, has quoted or paraphrased or cited this exchange. These authors all appear to have

done so without a second thought, so imposing is Bigelow's reputation.

Give it a second thought, however, and even on the face of it there is an odor to this incident. For example, Hooker is said to have replied that, no, he was not injured by a shell at Chancellorsville. Yet in fact he was quite seriously injured when a wooden pillar of the Chancellor house, against which he was leaning, was hit by a Confederate solid shot. In the weeks since the battle, he had often spoken of this injury as a factor in his defeat, and for him now to deny it ever happened is not credible. His confession is even less credible. Joe Hooker, it is true, was likely to say all manner of surprising and outrageous things—but never in disparagement of himself. Quite the contrary. He had made sure it was widely known in these weeks that it was his generals who had failed at Chancellorsville; he might have to accept the ultimate responsibility, but it was they who were really to blame for the lost campaign. For Joe Hooker to admit to a subordinate (and within hearing of that subordinate's aide hovering nearby) that he had lost his confidence, his nerve, in the midst of battle, is simply not believable.

Look closely at the retailer of this tale, E.P. Halstead, and it all quickly comes unraveled. Halstead had served on Doubleday's wartime staff, and in 1903—forty years after the alleged event—he included this conversation between Hooker and Doubleday in a letter describing the First Corps' role at Chancellorsville. Bigelow acquired the letter as research for his book. When the movements of Hooker's headquarters and of the First Corps' headquarters are tracked for this period, it is clear that they were dozens of miles apart, with never an opportunity for the two generals to meet like this. Indeed, they were never near enough to meet at any time on the march north from the Rappahannock and before Hooker left the army command. For good measure, the rest of Halstead's letter is a grossly inaccurate account of the First Corps' actions at Chancellorsville.

Halstead's tale is not all that uncommon for Civil War historiography of this period, the turn of the century—an elderly staff officer with at best a clouded recollection of some long-ago campfire speculation, or with at worst an urge to create a role for himself—in this case, a footnote—in the history of this war of the past. Of course the two principals were dead and unavailable to confirm or deny. Civil War bookshelves, alas, are crowded with memoirs and recollections of events that never happened, retailed by old Yanks and old Johnnies seeking a little sliver of notice in what had been for them the greatest experience of their lives.

With this slanderous cliché discounted, where does it leave us in evaluating Joe Hooker's generalship? It is useful to look first at what in the nineteenth century was termed the qualities for moral leadership. This was more than morality per se; it meant the whole of a man's char-



by
A.M. GAMBONE

HANCOCK AT GETTYSBURG

In the vast accumulation of written material about Gettysburg, Major General Winfield Scott Hancock has received repeated accolades for his battlefield performance. Indeed, many historians credit Hancock as being the Federal soldier most responsible for the Union victory. Yet none of these books offers a detailed study of what the general was doing on the battlefield. None follow his ubiquitous activities or analyze his critical, split-second, combat decisions.

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acter for leading in war. It needs to be understood, in this connection, that Joseph Hooker came into the Civil War, at least in the eyes of certain of his contemporaries, as not quite a gentleman. The antebellum army was a petty aristocracy, putting a high premium on social conformity, and with his rough edges Joe Hooker was no model of conformity.

His biographer explains that during his posting in California in the 1850's, "Idleness led Hooker along the usual path to the devil's workshop." He played cards for money, he drank, and he pursued female companionship in the manner of a middle-aged bachelor in the Victorian era—that is, he paid for his pleasure. It seems that the military were less tolerant of these habits than civilian society, and Hooker's raffish California reputation preceded him into the Civil War. General McClellan would write that in 1861 he gave a briefing on Hooker to Mr. Lincoln: "I told him that in the Mexican War Hooker was looked upon as a good soldier but an unreliable man, & that his course in California had been such as to forfeit the respect of his comrades—that he was then a common drunkard & gambler."

"Hooker drank very little—not more than the rest who were all abstemious, yet what little he drank made his cheek hot and red and his eye brighter. I can easily see how the stories of his drunkenness have grown ...."

It is true enough that Hooker enjoyed a game of cards played for money, but that he was a common drunkard is another matter. There is good evidence that the reputation of a drinker that attached to Joe Hooker was more perceived than real. John Hay, Lincoln's wartime secretary, made a perceptive comment on the subject. In his diary Hay described dining one evening in Washington with a group that included the general. "Hooker drank very little," he wrote, "not more than the rest who were all abstemious, yet what little he drank made his cheek hot and red & his eye brighter. I can easily see how the stories of his drunkenness have grown, if so little affects him as I have seen." This would explain the contradictions in the contemporary evidence—Hooker *appearing* to have drunk to excess when in reality he drank no more (and probably less) than the average general, and was in no way impaired in the process. It also belies the imputation, made first by the vindictive General Darius Couch, that Hooker was an alcoholic who found his courage in a bottle and lost it if he stopped drinking. There are too many adamant and wholly reliable eyewitnesses to Hooker's sobriety—among them General George Meade, artilleryman Charles Wainwright, and intelligence chief George Sharpe—for anyone today to believe otherwise. Joe Hooker did not abuse alcohol, nor was he dependent on it.

Nevertheless, the undercurrent of tales about Hooker's drinking, originating from his California days, persisted right through his war service, apparently unquenchable. Some who saw him lying comatose after his injury at Chancellorsville, for example, spread the gossip that he was dead drunk. After the battle, George Armstrong Custer made sure his old commander, General McClellan, knew what was behind the report of Hooker's wounding by a shell. "If anything," Custer wrote, "... prevented him from succeeding, it was a wound he received from a projectile which requires a cork to be drawn before it is serviceable." Congressional investigators could find no basis for such charges. The *New York Tribune* put its best correspondent, George Smalley, on the story. "I asked everybody likely to know," Smalley reported, "and not one witness could testify to having seen General Hooker the worse for whiskey." But the gossip was too deeply rooted to disappear.

Another dimension of the general's moral character acted on the gossips like pure catnip. On January 31, 1863, soon after Hooker took command of the Army of the Potomac, artillerist Charles Wainwright entered in his diary, "I am asked on all sides here if he drinks. Though thrown in very close contact with him through six months, I never saw him when I thought him the worse for liquor." Then he added, "Indeed, I should say that his failing was more in the way of women than whiskey." Blue-blooded Charles Francis Adams, Jr., grandson and great-grandson of presidents, is often quoted on this latter failing of Hooker's. During that winter of 1862-63, sniffed Captain Adams, "the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac was a place to which no self-respecting man liked to go, and no decent woman could go. It was a combination of bar-room and brothel." During this period in Washington, it was said, the general's carriage might be found of an evening drawn up outside one or another of the city's better-known brothels; indeed, a section of Washington's Second Ward thickly packed with brothels was known—and continued to be known for many years afterward—as Hooker's Division.

In contrast to the tales of Hooker's drunkenness, there seems to be little doubt that the general patronized prostitutes, although Adams's contention that Army of the Potomac headquarters was little better than a brothel must be taken at a large discount. At age forty-eight and unmarried when he took command of the army, Joe Hooker apparently followed the practice of many bachelors of elevated station in the Victorian age, and he made no particular secret of it. The one myth in this connection is that the slang term for a prostitute derived from his name. In fact "hooker," meaning prostitute, long predated the Civil War, originating probably from streetwalkers "hooking" or snaring their clients. This did not prevent insiders in Washington from winking and snickering at the nice conjunction between the general's name and the general's proclivity. The

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broadminded dismissed the matter with a shrug. Hooker's enemies regarded it as evidence of his moral unfitness for high command.

One other burden Joe Hooker brought with him from his days in California was a mutually embittering relationship with Henry W. Halleck. For the general-in-chief of all the North's armies and the general commanding the largest of those armies to be at loggerheads was an awkward situation, to say the least; certainly it was one more burden President Lincoln had to bear. Halleck was characteristically guarded on the subject, saying only that Hooker was aware "that I know some things about his character and conduct in California, and, fearing that I may use that information against him, he seeks to ward off its effect by making it appear that I am his personal enemy ...." Hooker, characteristically, was not at all guarded about their dispute. During their days together in California, he explained, Halleck joined a law firm specializing in land claims, and Hooker, trying to protect the interests of acquaintances, charged Halleck to his face with "schemes of avarice and plunder.... Indeed I indulged in still harsher language...." Whatever the truth of the matter—and Hooker's explanation is the more convincing of the two—it sounds like something Joe Hooker would say, and in a loud voice. He insisted Halleck carried a grudge against him right into the war. It was Halleck, he said, who had persuaded Lincoln to award command of the Army of the Potomac to Burnside in November 1862 rather than to him.

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When, two and a half months later, after the Fredericksburg disaster, Lincoln came to replace Burnside with Hooker, this time he took the decision alone, without consulting General Halleck; he recognized Halleck's predisposition. Hooker's sole condition for accepting the appointment was his insistence on an arm's-length relationship with the general-in-chief—neither the Army of the Potomac "nor its commander expected justice at his hands," Hooker told the president. On all substantive matters he would deal only with Lincoln, and so it was until the finish of the Chancellorsville campaign. Halleck complained that he was the last person in Washington to know what was going on with the Army of the Potomac.

Until Hooker retreated back across the Rappahannock, ending his Chancellorsville adventure, generally he was allowed to operate the Potomac army with a free hand. He could ignore the general-in-chief with impunity. Now, however, as Lee's army shifted northward and became an invading force, Mr. Lincoln began drawing in the reins on his army commander. The divide between Hooker and Halleck became a major factor in the growing crisis. "It was no use for me to make a request," Hooker said, "as that of itself would be sufficient cause for General Halleck to refuse it." The president sought to smooth the path between the two with a letter to Hooker marked "private." "If you and he would use the same frankness to one another, and to me, that I use to both of you," Lincoln wrote, "there would be no difficulty. I need and must have the professional skill of both, and yet these suspicions tend to deprive me of both.... Now, all I ask is that you will be in such mood that we can get into our action the best cordial judgment of yourself and General Halleck...."

It was to no avail, of course. Halleck, having regained the upper hand over his stubbornly independent subordinate, was not about to surrender it again. Neither he nor Hooker would blink, and in due course they clashed, disastrously for Hooker, over the garrison at Harper's Ferry. Hooker wanted the garrison for his army, Halleck refused him, Hooker filed his resignation in protest. It was accepted and Joe Hooker was gone—gone forever—from the army he had become so much a part of. Hooker noted bitterly that his successor, General Meade, was allowed to do as he wished with the Harper's Ferry garrison. In his valedictory to the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker leveled a broadside at Henry Halleck. "If the general-in-chief had been in the rebel interest," he testified, "it would have been impossible for him...to have added to the embarrassment he caused me from the moment I took command of the army of the Potomac to the time I surrendered it."

For historians persuaded by Bigelow's footnote that Joe Hooker had lost his nerve at Chancellorsville, it was but a short step to the conclusion that he welcomed the chance to relinquish army command in the face of the new test looming ahead. General Hooker, wrote T. Harry Williams, "was looking for an excuse to get rid of his command. He was afraid of Lee." But once the Bigelow footnote is deleted, as it were, the matter takes on a different cast.

It is widely acknowledged that Hooker's march north from the Rappahannock was carried out with considerable skill. It was Hooker who dispatched cavalry to the town of Gettysburg as the most likely point of concentration for the Confederates, and his moves shad-

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owing Lee seem to have been taken with considerable confidence. This in spite of the fact that he was in constant friction with the general-in-chief, and was the recipient of a warning from Mr. Lincoln: "I must tell you that I have some painful intimations that some of your corps and division commanders are not giving you their entire confidence." Indeed, it seems that the real purpose behind Hooker's resignation was merely to precipitate a showdown with Halleck. Joe Hooker's comment on the change of command, although written later, appears to be a true reflection of his feelings in that summer of 1863. The "wavering and vacillating" of some of his lieutenants did bother him, he admitted. "However," he wrote, "this would have been a source of no regret, could I have commanded, as I wished to, at Gettysburg, but the fates were against me."

To Joe Hooker's lasting credit, if he led the Potomac army to defeat at Chancellorsville, he left it strong enough to survive and win at Gettysburg.

In contrast to the McClellan era, Lincoln's relationship with Hooker as army commander had been comfortable and open. The president was remarkably candid with his general when appointing him to the command, and Hooker responded with full reports of his intentions and with details of his plans. He also respected, and acted on, the president's suggestions. Whatever Joe Hooker's failings—and Lincoln was very much aware of them—this man would fight. He might be rash, he might intrigue for promotion, but on his record he would fight. It will be remembered that the president had said of another general, by name U.S. Grant, under a cloud after Shiloh, "I can't spare this man; he fights."

At first, after Chancellorsville, Lincoln gave Hooker the benefit of the doubt. He was not disposed, he said, to throw away a gun just because it misfired once. In any case, it would look bad to the country if the administration continued to relieve generals after every battle. What finally changed the president's mind, as much as anything else, was the outspoken complaints against General Hooker by the Potomac army's high command. It did not sit well with these corps commanders when Hooker blamed some of their own—specifically Howard, Sedgwick, and Stoneman—for the Chancellorsville defeat. A generals' revolt had been a major factor in Burnside's overthrow; now the same fate befell Joe Hooker, ironically one of the originators of high-command discontent in this army.

When Lincoln warned Hooker about his dissident generals, he observed that the effect of such a revolt on the army would be "ruinous." With a showdown battle sure to be fought any day, somewhere in Maryland or Pennsylvania, it was vital that there be harmony among the generals who had to direct the fighting. The dissidents made it clear to Lincoln that Meade was their choice; Hooker had commended Meade as his best corps commander. With John Reynolds having taken himself out of contention for the high command, Meade's appointment was made without debate. Joe Hooker would have no second chance against Robert E. Lee; the fates, as he said, were against him.

Amidst all the controversy that has swirled about this larger-than-life figure, all the gossip and debate about his moral character, it is easy to overlook how well Hooker was prepared for army command when compared to most of his fellows. The primary training ground for the Civil War officer had been the Mexican War. Much has been said of Lee's scouting missions on the march to Mexico City, Jackson fighting his guns at Chapultepec, McClellan's bravery under fire, and other such exploits. Yet beyond the indelible experience of serving under enemy fire, the tactical lessons of Mexico were mostly those of the smoothbore era. The age of rifled armaments—Springfields and Enfields and Parrotts—ushered in by the Civil War was something new under the sun for the American soldier.

What could be gained from the war with Mexico, however, was the experience of military administration—literally how to run a command, and how to do it efficiently. In this Joe Hooker's Mexican War experience was unexcelled. He served as chief of staff to no fewer than five generals. None was a professional; each relied on Major Hooker to run his command for him. This involved, in addition, leading troops in combat often enough to earn him three brevets for gallantry. When Joe Hooker met Lincoln for the first time, after First Bull Run, he blurted out, "I was at Bull Run the other day, Mr. President, and it is no vanity in me to say that I am a damned sight better general than any you had on that field." He may have spoken brashly, but he had the credentials to back up his brashness. And he did back it up.

There is something refreshing about such candor, and indeed there is something refreshing about Joe Hooker. By all accounts, he was open and warm and disarmingly sincere in his personal relationships. "A gallant and chivalrous soldier," General Alpheus Williams said of him, "and most agreeable...." To be sure, Hooker talked far too much and too indiscreetly and with too much brag, but what he said, upon examination, often sounds suspiciously like truth. His boast to Mr. Lincoln that he was a damned sight better general than any the Union had at First Bull Run is an example. Look at some of the Union names on that battlefield—McDowell, Heintzelman, Keyes, Hunter—and one is inclined to agree. When he said that Ambrose Burnside had a brain the size of a hickory nut, he may not have been far off the mark. Hooker liked to boast, before Chancellorsville, that he had the finest army on the planet, and considering the sorry state of the army that he inherited from Burnside, and how he had restored it to life, there was truth there, too. In the midst of the Chancellorsville fight

he issued an address to his army, saying, "our enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defenses and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him." This would be much derided, yet at the time of its issue it was a perfectly accurate statement of the case—and, if the truth be acknowledged, "certain destruction" ought to have been Lee's fate.

Joe Hooker was outspoken enough to wear his ambition on his sleeve. He sincerely believed that he was a better general than George McClellan (and he was), and that his fighting record rated him the command in McClellan's place. He had no doubt at all that he was a better general than Ambrose Burnside (and without a doubt he was), and he unblushingly campaigned for Burnside's spot. The Army of the Potomac, rooted and grown to maturity in Washington, was the most politicized of Civil War armies, which fact Hooker understood perfectly; to get ahead in that army, one had to have friends in high places. It was necessary and vital that he work at that. General Halleck, head of the army, was his enemy and the roadblock to his advancement, but Hooker hoped to neutralize Halleck by cultivating members of Congress and the two Cabinet members he regarded as the most influential—Secretary of War Stanton and Secretary of the Treasury Chase. Others might call this intrigue; Hooker called it pragmatism.

"I was at Bull Run the other day, Mr. President, and it is no vanity in me to say that I am a damned sight better general than any you had on that field."

The one friend in high places who understood Hooker best was, of course, Abraham Lincoln. His famous letter of January 26, 1863, handed to Hooker along with his appointment as Army of the Potomac commander, weighed the general's assets and liabilities in blunt but kindly fashion. After fifteen months of frustration trying to reach and reason with General McClellan, Mr. Lincoln, commander-in- chief, was determined that this general understand exactly what was expected of him. The letter's candor also owed much to the Lincoln-Hooker arrangement to shunt Halleck to the sideline in the forthcoming campaign; if Hooker insisted on dealing only with the president, it was best that he be clear on where he stood with the president. Hooker calmly accepted Lincoln's criticism that "you have taken counsel of your ambition" in undercutting Burnside, "in which you did a great wrong to the country ...," for he believed the accusation was spread by Burnside himself as vengeance for losing the army command. Hooker was quoted as saying, "That is just such a letter as a father might write to his son," and it "ought to be printed in letters of gold." He was careful to preserve the letter, arranging for its publication in Professor Bates's book on Chancellorsville and in the *Official Records*.

Hooker took hold of the army command like he had been born to it, and Lincoln had every reason to be pleased with his new general. Hooker's talents as a military executive, talents honed in the Mexican War, seem to have come as a complete surprise to his contemporaries. In just two months he turned the Army of the Potomac around, to universal amazement. He cut the number of deserters on the rolls from more than 25,000

to less than 2,000. He introduced much-needed reforms in the daily running of the army, and saw to it that the men were well fed and well clad and well housed. This resulted in an enormous leap in morale. At the time of Hooker's appointment, Captain Henry Livermore Abbott, proper Bostonian, dismissed the new commander as "nothing more than a smart, driving, plucky Yankee, inordinately vain & ... entirely unscrupulous." Six weeks later Abbott was writing, "I must give Hooker the credit of saying that this step is the very best for the army that could be taken ...." The *New York Times* editorialized that the Army of the Potomac "is about as much Hookerized as it was at one time McClellanized."

These administrative changes and reforms were so solidly grounded that in the aftermath of the Chancellorsville defeat, in May 1863, there was nothing like the virtual collapse of the army that had followed Burnside's defeat at Fredericksburg the previous December. A Massachusetts soldier summed it up by insisting, "The morale of the Army of the Potomac was better in June than it had been in January," and he recalled "nothing of that spirit of insubordination and despondency ...." To Joe Hooker's lasting credit, if he led the Potomac army to defeat at Chancellorsville, he left it strong enough to survive and win at Gettysburg. In that sense he might be better remembered as "Administrative Joe" than "Fighting Joe."

A second aspect of Hooker's generalship—one largely unappreciated by historians—was his dedicated effort to finding a new way to fight once he was in command and got his army to the battlefield. Throughout his fighting record, from Williamsburg on the Peninsula

under McClellan to Fredericksburg under Burnside, Joe Hooker had been in the forefront of frontal attacks. At Williamsburg his division suffered almost 1,600 casualties in an unsupported frontal attack. In the Seven Days he defended against enemy frontal attacks. At Second Bull Run he led a frontal attack, on Pope's orders and under protest, and pronounced it "a useless slaughter." At Antietam he lost a third of his corps in a head-to-head slugging match with Stonewall Jackson. At Fredericksburg, in a fury at Burnside's tactics, he assaulted Marye's Heights, "lost as many men as my orders required me to lose," and suspended the attack. It was obvious that the rifled musket and the rifled cannon had made storming tactics tragically costly. There had to be, Joe Hooker thought, a better way.

The particular problem Hooker faced in the Chancellorsville campaign was to mount an aggressive offensive, yet not throw his army against an entrenched enemy as Burnside had done—and, in fact, against an enemy far better entrenched than it had been at Fredericksburg. All Hooker's planning, all his maneuvering at Chancellorsville was designed, first, to force Lee out of his entrenchments, and second, to press on Lee the choice of either attacking the Federals or giving up the Rappahannock line and falling back on Richmond. And after three days of brilliant maneuvering, Hooker achieved exactly that position.

Then the familiar story, with everything going sour for Fighting Joe. There was more than ample justification for each of the charges he leveled against his lieutenants. Howard, Sedgwick, and Stoneman in particular were dismal failures on this battlefield. There were flukish failures of communications. Hooker made important tactical errors. Yet in spite of all these various failings and missteps, the battle was very winnable for the Union during that furious Sunday morning of fighting on May 3—until the moment that General Hooker was hurled unconscious to the front porch floor of the Chancellor house from the blow of a Confederate solid shot from one of Porter Alexander's rifled pieces firing from Hazel Grove.

Without Hooker's loss-of-nerve confession to explain his Chancellorsville defeat, this battlefront injury assumes major importance. It was 9:00 a.m. when Hooker went down. For three hours that morning he had been managing the contest like the Fighting Joe of past battles—personally posting his infantry and his guns, rushing reinforcements to threatened points, riding his lines to encourage his troops. He was in his element. Whatever else had gone wrong, one thing had gone right and according to Hooker's original plan—it was the Confederates who were being forced to use storming tactics on this battlefield. The night before, after Jackson's flank attack on the Eleventh Corps, Gouverneur Warren was briefed by Hooker on how he planned to meet the enemy's renewed assault on May 3: "Genl. Hooker," Warren explained, "made his dispositions accordingly and intends to flank and destroy Jackson." That remained his aim—let the enemy fully commit his forces in attack, then counter with a flank assault using his reserves. On the porch of the Chancellor house Hooker was too far forward for safety—Alexander had learned from prisoners that the house was Hooker's headquarters, and took it under fire deliberately—but it offered a commanding view of the field, and Joe Hooker was always a general who led from the front.

The morning had been an unrelenting struggle of attack and counterattack, tilting first to the Confederates, then to the Federals. At 9 o'clock the tilt was Confederate, but to achieve that, Jeb Stuart—who had replaced the wounded Jackson in command of that wing



The Battle of Lookout Mountain November 24th 1863

of the army—had committed his last reserves. Hooker's reserves were still ample, and at the moment he was hit he was being handed a call for reinforcements to meet Stuart's charge. The solid shot hit the wooden porch pillar, split it lengthwise, and (in Hooker's words) hurled half of it "violently against me...which struck me in an erect position from my head to my feet." He lay unconscious for between thirty and forty minutes. At first it was assumed he had been killed. When he was found to be breathing, Dr. Jonathan Letterman, his medical director, expressed doubt that he would revive. When at last Hooker regained consciousness and tried to mount his horse to show himself and reassure the troops, he collapsed and vomited. In a daze, he was carried to the rear. "The blow which the General received seems to have knocked all the sense out of him," a staff man told his family. "For the remainder of the day he was wandering, and was unable to get any ideas into his head ...." General Abner Doubleday wrote that Hooker "suffered great pain and was in a comatose condition for most of the time. His mind was not clear, and they had to wake him up to communicate with him."

The solid shot hit the wooden porch pillar, split it lengthwise, and (in Hooker's words) hurled half of it "violently against me...which struck me in an erect position from my head to my feet." He lay unconscious for between thirty and forty minutes.

These are the classic symptoms of severe concussion. For the rest of the day the commanding general drifted in and out of awareness; he probably suffered periods of amnesia. The question here is why Darius Couch, the senior general on the field, did not immediately take the command. The answer lies in the absence of Dan Butterfield from field headquarters. Butterfield, Hooker's chief of staff, was directing the army's left wing around Fredericksburg. In his place temporarily on the other wing, with Hooker at the Chancellor house, was James Van Alen. Brigadier General Van Alen was a Sunday soldier, a wealthy New York political appointee of no particular skills whom Halleck had recently palmed off on Hooker's headquarters. Van Alan had no idea what to do in this crisis, and apparently no one told him. Dr. Letterman, who was authority for the fact that Hooker was incapable of command and ought to be replaced, seems to have been reluctant to take any action without a decisive chief of staff to lead the way. General Couch was eventually called to the scene, but by then Hooker had regained consciousness and, superficially at least, appeared to be uninjured, and (as Couch put it) "I went about my own business."

Hooker collapsed soon afterward, and it was at least half an hour before he was in a rational enough period to call Couch back again. In the more than an hour since Hooker was struck down, the battle reached its crisis and then slid rapidly into the Confederates' hands. In that time, every call to headquarters for reinforcements from Union commanders on the firing lines had been meet by silence. The high command was struck mute. Even now there might still have been a chance for victory—Reynolds's First Corps and Meade's Fifth had hardly been engaged all that morning—but it would not be risked. Meade pleaded the case, and Hooker refused him. He turned command over to Couch, with orders to pull back to a new line to protect the army's Rappahannock crossings. What little of his mental faculties Hooker could still collect were focused narrowly on one object—to save the army. His plan seemed a shambles. His reasoning was clouded. Over the next days his mind began to clear, but even then he could think of nothing more than inviting an attack by Lee against his fortified lines. Then, after yet another communications failure, Sedgwick and the Sixth Corps recrossed the Rappahannock prematurely, and Hooker was done. He recrossed the river with the rest of the army. Joe Hooker's grand campaign, begun with such high hopes, ended not with a bang but with a whimper.

It was less than two months later that Potomac army commander Hooker met the same fate as his four predecessors. The question in Washington now became what to do with him. In contrast to the earlier four, Mr. Lincoln was active in supporting a fighting role for Fighting Joe Hooker. "I have not thrown Gen. Hooker away," he told Meade, and attempted to promote a corps command for Hooker in the Army of the Potomac. Meade managed to evade this possibility. "It would be very difficult for Hooker to be quiet under me or anyone else," he remarked in a private letter, and there was truth to that. It is hard to imagine the irrepressible Joe Hooker meekly playing the subordinate in the army he once commanded.

The solution was found when it was decided to send reinforcements to Rosecrans in the western theater in the form of the Eleventh and Twelfth corps from the Army of the Potomac. These two corps had never been at home in the Potomac army—especially the Eleventh Corps, with unhappy experiences at both Chancellorsville and Gettysburg—and the army was glad to see them gone. And this offered the answer to the Joe Hooker problem—let him command the two orphaned corps.

When the command structure in the West was reshaped, Hooker found himself increasingly an outcast. Grant, put in overall command in the western theater, seemed to resent Fighting Joe being forced on him from Washington and hoped to be rid of him. General Grant, it was reported to Secretary Stanton, felt Hooker's "presence here is replete with both trouble and danger." Hooker's strong showing in taking Lookout Mountain during the Chattanooga campaign did not persuade Grant, who in his recollections was dismissive of Hooker's so-called "Battle Above the Clouds." "It is all

poetry," he said contemptuously. Hooker said defiantly, "I find I am regarded with a great deal of jealousy by those filling high places here," but he believed that his soldiership, as he called it, would carry him through: "I have never yet seen the time that there was no place for a man willing to fight."

In the spring of 1864, now under Sherman, Hooker marched on Atlanta in command of his two corps consolidated as the newly formed Twentieth Corps. He could take no comfort from having to report to William Tecumseh Sherman. Sherman, who had served with Hooker in the California days, wrote even before Chancellorsville: "I know Hooker well and tremble to think of his handling 100,000 men in the presence of Lee." Presumably Sherman thought Chancellorsville confirmed his prediction. Like Grant, he felt he had to tolerate Hooker because he was the president's choice. In any event, Hooker directed his corps effectively all during the advance to Atlanta's outskirts. Indeed, the Twentieth Corps did most of the fighting on this march and suffered by far the most casualties—over 5,000. These achievements only intensified Sherman's efforts to be rid of Fighting Joe.

His opportunity came suddenly in the battle for Atlanta. General James B. McPherson, commanding the Army of the Tennessee, was killed in action. Logic dictated that John A. Logan, who succeeded McPherson during the fighting as senior officer on the field, be named permanent commander of the Army of the Tennessee. Certainly Logan was qualified and had earned the position. Sherman would say that he rejected Logan as army commander because he was not a West Pointer, but there very likely was another motive in the choice he did make. In naming Oliver Otis Howard as head of the Army of the Tennessee, Sherman surely knew how Joe Hooker would react.

Of all the corps commanders under Sherman, Hooker had the most seniority and the most experience—experience in, among other things, commanding an army. He believed he was entitled to McPherson's command. To give it to Otis Howard, his former subordinate, the man he believed above all others was responsible for the Chancellorsville defeat, was an insult on Sherman's part, and a carefully calculated insult at that. Hooker's resignation was prompt. "Justice and self-respect alike require my removal from an army in which rank and service are ignored," he explained.

So ended Fighting Joe Hooker's service in the Civil War. How might he be summed up? Of two things we can be sure—he was not a drunk, and he never lost his nerve in battle. Once these canards are out of the way, it may be possible to paint him in more realistic colors. In that essential role of an officer—to take care of his men—he was paramount. No general on either side was better at that than Joe Hooker. No general in the Army of the Potomac had a better combat record. In every battle in which he was engaged—except one—his performance has to be rated at least "creditable" and at best "excellent." He was rough-edged and not much of a gentleman, and he talked too much and too loudly. He did not bother to disguise his ambition, and he did not suffer fools gladly. As to the battle for which he will always be remembered, Joe Hooker is entitled to be heard. "You may like to know my opinion of the battle of Chancellorsville," he wrote Professor Bates. "I won greater success on many fields in the war, but nowhere did I deserve it half so much...." Sitting in judgment after Chancellorsville, Mr. Lincoln said, "I have not thrown Gen. Hooker away." Nor should we. ■



Joe Hooker once more on top of the world: after his men had wrested Lookout Mountain from the Confederates.

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

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

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1. Which regiment had a live eagle as its mascot?
2. Which war time Governor was drowned in the Tennessee River when visiting troops?
3. Which Union colonel, whose brothers all fought for the Confederacy, was killed at the siege of Knoxville in 1863?
4. In which free State were attempts made to grow cotton during the Civil War?
5. Who is known to history as "The Butcher of Fredericksburg"?
6. Which Illinois Cavalry regiment served in the eastern theatre?
7. Which Union general's nephew was killed at Chancellorsville, fighting as a private in the ranks of the Confederates?

THE ANSWERS to questions 1-6 will be found on page 96. If you know the answer to question #7, send it in writing to the editorial address below. The author of the first correct answer opened will receive a free copy of The Official Records of the War of the Rebellion papers on CD. This prize is kindly donated by H-Bar Enterprises, whose advertisements appear elsewhere in this issue.

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N&S Document

Lafayette McLaws on Gettysburg

FROM TIME TO TIME *North & South* will publish original documents relating to the war. The following letter written by General Lafayette McLaws in 1895 was recently discovered at the Georgia Historical Society, and has not been seen before in print. Minor editorial changes have been made to punctuation and spelling to render it more readable; they make no material change to the meaning. McLaws' writing was notoriously difficult to read, and doubtful words have been placed in parentheses.

Lafayette McLaws, Major General, C.S.A.
Courtesy Eleanor S. Brockenbrough Library
The Museum of the Confederacy, Richmond, VA

Savannah, Georgia
July 13/95

B. F Johnson Publishing Co.,
Richmond, Virginia.

Your letter acknowledging mine duly received, and I thank you for your kind expressions towards myself. The *Story of the Confederate States* came to me some days after by Express.

I have not had time to make anything like a critical appreciation of the work of Mr. Derry —but have glanced over it, reading it here and there, finding errors which result from improper information about battles, which will exist until writers read and digest reports as printed in *Records of the Rebellion*.....

By mere chance I read in Derry's book, page 242, "Lee being informed of Sedgwick's advance towards Chancellorsville from Fredericksburg, sent Wilcox with his Brigade, who checked Sedgwick at Salem Church until McLaws and Anderson came up." The only truth in this statement being that *General Lee heard that Sedgwick was coming from Fredericksburg.*

The facts are as follows. The troops making the (charges) under Jackson on the right flank of the enemy, in which two of my Brigades took part, had just reached the road from Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville, clearing the way before them, when a Chaplain of one of the regiments of Barksdale's Brigade of my Division, which I had left at Marye's Heights, rode up to myself, he having mounted on a bareback horse with a blind bridle, it being a horse from a battery, and told me that Sedgwick was coming from our rear. General Lee just then appeared within a few yards of me, and I told the Chaplain to go and report the news to General Lee, which he did at once. General Lee called me, and asked if I had heard the report brought by the Chaplain. I told I had, and he then directed me to draw my division out from the line advancing and go back and meet Sedgwick. "Take Mahone's Brigade with you," he said, "and you will find Wilcox' Brigade on the road in your rear. Take him also." I proceeded at once to carry out the order, and as the Brigades were withdrawn from the

"I rode, as was my custom, along the whole front of my men, asking if they were ready for the fight, or if not was there anything I could do to make them confident of victory? "

woods they were marched towards Fredericksburg. Before leaving I asked General Lee for instructions. He replied, "You must act on your own judgment. My only order is, *don't let Sedgwick come here."* I replied that he could not unless he "ran over me." I galloped down the road and found Wilcox' Brigade across the road at Salem Church. I knew the ground and that it was a good position, and posted my line there, leaving Wilcox' Brigade across the main road, Wofford on his right and then Mahone and Semmes on his left, Kershaw's Brigade in rear close to Wilcox' Brigade The enemy could be plainly seen in the distance about a mile off, advancing in great force and rapidly, making a great noise. Before they came up I rode, as was my custom, along the whole front of my men, asking if they were ready for the fight, or if not was there anything I could do to make them confident of victory? When I came to General Semmes' Brigade, he replied to my inquiry, "I am not satisfied. I wish to be placed next to men of our Division, next to men I have seen tried "

I told him then to change with Mahone and touch Kershaw on his right. The change was rapidly made and in plain view of the enemy, now not over 500 yards distant. They had established heavy batteries, one of sixteen guns, which by their fire swept all my left and the ground in the rear. My artillery ammunition had been so far exhausted that there was none with which to reply to his (artillery, often heavy), and I had directed Captain Manly to take his battery and another and place them on the right of the main road, about 400 yards in rear of my line, and be ready for a close and deadly fight, for if my line was broken by the corning rush of the enemy I would reform in rear of his battery. The enemy was now nearly upon us and I took my place in rear of Wilcox' Brigade, with Wilcox by my side. Within a few minutes after, the enemy struck the Brigade of Wilcox along the main road and its immediate vicinity, and (- - -) gave way. Broke! Wilcox was talking to me at the time, and his face was away from his Brigade. I at once put my hand on him and said, "General, go to your men!" and he dashed away then. But Kennedy's SC regiment and Jarnes' SC battalion of Kershaw's Brigade immediately poured a destructive volley into the ranks of the enemy, which stopped their mad rush. Wilcox's men now in order, joining with Kershaw's, the enemy gave back from the road and turning to my right tried to force their way over Semmes. Then the struggle was terrific for awhile, which was shown after the repulse by finding the dead and wounded of fifteen different regiments in front of Semmes. So soon as the enemy ceased to press my line, I ordered an advance and the enemy gave way and was pursued until they got under cover of their numerous batteries, when my advance was brought back, and the line reformed and fortified to some extent along its first position. This was a very sharp and desperate and deadly fight against great odds. The stake played for was the Battle of Chancellorsville, which would have gone in favor of the federals, had Sedgwick been successful. Had not my Division stood like a rock, against enormous odds, Sedgwick's corps—and I think he had another division with him—would have marched on, and striking General Lee's flank and rear, would have necessitated the withdrawal of the Confederate forces opposed to Hooker, and then Hooker's forces not yet across the river, advancing in their turn, the result would have been disastrous.

You will perceive from foregoing that "Wilcox" did not check Sedgwick, nor would he have tried to do so with his Brigade, for it would have been annihilation. Anderson's Division was not present at Salem Church, but was brought from Chancellorsville the next day by General Lee, who had it marched around and (- - -) to Early, and late in the evening the force under myself advanced against the enemy from Salem Church and Early and Anderson from the direction of Fredericksburg. Sedgwick did not make much resistance to the combined advance, but crossed the river at Banks's Ford after dark. The evening was so far advanced that night came on before the

Lafayette McLaws' coconut cup.
Courtesy the Georgia Historical Society

movement could be carried to completion. Our troops did not like to risk the encounter of each other in the dark and the pursuit was not vigorous, as it would have been had the attack been made earlier in the day.

In reference to (the) Battle of Fredericksburg, I send you a copy of my account of it, read before the Georgia Historical Society and Confederate Historical Association. You will perceive from it that general McLaws' Division was there and that general McLaws was in command of the forces that quartered in the city, at Marye's Heights, and the hills around, a fact which Derry does not mention. General Long in his memoirs of General Lee makes the same omission, but the General was not there, nor in the vicinity, and got his information of that battle as he did that of most of the battles he describes, from hearsay. .

The Battle of Gettysburg has not as yet been analyzed to make the combination of movements comprehensible. The disjointed assaults which could not under any circumstances have produced favorable results, have not yet been explained. Why Ewell should have ordered his assault early on morning July 2, without having General Meade's forces on other parts of the battlefield engaged by any of our troops, so as to prevent the concentration of all his forces upon Ewell, has not been even commented on. And why Ewell was quiet when Longstreet's assault was made at the other end of Meade's line and stood in great need of a diversion in his favor is not explained. General Meade states that the assault on his left was so forcible that he thought all of Lee's army was there, and to resist this assault he brought all but one Brigade from his right. Where was Ewell then?

Why General Longstreet did not assault early on morning of 2 July when he could have occupied Round Top without opposition, is still an open question! If this had been done, Meade says he would have retreated to Pipe Creek. The way was open, and the obstacle was himself (Longstreet). Why Pickett was allowed to go forward, into the "jaws of death", with defeat plainly conspicuous, has not been commented on as it should be in history. I have read in Confederate Records of the war a printed letter from Colonel Walter Taylor, the war Adjutant general of General Lee, wherein he states that he, in person, carried to General Ewell an order from General Lee, on evening of July 1, to advance at once and take possession of Culp's Hill, which commanded Cemetery Ridge, but Ewell demurred from doing it, pleading that (Edward) Johnson's Division was not up and that his troops were much fatigued, and before the order could be repeated, it was too late.

(the next page of McLaws' letter is missing, and when he resumes he is talking about the fighting around Savannah.)

Commentary

McLaws is here commenting on Joseph Tyrone Derry's book, *Story of the Confederate States.* Derry's book was a children's book, "designed especially for the boys and girls of the South " Nevins, Robertson, and Wiley describe it in their Civil *War Books: A Critical Bibliography* as "neo-Confederate propaganda that is virtually worthless as history." McLaws' account of the clash at Salem Church exaggerates both his part in it and the dimensions of the struggle. The battle was pretty much conducted by Wilcox, and saw two Confederate Brigades attacked by two Union Brigades and perhaps elements of a third.

His comments on the Battle of Gettysburg are of more interest, first because McLaws made no report of the battle and second an example of criticism of Lee's generalship during the period when Lee was being deified. To say that Lee's direction of the battle was incomprehensible and "could not under any circumstances have produced favorable results" is pretty strong stuff at any time, and particularly so in the 1890s. Of course, McLaws is making classic use of hindsight. Had Lee known in advance how the battle would develop, he would not have made the decisions he did.

Lafayette McLaws' sword and scabbard, spurs, and percussion pistol.
Courtesy the Georgia Historical Society

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The Chattahoochee

JULY 5, 1864 found General William T. Sherman impatiently pressing his powerful armies southward toward the Chattahoochee River, the last natural barrier blocking his advance on Atlanta, *The Gate City of The South.* During the previous two months he had advanced almost ninety miles into enemy territory, using his superior manpower to flank his adversary, Joseph E. Johnston, out of one position after another. But he had failed to bring his elusive opponent to bay and force the decisive battle that would bring the campaign to a conclusion. He was therefore excited at the prospect of catching Johnston in the act of crossing such a broad and deep river as the Chattahoochee. Sherman expected no resistance as he approached the river and wrote:

"I knew that Johnston would not remain long on the west bank of the Chattahoochee, for I could easily practise on that ground to better advantage our former tactics of intrenching a moiety in his front, and with the rest of my army cross the river and threaten either his rear or the city of Atlanta itself."

BUT AS HIS FORCES NEARED THE RIVER, he was astounded to see not a retreating army desperately trying to escape across the bridges—but instead—the most formidable line of fortifications he had yet encountered. Sherman later wrote:

"I confess I had not learned beforehand of the existence of this strong place .....During the night Johnston drew back his army and trains inside the 'tête-du-pont' at the Chattahoochee, which proved one of the strongest pieces of field fortifications I ever saw."

The architect of the *"tête-du-pont"* to which Sherman referred was Brigadier General Francis Asbury Shoup, Chief of Artillery for the Confederate Army of Tennessee. His ingenious design for these fortifications was years ahead of its time and baffled his contemporaries and later day historians alike. There is rather convincing evidence moreover, that neither Confederate army commander Joseph E. Johnston nor corps commander John B. Hood fully appreciated Shoup's brilliant concept—with the result that the full potential of this innovative defensive system was never realized.

When the Civil War began in 1861, defensive tactics differed little from offensive tactics and consisted essentially of an unprotected, double-rank *Line of Battle* facing the enemy in the open field. But staggering casualties sustained early in the war caused such tactics to be discarded for the most practical of considerations—SURVIVAL! Defensive tactics soon embraced the concept of *digging in* for protection and by the summer of 1864, military engineers on both sides had developed a fairly uniform system of artillery forts or redoubts, connected by infantry trenches and screened in front by rifle pits

by William R. Scaife

River Line

An American Maginot

"The Battle of KennesawMountain"
Courtesy Library of Congress

On June 27th Sherman made a costly assault on Confederate positions at Kennesaw Mountain ...

for individual soldiers. The earth was thrown to the front or enemy's side of the excavations and often reinforced with logs and timbers. The excavated earth in front of infantry trenches was usually surmounted by a *head log* with a firing slit below, to afford additional protection to the riflemen. Such defensive lines were known collectively as *earthworks* or simply *works*.

But General Shoup's design was a radical departure from the then accepted method of *digging in* and embraced a system of log forts built *above* grade. Each fort was diamond shaped in plan with its two outer faces pointing in the direction of the enemy like an arrowhead. The forts were constructed after the fashion of log cabins, using double walls of logs filled with compacted earth. The exterior face walls were 10 to 12 feet thick at the base and extended to a height of 10 to 12 feet—surmounted by an infantry parapet or *banquette* for riflemen, for a total height of some 16 feet. These massive earthen structures could readily absorb the impact of artillery fire and were therefore nearly impregnable. Each fort was designed to be manned by a company of 80 riflemen and the strange looking structures became known as *shoupades* in honor of their designer. [1]

The *shoupades* were built at intervals of 60 to 175 yards and connected by a stockade of vertical logs firmly embedded in the earth and extending 8 feet into the air with sharpened points. At a point approximately halfway between *shoupades*, the stockades formed a *re-entrant angle* and were broken by an emplacement or redan for two artillery pieces. This placement of artillery at the *re-entrant angle* was the key to Shoup's innovative system and the element so little understood by his contemporaries or by historians who would view the remnants of the *River Line* years after the war.

The artillery in the *redans* provided an enfilading fire at point blank range across the faces of each *shoupade*, as well as directly to the front. The *shoupades*, positioned to either side of the artillery redans, in turn provided an enfilading cross fire at optimum rifle range across the fronts of the artillery positions. This close spacing of *shoupades* and artillery emplacements thus made them mutually supporting and their combined enfilading cross

Joe Johnston's strategy was to lure Sherman South until his army became vulnerable. But Jeff Davis' patience ran out first.

fire thoroughly covered every conceivable approach to the position.

The connecting stockades contained slits through which riflemen could add their fire to the concentrated cross fire from shoupades and artillery emplacements—and in the unlikely event that any assaulting troops somehow survived the intense combined fire, it is doubtful they could have negotiated either the 8 foot high stockades or the 16 foot high, almost vertical sides of the shoupades. In Shoup's words, *"Defended by a determined garrison, it would have been impossible to take them by assault, and they were proof against field guns at long range."* [2]

AS THE CONFEDERATE ARMY retreated from Dalton, Shoup had discussed his ideas for the innovative defensive system with General Joseph E. Johnston on several occasions. Finally, on or about June 18, while the Confederate army was entrenched near Kennesaw Mountain, Shoup went to Johnston and urged him to authorize construction of his proposed defensive system at the point where the Western & Atlantic Railroad crossed the Chattahoochee River, a few miles northwest of Atlanta. Some 30 years after the war, Shoup wrote a fascinating article in the *Confederate Veteran* magazine, in which he described his meeting with Johnston—as well as the military possibilities inherent in his innovative scheme. Shoup's article read in part as follows:

"I was chief of artillery of Johnston's army, and as such was intimately associated with the General. He had constantly used me on engineer duty during the retreat, and I had often talked with him about a system of works of somewhat novel character which I wanted to build, and he had expressed himself favorably with regard to my project; so that one night, about two weeks before the abandonment of Marietta, as I mused before my camp fire, filled with apprehensions at the condition of affairs, the impulse seized upon me to go to General Johnston and ask him to give me authority to erect such a system, as a huge 'tête-du-pont,' at the railway crossing at the Chattahoochee.

I went at once and found the General at leisure. He received me with his accustomed cordiality and made it easy for me to proceed with my audacious proposition. I began by telling him that I had come upon an extraordinary venture, and he assured me of his attention. I then ventured to say, as a preliminary, that I assumed he would be compelled to retire before the enemy before a great while; and he replied that it was but a question of time, and that a short time, and went on to tell me some of the condition of affairs. I then ventured to ask him further if he had any specific plans as to his movement after leaving Marietta. He replied that he had not—that he should be compelled to make the best of his way across the river.

I then told him that if he would let me go to the Chattahoochee, and give me the authority to gather a sufficient number of negroes, I would undertake to construct a line of works covering the railroad crossing, such as could be held indefinitely by one division against Sherman's entire army; that I would engage to complete them within two weeks—that I only asked him to give me the necessary authority, and a few engineer officers.

The General was at once taken by the project and began eagerly to discuss it with me. He got his maps and we examined the proposed position. He asked me my idea as to how such a line might be used. I told him that I proposed to throw it out sufficiently far from the river to give full space within for the whole army, that he could concentrate his entire force in the center or upon either flank for any movement upon the enemy, or in case the enemy should cross the river, he could attack him in flank or in rear with a larger force, proportionally, than Sherman could bring against him, because the enemy would have to have a large force to protect his depot of supplies and maintain his communica-



54 Millimeter Scale Model of a Shoupade

Model by William R. Scaife, Photo by Jack Melton, Jr.



ARCHITECT'S DRAWING OF A SHOUPADE

Francis Asbury Shoup ~ 1834 - 1896

FRANCIS ASBURY SHOUP was born in Laurel, Indiana in 1834 and graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1855, ranked 15th in a class of 34. He served as a Second Lieutenant in the 1st Artillery Battalion, including service during the Seminole War. He resigned his commission January 10, 1860, to study law at Asbury College (now Depaw University) and in 1861 went to Florida where he was admitted to the bar and began a law practice in St. Augustine.

With the secession of Florida from the Union, he entered Confederate military service as a lieutenant of artillery. He was promoted to major in October, 1861 and served as Chief of Artillery for Hardee's Corps at the Battle of Shiloh in 1862. He was appointed Brigadier General, C.S.A. on September 12, 1862 and was engaged at Prairie Grove and Mobile. He commanded a brigade at Vicksburg, where he was captured and after being exchanged, became Joseph E. Johnston's Chief of Artillery during the Atlanta Campaign of 1864.

When Johnston was relieved of command of the Army of Tennessee in July, he became Chief of Staff for the new commander, John B. Hood, on July 21, 1864.

Immediately following the war, he accepted the chair of mathematics at the University of Mississippi and in 1869 received Episcopal Orders and became rector at St. Peter's Parish in Oxford, Mississippi. In the same year he became chaplain and professor of mathematics at the University of the South at Sewanee, Tennessee.

In 1875, he left Sewanee to serve as rector of Episcopal churches at Waterford, New Jersey, Nashville, Tennessee and New Orleans, Louisiana, before returning to Sewanee in 1883. There he served as professor of mathematics, physics and engineering at the University of the South until his death on September 4, 1896.

tions; or as a more brilliant movement, he might let him go, and march out upon his communications, capture his depots and press on into Tennessee and Kentucky, letting him get back the best way he could. He would not be able to hold himself together by any possibility for lack of supplies and would be compelled to disperse." [3]

According to Shoup, the meeting was concluded with Johnston's enthusiastic acceptance of his plan—so enthusiastic in fact, that he ordered a special locomotive to take Shoup to Atlanta that same night. Gangs of Negro slaves were quickly gathered from nearby plantations and hurried with tools and provisions to the Chattahoochee River and placed at the disposal of Major William B. Foster, Senior Engineer for William W. Loring's corps. Shoup and Foster laid out what became known as the *Chattahoochee River Line* on high ground admirably suited for the defense.

The line started at a point on the river about a mile above the railroad bridge and swept around to the west and south at an average distance of about a mile from the river and was anchored on the left at the river about three miles below the bridge, near the mouth of Proctor's Creek. The four mile long, crescent shaped line thus enclosed a powerful bridgehead or *"tête-du-pont,"* from which the Confederate army could protect the rail and wagon road bridges over the Chattahoochee River. [4]

Within a few days the work force had swelled to a thousand men, many of whom were already familiar with log cabin construction, and the work of constructing the *shoupades* and stockades progressed rapidly. Timber was plentiful and immediately at hand and, according to Shoup, *"The line sprang into existence as if by magic."* [5]

Heavy 20 pounder rifled Parrott guns were brought up from the coastal defenses at Mobile, Alabama and placed at key salient points in the line and the *shoupades* were supplied with hand grenades, fire balls and other contrivances for repelling assaults. The hospitals in Atlanta were combed for the "walking wounded" and other disabled men unfit for active duty but still able to handle rifles and to man the works—so that the bulk of Johnston's army would be free to maneuver in the field.

Within a week the entire line was nearing completion—when General Johnston ordered Shoup to extend

a line of rifle pits southward from the main line for a distance of nearly three miles to cover the crossing at Mayson-Turner's Ferry. The map should be consulted to fully appreciate the significance of this move by Johnston, as it changed the *Chattahoochee River Line* from the compact bastion conceived by Shoup to a line over six miles long, made up of Shoup's new structures on the right—but almost three miles of conventional earthworks on the left.

"Much as I deplored it, I was compelled to suspend my work and throw up this line of something like three miles in length. I foresaw that the spirit of my design was not understood or not heeded by General Johnston or he would not think of rifle pits in connection with such a system as we had constructed [they] did not in the least strengthen our position in defense of the [river] crossings, but were instead an element of weakness." [6]

William Tecumseh Sherman during the Atlanta Campaign

In the meantime the opposing armies were drawing nearer to the Chattahoochee River. Johnston had abandoned the *Lost Mountain Line*, six miles north of Marietta on June 18 and deployed two miles to the south in the *Kennesaw Mountain Line* which ran for some six miles from the railroad on the right, across Kennesaw Mountain, Little Kennesaw Mountain and the Kennesaw Spur or Pigeon Hill, to a ridge on the left which later would become known as *Cheatham Hill.*

ON JUNE 27, at the *Battle of Kennesaw Mountain*, George H. Thomas' Army of the Cumberland struck a salient angle held by Benjamin F. Cheatham's division on the aforementioned ridge, while James B. McPherson's Army of the Tennessee struck some two and a half miles to the north along Burnt Hickory Road in the area of Pigeon Hill and John M. Schofield's Army of the Ohio feinted southward and to the right in a diversionary movement. While McPherson's troops attacked in conventional linear formation or *Line of Battle*, Thomas' Army of the Cumberland attacked in column of regiments, using *Napoleonic Heavy Infantry Tactics*. In both cases they were repulsed with staggering losses—their heaviest of the entire campaign. When early in the afternoon Sherman asked his most trusted lieutenant, Major General George H. Thomas, if he thought he could carry any part of the enemy's line by attacking again that day, the *Rock of Chickamauga* replied, *"One or two more such assaults would use up this army!"* But Schofield's feint to the south had pushed successfully down the Sandtown Road beyond Olley's Creek and, in Sherman's words, *"Won the only advantage of the day."*

Schofield's extension to the Confederate left and rear left Johnston little choice but to abandon the *Kennesaw Mountain Line* and to retire southward toward the Chattahoochee River. But the eleven mile retreat would not be made in one bound—for Johnston intended to retard the Federal advance, while withdrawing his wagon trains across the Chattahoochee River so as to save every item of equipment needed by his army.

To implement this strategy, Johnston deployed his army on July 3 in a previously prepared position astride the Western & Atlantic Railroad and the wagon road (today's Atlanta Road) near Smyrna Camp Ground, some four miles south of Marietta. The nearly six mile long double line of entrenchments was known as the *Smyrna Line* and was anchored on the right at Rottenwood Creek. It ran westward along today's Smyrna-Roswell (Windy Hill) Road for some three miles to the railroad at Smyrna Station, then continued westward along today's Concord Road for about two miles, where it turned abruptly southward along today's Cooper Lake Road to a point overlooking Nickajack Creek on the extreme left.

Sherman arrived in Marietta on July 3 and established his headquarters in the Kennesaw House, the town's most fashionable hotel. He then rode into the public square, urging his men forward. The previous month had been particularly frustrating to the impatient Federal commanding general, so frustrating in fact, that back on June 18 he had unburdened himself in a letter to his chief, General Ulysses S. Grant:

"..... Garrard is over-cautious and I think Stoneman is lazy [but] my chief source of trouble is the Army of the Cumberland, which is dreadfully slow. A fresh furrow in a plowed field will stop the whole column and all begin to intrench." [8]

But at last, the stalemate appeared to be broken and Sherman anticipated his most promising opportunity of the campaign. He wrote George H. Thomas on July 3:

"The more I reflect, the more I know Johnston's halt is to save time to cross his material and men. No general, such as he, would invite battle with the Chattahoochee River behind him. I have ordered McPherson and Schofield to cross Nickajack [Creek] at any cost and work night and day to get the enemy started in confusion toward his bridges.

We will never have such a chance again, and I want you to impress on Hooker, Howard and Palmer the importance of the most intense energy of attack tonight and in the morning and to press with vehemence at any cost of life and material. Every inch of his line should be felt and the moment there is a give, pursuit should be made. We now have the best chance ever offered of a large army fighting at a disadvantage with a river to his rear." [9]


CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER LINE
N
SMYRNA LINE
Occupied July2 to July 4, 1864
Battle of Smyrna July 4
Ruff's Station
Grose
75th Ill.
Cleburne
Western & Atlantic RR
Atlanta Road
Rottenwood Creek
Garrard to Roswell (July 5)
HOWARD
July 5
Stanley
Newton
1st Oh. Batt. A
7th Ind. Batt.
Vining's Mtn
6th Oh. Batt.
Wood
Bridge's Ill. Batt.
Vining's Station
1st Ill. Batt M
45th Ill.
Noblitt
Knefler
Hazen
41st Oh.
19th Ind. Batt.
19th Oh.
PALMER
July 5
Johnson
Moore
Baird
McCook
Este
Walker
10th Ky.
Martin & Kelly of Wheeler's Cavalry
Wheeler's Cavalry
Battle of Ruff's Mill July 4
Fuller
Stevenson
Ruff's Mill
HOOKER
July 5
Williams
Davis
Mitchell
Dilworth
Morgan
Givert
Daniell's or Concord Mill
Dodgen's Mill
Nickajack Creek
Ward
Harrison
Wood
Coburn
Jones
Ireland
Candy
Geary
LOGAN
M.L. Smith
Dodd Farm
Giles Smith
Lightburn
McCook & Stoneman (down river)
Harrow
Osterhaus
Turner's Ferry Road
Gresham
10th Oh. Battery
Williams
Walcutt
15th Ohio Battery
Oliver
Sanderson
Hall
1st Minn. Battery
3rd Oh. Battery
Malloy
Batt H, 1st Mich.
Force
Batt D, 1st Ill.
BLAIR
Lickskillet Road
Leggett
DODGE
July 5th
9th Ill. M.I.
Green & Howell's Ferry
Jackson's Cavalry and 1st Division Georgia Militia
Manigault
Clayton
Brown
Stevenson
Cheatham (of Hardee)
HOOD
Walker
Cleburne
Bate
French
Walthall
Loring
56th Miss.
STEWART
HARDEE
Chattahoochee River
Nancy Creek
Peachtree Creek
Montgomery Ferry
Guibor's Battery
Lumden's Battery
Ector's (of French)
to Atlanta
Proctor's Creek
LEGEND
Supporting Lines
Fortified Main Lines
0
1/2
1 Mile
SCALE
Map Graphics by Joe Youst
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FEDERAL ORDER OF BATTLE
CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER LINE,
July 5th-9th, 1864

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
Estimated Effective Strength, June 30, 1864- 98,000men.

XXXX
CUMBERLAND
Major General George H. Thomas
Escort: Co. I, 1 Ohio Cavalry

XXX HOWARD IV

FIRST XX STANLEY

X FIRST	X SECOND	X THIRD	X ●
CRUFT 21 Illinois 38 Illinois 31 Indiana 81 Indiana 1 Kentucky 2 Kentucky 90 Ohio 101 Ohio	WHITAKER 96 Illinois 115 Illinois 35 Indiana 84 Indiana 21 Kentucky 40 Ohio 51 Ohio	GROSE 59 Illinois 75 Illinois 80 Illinois 84 Illinois 9 Indiana 30 Indiana 36 Indiana 84 Indiana 77 Pennsylvania	SIMONSON 5 Indiana Lt Batt. PA. Lt Batt. B 4-Napoleons & 6-3" Ord. Rifles.

SECOND XX NEWTON

X FIRST	X SECOND	X THIRD	X ●
SHERMAN 36 Illinois 44 Illinois 73 Illinois 74 Illinois 88 Illinois 15 Missouri 24 Wisconsin	WAGNER 100 Illinois 40 Indiana 57 Indiana 26 Ohio 97 Ohio 28 Kentucky	BRADLEY 27 Illinois 42 Illinois 51 Illinois 79 Illinois 3 Kentucky 64 Ohio 65 Ohio 125 Ohio	GOODSPEED 1 Illinois Lt. Batt.M 1 Ohio Lt. Batt A 6-Napoleons & 4-3" Ord. Rifles.

THIRD XX WOOD

X FIRST	X SECOND	X THIRD	X ●
NODINE 25 Illinois 35 Illinois 89 Illinois 32 Indiana 88 Illinois 8 Kansas 15 Ohio 49 Ohio 15 Wisconsin	HAZEN 6 Indiana 5 Kentucky 6 Kentucky 23 Kentucky 88 Illinois 8 Kansas 41 Ohio 71 Ohio 93 Ohio 124 Ohio	KNEFLER 79 Indiana 86 Indiana 9 Kentucky 17 Kentucky 13 Ohio 19 Ohio 59 Ohio	BRADLEY Bridge's Ill. Lt. Batt. 6 Ohio Lt. Batt 6-Napoleons

XXX PALMER XIV

FIRST XX KING

X FIRST	X SECOND	X THIRD	X ●
McCOOK 104 Illinois 42 Indiana 88 Indiana 15 Kentucky 2 Ohio 33 Ohio 94 Ohio 10 Wisconsin 21 Wisconsin	MOORE 11 Michigan 15 US 16 US 18 US 19 US	GIVEN 37 Indiana 38 Indiana 21 Ohio 74 Ohio 78 PA. 79 PA. 1 Wisconsin	DRURY 1 Illinois Lt Batt.C 1 Ohio Battery I 4-3" Ord. Rifles & 4-10lb Parrott Rifles.

SECOND XX DAVIS

X FIRST	X SECOND	X THIRD	X ●
MORGAN 10 Illinois 16 Illinois 60 Illinois 10 Michigan 14 Michigan	MITCHELL 34 Illinois 78 Illinois 98 Ohio 113 Ohio 121 Ohio	DILWORTH 85 Illinois 86 Illinois 110 Illinois 125 Illinois 25 Indiana 52 Ohio	BARNETT 2 Illinois Lt. Batt.I 5 Wisconsin Lt. Batt & Det. 2 Minn. Batt. 4-Napoleons & 4-3" Ord. Rifles.

THIRD XX BAIRD

X FIRST	X SECOND	X THIRD	X ●
TURCHIN 82 Indiana 23 Missouri 17 Ohio 31 Ohio 89 Ohio 92 Ohio	GLEASON 75 Indiana 87 Indiana 101 Indiana 2 Minnesota 35 Ohio 105 Ohio	ESTE 10 Indiana 74 Indiana 10 Kentucky 14 Ohio 38 Ohio	ESTEP 7 Indiana Lt. Batt. 19 Indiana Lt. Batt. 4-Napoleons & 2-3" Ord. Rifles. & 4-10lb. Parrot Rifles.

XXXX CUMBERLAND

X RESERVE	PONTONIERS	AMMUNITION TRAIN GD	SIEGE ●
LE FAVOUR 9 Michigan 22 Michigan	BUELL 58 Indiana	BARBER 1 Bn Ohio Sharpshooters	SUTERMEISTER 11 Indiana Batt. 4-20lb. Parrotts 2-24lb. Howitzers

XXX HOOKER XX

FIRST XX WILLIAMS

X FIRST	X SECOND	X THIRD	X ●
KNIPE 5 Connecticut 3 Maryland Det. 123 New York 141 New York 46 PA.	RUGER 27 Indiana 2 Massachusetts 13 New Jersey 107 New York 150 New York 3 Wisconsin	ROBINSON 82 Illinois 101 Illinois 143 New York 61 Ohio 82 Ohio	WOODBURY 1 New York Lt Batt.I 1 New York Lt Batt.M 6-3" Ord. Rifles & 4-Napoleons

SECOND XX GEARY

X FIRST	X SECOND	X THIRD	X ●
CANDY 5 Ohio 29 Ohio 66 Ohio 28 PA. 147 PA.	JONES 33 New Jersey 119 New York 134 New York 154 New York 73 PA. 109 PA.	IRELAND 60 New York 102 New York 137 New York 149 New York 29 PA. 111 PA.	ALESHIRE 13 New York Lt. Batt. Pennsylvania Lt Batt. E 6-Napoleons & 4-3" Ord. Rifles.

THIRD XX WARD

X FIRST	X SECOND	X THIRD	X ●
HARRISON 102 Illinois 105 Illinois 129 Illinois 70 Indiana 79 Ohio	COBURN 33 Indiana 85 Indiana 19 Michigan 22 Wisconsin	WOOD 20 Connecticut 33 Massachusetts 136 New York 55 Ohio 73 Ohio 26 Wisconsin	GARY 1 Michigan Lt. Batt.I 1 Ohio Lt. Batt.C 6-Napoleons & 6-10lb. Parrot Rifles.



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CONFEDERATE ORDER OF BATTLE CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER LINE, July 5th-9th, 1864

GENERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON G.O.C. ARMY OF TENNESSEE

Present for duty, June 30, 1864- 69,946 men

XXX WHEELER

XX KELLY
- X HANNON — 53 Alabama, 24 Alabama Bn
- X DIBRELL — 4 Tennessee, 8 Tennessee, 9 Tennessee, 10 Tennessee, 11 Tennessee
- X ANDERSON — 3 Confederate, 5 Confederate, 8 Confederate, 10 Confederate, 12 Confederate
- X WILLIAMS — 2 Kentucky, 3 Kentucky, 9 Kentucky, 2 Kentucky Bn, Allision's Tenn. Sqdn., Hamilton's Tenn. Sqdn.

XX MARTIN
- X ALLEN — 1 Alabama, 3 Alabama, 4 Alabama, 7 Alabama, 51 Alabama, 12 Alabama Bn
- X IVERSON — 1 Georgia, 2 Georgia, 3 Georgia, 4 Georgia, 6 Georgia

WHEELER'S Horse Artillery — Georgia Battery (1 Section), Huwald's Tennessee Battery, Tennessee Battery, Tennessee Battery, Arkansas Battery (8-12Lb How & 8-3" Ord. Rif)

XXX HARDEE

XX CHEATHAM
- X MANEY — 1+27 Tennessee, 4 Confederate, 6 & 9 Tennessee, 41 Tennessee, 50 Tennessee
- X STRAHL — 4&5 Tennessee, 19 Tennessee, 24 Tennessee, 31 Tennessee, 33 Tennessee
- X WRIGHT — 8 Tennessee, 16 Tennessee, 28 Tennessee, 38 Tennessee, 51+52 Tennessee
- X VAUGHN — 11 Tennessee, 12&47 Tennessee, 29 Tennessee, 13&154 Tennessee

XX CLEBURNE
- X POLK — 1&15 Arkansas, 5 Confederate, 2 Tennessee, 35&48 Tennessee
- X GOVAN — 2&24 Arkansas, 5&13 Arkansas, 6&7 Arkansas, 8&19 Arkansas, 3 Confederate
- X LOWREY — 16 Alabama, 33 Alabama, 45 Alabama, 32 Mississippi, 45 Mississippi
- X GRANBURY — 6&15 Texas Cav, 7 Texas, 10 Texas, 17&18 Texas Cav, 24&25 Texas Cav.

XX WALKER
- X MERCER — 1 Georgia, 54 Georgia, 57 Georgia, 63 Georgia
- X GIST — 8 Georgia Bn, 46 Georgia, 16 S. Carolina, 24 S. Carolina
- X JACKSON — 47 Georgia, 65 Georgia, 5 Mississippi, 8 Mississippi, 2 Georgia Sharpshooters
- X STEVENS — 1 Georgia Confed, 25 Georgia, 29 Georgia, 30 Georgia, 66 Georgia, 1 Georgia Sharpshooters

XX BATE
- X SMITH — 37 Georgia, 20 Tennessee, 30 Tennessee, 15&37 Tennessee, 4 Georgia Sharpshooters
- X LEWIS — 2 Kentucky, 4 Kentucky, 5 Kentucky, 6 Kentucky, 9 Kentucky
- X FINLEY — 1+3 Florida Cavalry, 1+4 Florida, 6 Florida, 7 Florida

XXX HARDEE

- II HOXTON — 8-Napoleons, 4-12lb How.
- II HOTCHKISS — 8-Napoleons, 4-12lb How.
- II MARTIN — 6-Napoleons, 6-12lb How.
- II COBB — 8-Napoleons, 4-12lb How.
- II PALMER — 8-Napoleons, 4-3" Ord. Rif.

FIRST DIVISION GEORGIA MILITIA

XX SMITH
- X CARSWELL, First Bgde — 1 Regiment, 2 Regiment, 3 Regiment
- X PHILLIPS, Second Bgde — 4 Regiment, 5 Regiment, 6 Regiment
- X ANDERSON, Third Bgde — 7 Regiment, 8 Regiment, 9 Regiment
- X McCAY, Fourth Bgde — 10 Regiment, 11 Regiment, 12 Regiment

XXX STEWART

XX LORING
- X ADAMS — 6 Mississippi, 14 Mississippi, 15 Mississippi, 20 Mississippi, 23 Mississippi, 43 Mississippi
- X SCOTT — 27 Alabama, 35 Alabama, 49 Alabama, 55 Alabama, 57 Alabama, 12 Louisiana
- X FEATHERSTON — 3 Mississippi, 22 Mississippi, 31 Mississippi, 33 Mississippi, 40 Mississippi, 1 Mississippi Sharpshooters

XX FRENCH
- X ECTOR — 29 N. Carolina, 39 N. Carolina, 9 Texas, 10 Texas Cavalry, 14 Texas Cavalry, 32 Texas Cavalry
- X COCKRELL — 1+4 Missouri, 2+6 Missouri, 3+5 Missouri, 1+3 Missouri Cavalry
- X SEARS — 4 Mississippi, 35 Mississippi, 36 Mississippi, 46 Mississippi, 7 Mississippi Bn

XX WALTHALL
- X CANTEY — 17 Alabama, 26 Alabama, 29 Alabama, 37 Mississippi
- X QUARLES — 1 Alabama, 4 Alabama, 30 Louisiana, 42 Tennessee, 46+55 Tennessee, 48 Tennessee, 49 Tennessee, 53 Tennessee
- X REYNOLDS — 1 Ark. Mntd Rifles, 2 Ark. Mntd Rifles, 4 Ark. Mntd Rifles, 9 Ark. Mntd Rifles, 25 Ark. Mntd Rifles

XXX STEWART

- II MYRICK — 12-Napoleons
- II STORR — 10-Napoleons, 2-3" Ord. Rif.
- II PRESTON — 8-Napoleons
- II WADDELL — 10-12lb How., 2-12lb Blakely Rif.

XXX HOOD

XX HINDMAN
- X DEAS — 19 Alabama, 22 Alabama, 25 Alabama, 39 Alabama, 50 Alabama, 17 Alabama Sharpshooters
- X MANIGAULT — 24 Alabama, 28 Alabama, 34 Alabama, 10 S Carolina, 19 S Carolina
- X WALTHALL* — 24+27 Mississippi, 29+30 Mississippi, 34 Mississippi
- X TUCKER — 7 Mississippi, 9 Mississippi, 10 Mississippi, 41 Mississippi, 44 Mississippi, 9 Mississippi Sharpshooters

*Commanded from June 6 by Col. Samuel Benton, Walthall having been given command of a division in Loring's (Polk's) Corps (the Corps later commanded by A.P. Stewart).

XX STEVENSON
- X BROWN — 3 Tennessee, 18 Tennessee, 26 Tennessee, 3 Tennessee, 32 Tennessee, 45+23 Tennessee
- X CUMMING — 34 Georgia, 36 Georgia, 39 Georgia, 56 Georgia, 2 Georgia State Line
- X REYNOLDS — 58 N. Carolina, 60 N. Carolina, 54 Virgina, 63 Virgina
- X PETTUS — 20 Alabama, 23 Alabama, 30 Alabama, 31 Alabama, 46 Alabama

XX CLAYTON
- X HOLTZCLAW — 18 Alabama, 32+58 Alabama, 36 Alabama, 38 Alabama
- X STOVALL — 40 Georgia, 41 Georgia, 42 Georgia, 43 Georgia, 52 Georgia, 1 Georgia State Line
- X BAKER — 37 Alabama, 40 Alabama, 42 Alabama, 54 Alabama
- X GIBSON — 1 Louisiana, 13 Louisiana, 16+25 Louisiana, 19 Louisiana, 20 Louisiana, 14 Bn Louisiana Sharpshooters

XXX HOOD

- II COURTNEY — 4-Napoleons, 4-12lb How., 4-3" Ord. Rif.
- II ELDRIGE — 6-Napoleons, 2-12lb How., 4-3" Ord. Rif.
- II JOHNSTON — 12-Napoleons
- II WILLIAMS — 4-Napoleons, 4-12lb How., 4-3" Ord. Rif.

XXX HUMES

XX JACKSON
- X ASHBY — 1 Tennessee, 2 Tennessee, 5 Tennessee, 9 Tennessee
- X HARRISON — 3 Arkansas, 4 Tennessee, 8 Texas, 11 Texas
- X FERGUSON — 2 Alabama, 56 Alabama, 9 Mississippi
- X ARMSTRONG — 1 Mississippi, 2 Mississippi, 28 Mississippi, Ballentine's Mississippi Regt.
- X ROSS — 1 Texas Legion, 3 Texas Legion, 6 Texas Legion, 9 Texas Legion

JACKSON'S Division Artillery — Columbus Georgia Batt., Missouri Battery, S. Carolina Battery (8-3" Ord. Rif)

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"Captain, they have shot the ass off me this time."

By the morning of July 4, Sherman's forces had closed in on the *Smyrna Line* and both its flanks. William Grose's Brigade led the advance of Howard's IV Corps down the east side of the Western & Atlantic Railroad and was the first Federal unit to contact Confederate pickets at Ruff's Station, three and a half miles south of Marietta. The picket line was backed up by the main Confederate line at Smyrna but Sherman, in his eagerness to overtake Johnston before he could safely cross the Chattahoochee, had ridden to Howard's position at 11:30 on the morning of July 4, to urge him forward.

Thus prodded by his chief, Howard sent Grose's Brigade in a charge across a large corn field with a skirmish line of the 75th Illinois Regiment leading, under the command of Captain Robert Hale. They drove in the Confederate pickets but were met at the main line by Patrick Cleburne's elite division of Hardee's Corps. Grose's attack, known as the *Battle of Smyrna,* was repulsed with heavy losses, and the reversal gave Sherman second thoughts about routing Johnston's army before it reached the Chattahoochee River. As an aftermath of the Federal attack, many of the assaulting troops were forced to seek whatever cover they could find in front of the Confederate works, within easy range of their guns. According to Lieutenant Chesley D. Mosman of the 59th Illinois Regiment, some of the men were attempting to erect a crude barricade of fence rails when a Confederate shell burst in their midst. Private Charley Brown of Company D received a painful, and no doubt embarrassing, shrapnel wound in the buttocks—but somehow managed to maintain his sense of humor. When his company commander inquired about his condition, Brown explained his predicament, as only a soldier could:

"Captain, they have shot the ass off me this time." [10]

Meanwhile, John W. Fuller's 1st Brigade of James Veatch's 4th Division of Dodge's XVI Corps, operating on Sherman's far right, crossed Nickajack Creek at Ruff's Mill, some three and a half miles southeast of Smyrna Campground. They drove the Confederates from a hilltop position on today's Concord Road, near where the Ruff family cemetery is now located, then advanced eastward along Concord Road until encountering the main Confederate line near its intersection with Hurt Road. The Confederate line at that point was manned by Carter L. Stevenson's division of Hood's Corps at the salient



"Capture of De Gress's Battery by the Confederates" (Battle of Atlanta)
Courtesy of the Library of Congress

angle in the line, where Hood's Corps joined Hardee's Corps. At 6:00 p.m. Fuller's men rushed forward in what became known as the *Battle of Ruff's Mill*. More than 80 fell in the short charge which covered less than a hundred yards, including Colonel Edward F. Noyes of the 39th Ohio, who was wounded and lost a foot to amputation. But Colonel Noyes' performance would assure him a future in politics and he would go on to become Governor of Ohio after the war. The Confederates withdrew a short distance only to take a position in their second line and the costly assault had gained little advantage for the Federals.

BUT THE DEEP PENETRATION BEYOND the Confederate left flank had brought Federal troops closer to Atlanta than Johnston's main force at Smyrna Camp Ground—forcing him to abandon the *Smyrna Line* during the early morning hours of July 5 and to retire to the innovative and strange looking defensive works built by General Shoup north of the Chattahoochee River.

On the night of July 5 the Confederate army arrived and began occupying the *River Line*. Alex P. Stewart's corps manned the right beginning at the river and extending across the Western & Atlantic Railroad and the wagon road to Atlanta, William J. Hardee's corps manned the center, extending eastward beyond today's Buckner Road and John B. Hood's corps manned the left, anchored at the mouth of Nickajack Creek. Joseph Wheeler's cavalry was pulled back across the river, covering the right flank while William H. Jackson's cavalry division and Gustavus W. Smith's Georgia Militia covered the bridges and ferry crossings on the left.

But the troops apparently had not been instructed in advance as to how the unconventional structures in the *River Line* were to be manned or utilized. Being accustomed to earthworks, they were fascinated by the strange looking *shoupades* and connecting stockades which they were expected to defend. Some ridiculed and laughed at them while others complained that they would be utterly unsafe and began tearing down the stockades and digging new trenches.

Even some of the general officers were puzzled when they saw the structures for the first time. General John B. Hood urged that the position be abandoned and the army moved across the Chattahoochee River—and General Shoup later stated that he doubted General Hood understood the design or even stopped to think much about it. Even defensive genius Patrick R. Cleburne at first questioned their value but later told Shoup:

"I knew you [Shoup] had built the thing and I felt sure there must be some sense to it, so I began to study the scheme. In a moment the whole plan flashed upon me. I got up in one of the redoubts with a crowd of men about me, anxious to hear what I thought. I first directed their attention to the redoubt [shoupade] itself, pointed out how it was entirely enclosed with perpendicular sides, and asked them if they did not think a company of men could hold it against any force that could be brought against it? They said yes, they could hold it against the world. I then pointed out how it was defended by a cross fire from half a dozen other works within easy range, and the re-entering angles of the stockades." [11]

According to Shoup, *"Cleburne had withdrawn all his men, except enough to garrison these little works, and his division was comfortably encamped in the rear."* General Hardee declared the *River Line* would make Shoup famous and Georgia Militia commander, General Gustavus W. Smith, coined the term *shoupade* to describe the innovative infantry forts. [12]

John M. Palmer's XIV Federal Corps came down from Smyrna on the wagon road (today's Atlanta Road) and at Spring Hill Station Absalom Baird's 3rd Division turned eastward toward Vinings Station, while Richard W. Johnson's 1st Division and Jefferson C. Davis' 2nd

THE CAMPAIGN FOR ATLANTA

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

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CLISBY AUSTIN HOUSE
Sherman's Headquarters May 5 to May 12

FEDERAL REPULSE AT DUG GAP
May 8, 1864

VAN DEN CORPUT'S BATTERY AT RESACA
May 15, 1864



BATTLE OF PICKETT'S MILL
May 27, 1864

BATTLE OF PEACHTREE CREEK
July 20, 1864



BATTLE OF ATLANTA
July 22, 1864

FEDERAL MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
William T. Sherman

CONFEDERATE ARMY OF TENNESSEE
Joseph E. Johnston (to July 17)
John B. Hood

Rocky Face Ridge - May 5 - 12
Resaca - May 13 - 15
Rome Crossroads - May 16
Cassville - May 19
New Hope Church - May 25
Pickett's Mill - May 27
Dallas - May 28
Kolb's Farm - June 22
Kennesaw Mountain - June 27
Smyrna Line - July 4
River Line, July 5 - 10
Peachtree Creek - July 20
Atlanta (Bald Hill) - July 22
Ezra Church - July 28
Utoy Creek - August 6
Jonesboro - Aug. 31 - Sept. 1

0 10 20 MILES
SCALE

THE CAMPAIGN FOR ATLANTA

MAY 5 TO SEPTEMBER 1, 1864

Map by William R. Scaife

Artwork by Rick Reeves

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"The Battle of Atlanta" Courtesy the Library of Congress

The Battle of Atlanta was the climax of the campaign, and the capture of the city a much needed boost to Lincoln's chances of reelection.

Division continued along the main wagon road toward the *River Line*.

A portion of the retreating Confederate wagon train had been detoured on July 5 from the main wagon road by way of Vinings Station and Pace's Ferry, escorted by William Martin's and John Kelly's divisions of Wheeler's cavalry. Absalom Baird's forces pursued the wagon train southward through the village of Vinings towards Pace's Ferry crossing but paused at nearby Vinings Hill or Mt. Wilkinson, to view for the first time the coveted prize of the campaign—ATLANTA. Baird's Assistant Inspector General, Major James A. Connally, wrote his wife on July 12, describing the exciting event:

"Mine eyes have beheld the promised land! The domes and minarets and spires of Atlanta are glittering in the sunlight before us, and only 8 miles distant. On the morning of the 5th, while riding at the extreme front with the General [Absalom Baird], and eagerly pressing our skirmishers forward after the rapidly retreating rebels, suddenly we came upon a high bluff [Vinings Hill] overlooking the Chattahoochee, and looking southward across the river, there lay the beautiful 'Gate City' in full view, and as the soldiers caught the announcement that Atlanta was in sight, such a cheer went up as must have been heard even in the entrenchments of the doomed city itself. In a very few moments Generals Sherman and Thomas (who are always with the extreme front when a sudden movement is taking place) were with us on the hill top, and the two veterans, for a moment, gazed at the glittering prize in silence. I watched the two noble soldiers—Sherman stepping nervously about, his eyes sparkling and his face aglow—casting a single glance at Atlanta, another at the River, and a dozen at the surrounding valley to see where he could best cross the River, how he could best flank them. Thomas stood there like a noble Roman, calm, soldierly, dignified; no trace of excitement about the grand old soldier who had ruled the storm at Chickamauga. Turning quietly to my General [Baird], he said: 'Send up a couple of guns [Otho H. Morgan's 7th Indiana Battery] and we'll throw some shells over there,' pointing to some heavy timber across the river.....and in fifteen minutes from the time our line of skirmishers reached that hill top, a Parrott shell went screaming from the high point, and burst beautifully on the south side of the Chattahoochee—the first since the war began. That was a glorious moment, and I felt proud that I belonged to this grand army, and that I was at the front instead of at the rear, doing fancy duty." [13]

Kenner Garrard's cavalry division was sent 18 miles upriver to the small manufacturing town of Roswell to seize the nearby wagon road bridge over the Chattahoochee River, while John M. Schofield's Army of the Ohio (XXIII Corps) was moved to Smyrna Camp Ground to be held as a mobile force prepared to move quickly in any direction.

Sherman established his headquarters at the Hardy Pace House in Vinings in order to, in his words, *"Study the case a little,"* and on July 6 dispatched General Henry Halleck in Washington, *"I propose to study the crossings of the Chattahoochee, and, when all is ready, to move quickly."* [14]

The only permanent structures across the Chattahoochee River were the Western & Atlantic Railroad and wagon road bridges at the big bend in the river at Montgomery's Ferry (now Bolton), on the direct route to Atlanta, and the wagon road bridge at the manufacturing town of Roswell, some eighteen miles upriver. The usual method of crossing the river was by means of ferries—or flat boats pushed over by poles. A number of such ferries, plus several shallow fords which might be waded by a military force in an emergency, were scattered along the twenty eight mile long stretch of river between the mouth of Sweetwater Creek (ten miles below the railroad bridge) and Roswell (eighteen miles above the bridge).

On July 7 Sherman sent John M. Schofield to reconnoiter the Chattahoochee River between Pace's Ferry and Roswell to select the most advantageous crossing point. Schofield, with some advice from cavalry commander Edward M. McCook—who had already scouted the area—selected for the crossing the point where Soap creek entered the Chattahoochee River. The crossing point, some six miles above Powers' Ferry, was known variously as Isom's Ferry or Cavalry Ford and is near the present site of the Atlanta Country Club.

Jacob Cox's 3rd Division spearheaded the operation, which Cox later described in great detail in his classic work, ATLANTA. According to Cox, Schofield's XXIII Corps moved on the morning of July 8 to the paper mill on Soap Creek, accompanied by the 58th Indiana Pontoniers and a pontoon train commanded by Colonel George P. Buell. Soap Creek ran for some distance on a southerly course almost parallel with the Chattahoochee River, before making a sharp turn and emptying into the larger stream. Between the creek and the river ran a high ridge, rising to some 250 feet above the river and screening the lower end of Soap Creek from the view of Confederate pickets on the south side of the river. The area just above the mouth of the creek consequently made an excellent staging area, where Colonel Buell could assemble his pontoons without detection.

About half a mile above the mouth of Soap Creek a stone fish-dam had been constructed, which constricted the Chattahoochee to a relatively narrow channel near its center and provided a convenient place to ford the river. Cox's plan called for Colonel Daniel Cameron's 2nd Brigade to cross at the fish-dam while Colonel Robert K. Byrd's 3rd Brigade crossed in pontoon boats half a mile below at the mouth of Soap Creek. Cameron's brigade crossed Soap Creek at the paper mill at 3:30 p.m. on July 8 and moved to the river, where his advance guard of the 103rd Ohio Regiment, under Colonel John S. Casement, waded the Chattahoochee at the fish-dam. Shortly thereafter, twenty pontoon boats shot out from the mouth of Soap Creek, loaded with Colonel Lawrence H. Rousseau's 12th Kentucky Regiment, while the rest of Byrd's brigade deployed on the river's edge to provide covering fire for the crossing.

TWO POINTS are I think worth making in response to Bill Scaife's excellent article. First, some authorities contend that Shoup's originality lay not so much in the concepts behind his fortifications—angled works to produce enfillade and concentrated fire had been standard in Europe since at least the 16th century—but in the swift way in which they were constructed. For that matter excavations of stone age hill forts in Britain have revealed the same principles at work: defense works designed to channel attacks so that they could be decimated by enfillade fire—in this case stockpiles of rocks placed where they could be hurled at the attacks' right, *i.e., unshielded*, side.

Second, as Sherman's army could operate up to a distance of perhaps twenty miles on either side of his supply line, it would have taken a line of Shoupades more than forty miles long to prevent the defenses being outflanked. And there were insufficient men and guns to man such a line. In fact Shoupe's conception would only have worked if Sherman had been willing to sit down in front of the defenses or (even less likely) assault them head on, allowing Johnston the time to attack him in the flank.

The Shoupades would have worked perfectly to block a narrow approach to a key position, say a city on a peninsular. But built were they were, they were indeed an American Maginot!

—Keith Poulter

A small cavalry outpost and a single piece of artillery was the only Confederate force in the vicinity of the crossing and after firing only two cannon-shots, the cannoneers and horsemen were driven away by Byrd's riflemen from the other side of the river—and the artillery piece was captured without the Federals losing a man.

The remainder of Byrd's brigade was quickly ferried across, a pontoon bridge erected, and Cox's entire division entrenched a bridgehead on the ridges south of the river. On learning of the crossing, Confederate Gen-

eral Johnston ordered a cavalry reconnaissance of the bridgehead but concluded that it was by that time too well secured and made no effort to expel Cox's forces. [15]

On July 9 two more crossings were made by Federal cavalry—one by Garrard near Roswell and one by Colonel James Brownlow's 1st Tennessee (Federal) Regiment of McCook's cavalry division at Cochran's Ford, a mile below Soap Creek.

Edward M. McCook's cavalry division had been ordered to support Schofield's crossing at Soap Creek and on July 6 established his headquarters at the Asbury Hargrove House, near where the Smyrna-Pace's Ferry Road crossed Rottenwood Creek. On July 9 he sent Colonel Joseph Dorr's 1st Brigade across the newly-erected pontoon bridge at Soap Creek to scout the area in front of Cox's entrenched bridgehead. McCook then sent Colonel James Brownlow with a detachment of the 1st Tennessee (Federal) Cavalry Regiment a mile and a half below Soap Creek, where Elisha Cochran had his residence and another stone fish-dam across the river. There Brownlow crossed the Chattahoochee, in an appropriate finale to the several crossings made under fire. McCook described the unconventional, but successful, crossing made by Brownlow's Tennesseans on July 9:

"Brownlow performed one of his characteristic feats today. I ordered a detachment to cross at Cochran's Ford. It was deep, and he took them over naked, nothing but guns, cartridge boxes and [of all things] hats. They drove the enemy out of their rifle pits, captured a non-commissioned officer, 3 men and two boats on the other side. They would have got more, but the rebels had the advantage in running through the bushes with clothes on. It was certainly one of the funniest sights of the war, and a very successful raid for naked men to make." [16]

Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston perhaps occupied in the *River Line* the most formidable defensive position taken by an army during the entire war. But he faced George H. Thomas' ponderous Army of the Cumberland in his front, while Sherman had two well-established bridgeheads across the river on his right flank at Roswell and Soap Creek. On the night of July 9, 1864, Johnston ordered the evacuation of the *River Line*, but whatever discussions were held with his subordinate commanders before making that decision have been lost to history. Johnston covered the subject in his official report with three astonishingly brief and matter-of-fact sentences:

"The enemy advanced as usual covered by intrenchments. Skirmishing continued until the 9th. Our infantry and artillery were brought to the southeast side of the river that night because two Federal corps had crossed it above Powers' Ferry on the 8th and intrenched." [17]

In his *Narrative of Military Operations*, Johnston neither discussed the basic *River Line* concept, as later described by General Shoup, nor offered any explanation as to why, after such laborious preparations, the bastion on the Chattahoochee was abandoned without a fight.

In General Shoup's article, published in the *Confederate Veteran* magazine thirty one years after the fact and only a few months before his death, he described a meeting, held as he recalled on July 7, in which the subject was discussed:

Railyards in Atlanta after the fall of the city.

National Archives

"Gen. Johnston called a council of the corps commanders to consider the situation, and I was invited to be present. Gen. Hood stated his position, and urged that the army be moved across the river. He did not seem to understand the design of the works on his right; and I doubt he ever stopped to think much about them.

When I was called upon to say what I thought ought to be done, I said that, in my opinion, Gen. Hood ought to be moved across the river, and a least one of the other corps; but that it would be no reason for abandoning the works, that they ought to be provisioned, so as to stand a siege, if necessary, of a considerable period. No definite conclusion was reached, but the tone in favor of holding on to the side of the river next the enemy was not such as I could have wished. It was the second day after this, I think, (we abandoned the works on the 9th of July), while I was working hard to make our left flank strong, ...information reached me that the whole army was leaving that side of the river. I need not attempt to say what a blow it was to me. I took a long look at the works into which my heart had gone to such a degree, and felt that the days of the Confederacy were numbered. I could not then, and I have never been able since, to see why the position should not have been held indefinitely. There were four or five pontoon bridges in our rear, besides the railroad bridge, so that the small number of men necessary to hold the place could have been crossed, if it should become necessary, in an hour's time.

The next day after the evacuation, Gen. Johnston sent for me. He said he was sorry he had been obliged to abandon my works, but that the enemy had already crossed the river in considerable force, and he thought it best to be on this side; and this is the only reason he gives in his official report." [18]

The only other contemporary reference to the abandonment of Shoup's River Line concept was found in

Major General Samuel G. French's journal under the date of July 10, 1864:

"The works of General Shoup, with its stockades, did not give Johnston spare troops enough to prevent this movement of the enemy [across the Chattahoochee River]. Thus we are constantly outflanked by a superior force not disposed to attack us behind any kind of works." [19]

Shoup had designed the *River Line* to be manned by a single division of infantry so that, properly provisioned, it could withstand a long siege, leaving most of the army free to maneuver in the field and presumably protect the flanks of the bastion. But more than half the artillery available to Johnston's Army of Tennessee would be required in the intermediate redoubts plus the forts anchoring each end and the salient angles in the *River Line*. Joseph E. Johnston's conservative nature and his reluctance to place both men and materials in unnecessary peril may have caused him to withdraw from the line rather than risk the possible loss of over half his artillery force.

National Archives

Looking north over the Chattahoochee River. The bridge is probably the railroad bridge shown on the map near the junction of the river and Peachtree Creek.

Shoup's design for the *River Line* was years ahead of its time and one of the most significant military developments of the war—but neither participants nor later day historians have ever adequately described the construction of the line—or explained just how it was intended to work. The master photographer, George N. Barnard, traveled with Sherman and photographed every significant landmark and fortification of the campaign *except the River Line!*

The only description of the design, construction and military concept of the *River Line* was found in the aforementioned article written by Shoup himself some thirty one years after its construction and only a few months before his death. But unless one has a knowledge of military engineering, architectural and mathematical terms, along with some understanding of construction, the article is likely to be confusing and difficult to follow. For example, when Shoup describes a *re-entering angle*, he refers to what an architect or military engineer would call a *re-entrant corner* or what a mathematician would call *an interior angle of a polygon less than 180 degrees.*

The illustrations accompanying Shoup's article, while conveying his basic concept, do little to clarify matters for even the most sophisticated reader. The plan of a *shoupade* explains much of his design, but is without dimensions and the illustration intended to show construction details is neither a true section cut through a wall nor a true elevation view taken from outside the structure—but instead a combination of the two. The sketch intended to show the connecting stockades running between *shoupades* fails to indicate either artillery positions or the *re-entrant angles* described by Shoup and so critical to his concept.

An excellent description of the *River Line*, in some respects superior to that written by Shoup in the *Confederate Veteran* Magazine, appeared in the official report of Sherman's Chief of Engineers, Captain Orlando M. Poe:

"The line of works consisted of a system of square redoubts [shoupades], in defensive relations, connected by infantry parapets, but few of these redoubts were prepared for artillery, being arranged with a banquette [20] *for infantry fire. The artillery was placed in small intermediate redans. The Redoubts partook more of the character of tambours.* [21] *They were constructed by building double log-pens and filling the space between with earth. There was nothing in the plan to recommend them to the attention of engineers. The left of the line rested upon a large seven-gun redoubt near the mouth of Nickajack Creek and the right upon another redoubt prepared for eight guns, and situated near the Chattahoochee, about one mile above the railroad bridge....The railroad bridge at its southern end was protected by three batteries of irregular shape and one redoubt. This line, owing to the care bestowed upon its construction and the nature of the approaches, was by far the strongest we have yet encountered. It had been built for some length of time and had been located by good engineers. A few days spent in reconnaissance showed us very plainly that it would cost many lives to carry the position by assault, even were an assault to succeed, which was extremely doubtful. It was accordingly deemed best to turn it."* [22]

Poe saw the diamond shaped *shoupades* as square redoubts—a mistake that would be frequently made by others in later years—but his description otherwise precisely confirmed Shoup's article of some thirty one years later. It is interesting that although Poe stated the defensive line, *"had been located by good engineers,"* he added that, *"There was nothing in the plan to recommend it to the attention of [our] engineers."* This suggests that there may have been just a modicum of professional jealousy and some reluctance on the part of both Sherman and Poe to give too much credit to the enemy's engineering skills. It might even account for the fact that this impressive structure was apparently never photographed or sketched and was barely mentioned in Federal annals of the Atlanta campaign.

There is today tragically little left of the once magnificent line of fortifications known as the *Chattahoochee River Line.* Only twelve identifiable infantry forts or *shoupades* remain—eleven of which are on private land ...

It becomes obvious from all of this, that both the design and details of construction of the River Line have, for the most part, been lost to history. Research for this work therefore involved the measurement of each of the twelve remaining *shoupades*, along with the distances and angles to the artillery redans between them and—last but not least—the construction of a 54 millimeter scale model of a *shoupade*. The research also included a study and analysis of the Morris [23] and Dodge-Ruger [24] maps. The former, prepared by Captain Walter J. Morris, Chief Engineer for the Confederate Army of Mississippi (Polk's Corps), immediately after the *River Line* was occupied by the Confederate army, is quite accurate on the right side of the line, where Loring's (Polk's) Corps was posted. But, as was the case at Cassville and other places, Morris' map contains discrepancies in areas where he was not personally present—in this case on the far left where Hood's Corps was posted. The Dodge-Ruger map, on the other hand, was prepared from a field survey conducted under much more favorable circumstances ten years after the war and is a much more reliable document.

THE RESEARCH WAS EXTENDED to include the measurement and mapping of the entire line, both from the ground and from the air, locating existing ruins, structures previously observed or photographed but later obliterated, and projecting the overall configuration of the original line. The results of this research, combined with Shoup's descriptions and those of Sherman's Chief of Engineers, Captain Orlando M. Poe, formed the basis for the maps contained herein and the description of the design of the *River Line* found at the beginning of this work—as well as the architect's drawing and scale model of a *shoupade*. Shoup reported that the *shoupades* were spaced at intervals of approximately eighty yards, while Captain Samuel T. Fisher, writing in *One of Cleburne's Command*, said they were spaced every 150 to 200 yards. Actual measurements in the field today disclose considerable variation in spacing, indicating what one might suspect, that precise locations were dictated by considerations of terrain and fields of fire. The maximum spacing of *shoupades* found in a surviving contiguous segment of the line was 175 yards and the minimum spacing, between the last two *shoupades* on the extreme left of the *Original Line*, was only 60 yards.

There is today tragically little left of the once magnificent line of fortifications known as the *Chattahoochee River Line.* Only twelve identifiable infantry forts or *shoupades* remain—eleven of which are on private land and are therefore quite vulnerable to eventual destruction. Most of these surviving structures are in the yards of private residences, where many property owners have formidable security systems and impressively intimidating, large dogs.

The analogy between the *Chattahoochee River Line* and France's *Maginot Line* of World War II is a compelling one. Both protected key cities to their rear, Atlanta and Paris. Both reflected *state of the art* military thinking in both their design and construction and were virtually impregnable against direct frontal assault. Both would remain forever untested in battle but both would be neutralized by flanking movements. William T. Sherman would neutralize the *River Line* by sending John M. Schofield's Army of the Ohio across the Chattahoochee River at Soap Creek to threaten Atlanta, while Adolph Hitler would neutralize the *Maginot Line* by sending his Stuka-supported panzer divisions crashing through the low countries of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands toward Paris and the heart of France. ■

1 Half the company would be deployed as riflemen on the parapet while the remaining 40 men would be stationed in fort below to serve as loaders for the riflemen above.
2 F. A. Shoup, *Works at the Chattahoochee River, Confederate Veteran* magazine, III (1895), 262-265.
3 Shoup, 264.
4 Johnston later explained that the line was built on the north side of the river because the elevated terrain on that side so completely dominated the relatively flat land south of the river
5 Shoup, 262.
6 Shoup, 264.
7 Jacob Cox, *Atlanta*, 130.
8 O. R. 38, IV, 507, Sherman to Grant.
9 O. R. 38, V, 30, Sherman to George H. Thomas.
10 *Civil War Journal of Chesley A. Mosman*, 235.
11 Shoup, 262.
12 Shoup, 262.
13 Major James A. Connally, *Three Years in the Army of the Cumberland*, 234.
14 W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, 68.
O. R. 38, IV, 433, Sherman to Halleck.
15 Cox, *Atlanta*, 140.
16 O. R. 38, II, 760, Edward M. McCook's Report.
17 O. R. 38, III, 617, Joseph E. Johnston's Report.
18 Shoup, 262.
19 S. G. French, *Two Wars*, 216.
20 Banquette: A platform lining a trench or parapet wall on which soldiers stand while firing (*American Heritage Dictionary*).
21 Tambour: The vertical part of a cupola (*American Heritage Dictionary*).
22 O. R. 38, I, 129, Orlando M. Poe's Report.
23 Captain Walter J. Morris, *Map Showing Approximate Position of the Army of Mississippi*, 1864.
24 J. T. Dodge and Edward Ruger, *Map IV, Illustrating the Military Operations of the Atlanta Campaign*, 1874.

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

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

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



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UNION & EMANCIPATION: ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND RACE IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA

Edited by David W. Blight and Brooks D. Simpson. Kent State University Press, P.O. Box 5190, Kent, OH 44242-0001. 231 pp $35.00 plus shipping.

UNION & EMANCIPATION is a book of seven essays dealing with the issues of race, slavery, and emancipation during the Civil War era. The common denominator of the contributors is that they all completed their graduate work at the University of Wisconsin at Madison.

From 1830 to the Civil War, political abolitionists charged that a Slave Power conspiracy enlisted the federal government in several schemes to extend slavery into Cuba, Nicaragua, and Mexico. Robert F. May convincingly establishes that American presidents, including suspicioned Democrats Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan, distanced themselves from Slave Power filibusters.



Michael J. McManus offers an analysis of Wisconsin anti-slavrery Republicans in the years preceding the Civil War. He contends that they used states rights in a "positive application" to resist enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. Peter Knupfer examines the Constitutional Union Party of 1860 and suggests that party leaders were divided over the future of their own movement. The result was the "final departure of the [Henry] Clay and [Andrew] Jackson generation." Louis S. Gerteis writes about the American popular entertainment of blackface minstrelsy. It proved to be a cultural device that both reinforced white stereotypes

about African Americans, and provided a forum for blacks to talk back.

Ira Berlin challenges the singular role of Abraham Lincoln in the freeing of the slaves. He contends that slaves themselves played a role by forcing the issue of what should be done with them, as well as serving in the Union army and in support role. Yet, he concedes that slaves "could not free themselves," meaning that his departure from James McPherson may not be as sharp as he iimplies.

The editors present the most readable of the essays. Brooks D. Simpson portrays Ulysses S. Grant as a man who, in the midst of struggling in a changing world, genuinely tried to do right by Afican Americans. David W. Blight analyzes the issue of race and reunion. He raises the question of why, by the fiftieth anniversay of emancipation in 1913, "the spirit of sectional reconciliation had overpowered any hope of racial reconcilation in the national memory."

Union & Emancipation is a well-written and scholarly book that makes a valuable comtribution to understanding the overall issue of race and its effects upon society and individuals. It is unfortunate that most Civl War enthusiasts care more about how the war was fought, rather than why the war was fought and what were its effects. For that reason, and because some of the essays make for a slow read, this book will not find a general audience. For serious students, however, it can be highly recommended.

—Larry J. Daniel, Murray, Kentucky

A LIFE OF ALBERT PIKE
Walter L. Brown, Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1997. Pp. 586. $48.00

ALBERT PIKE is hardly a household name today, but in the nineteenth century he was a man of some stature and influence. Born in New England, Pike moved to the Arkansas Territory in the 1830s to seek his fortune. He published a newspaper, practiced law, dabbled in the literary arts, and built a mansion that still stands today in Little Rock. But it is Pike's celebrated role as a leader of Indian troops in the Civil War that most interests readers of this magazine. This unusual assignment came about because Pike had represented the Creeks and Choctaws in a series of legal disputes with the federal government during the antebellum period. The Confederate government named him commissioner to the Indians and commander of the Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma) on the reasonable grounds that he was a known and trusted figure to the natives.

Pike convinced most of the leaders of the Five Civilized Tribes to ally their peoples with the Confederacy and to raise military forces for their own defense. He realistically envisioned the undisciplined Indian troops as a home guard, but when a Union army invaded northwest Arkansas in early 1862, Pike and about eight hundred Cherokees reluctantly took part in a Confederate counterstroke that came to grief at Pea Ridge. For Pike, Pea Ridge was an inglorious affair. He was ineffectual and his Indians played only a marginal role in the battle.

Worse was to follow. In the aftermath of the fighting several Union soldiers were found to have been scalped and mutilated. Northern journalists and politicians sensationalized the incident and Pike was denounced in the press and even in the halls of Congress as a renegade. Stung by the stain on his reputation and disgusted by what he perceived as the Confederacy's mistreatment of the Indians, Pike resigned in mid-1862 and dropped out of the war. He spent much of the rest of his life revising the rituals of the Scottish Rite of Freemasonry and trying to restore his reputation and fortune. He died in Washington in 1891.

A Life of Albert Pike by Walter Brown, a retired historian, is the most detailed biography of Pike yet published. Unfortunately, it relies a bit too heavily on Pike's version of events and the chapters on the Civil War contain a number of errors. (To cite one of the most egregious examples, Benjamin McCulloch was killed at the outset of the battle of Pea Ridge and did not lead "charge after charge" against the Yankees.) The book is also very short on analysis. Pike was an important and controversial figure *(continued on page 78)*



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The Man Who Taught the Army How to Fight

by Geoffrey Perret

Ulysses S. Grant,
Horse and Wagon, 1842

Watercolor, 21 3/4" x 21 3/4"

The George Washington University Permanent Collection, Courtesy the Dimock Gallery

It was at West Point that Grant's artistic ability got its first chance to flower and anyone who has seen his drawings or paintings is almost sure to be impressed.

WHEN ULYSSES S. GRANT was about two years old a neighbor thought it would be fun to fire a flintlock pistol close to his head. Instead of bursting into tears and screaming as expected, the infant Grant didn't even blink, but reached out his tiny pink hands to grasp hold of the pistol, clamoring, "Fick it again! Fick it again!" The physical and nervous constitution that made him impervious to gunfire even as a child remained with him throughout his life. On the field of battle Grant never ducked, flinched or seemed even to notice the bullets flying around his head or the artillery fire that exploded nearby, not even when horses were shot under him or people standing a few feet away were cut down. Although he had never consciously intended to pursue a military career, he seemed almost destined for a soldier's life.

Even so, his generalship wasn't rooted in any love of war. He was appalled at the suffering that war brought to entire families and the cost in life and limb depressed him. But because he was such a deeply emotional person, he was susceptible at the same time to the timeless drama and sheer spectacle of war. Grant's devoted wife, Julia, had no doubt that soldiering, especially in wartime, had an irresistible allure. "He was happy in the fight and din of battle," she noticed, "but restless in the barracks. He could no more resist the sound of a fife or drum or a chance to fire a gun that a woman can resist bonnets." The fact that it was his patriotic duty to serve his country in its hour of need provided more than enough justification for a military career.

Long before he fought his last battle, Grant's generalship was both damned and praised, but it was rarely studied. To his critics, he was "Butcher Grant," a brutal and mentally limited man who used the Union's superiority in men and materiel to bludgeon the South into submission, someone who shrugged off death and destruction as mere by-products of war.



Drawing (top) and Water Color (bottom) by Cadet U. S. Grant, *Courtesy Library of Congress*

His admirers, on the other hand, tended to take his success as all the proof needed to establish his military genius, without giving much thought to what his abilities involved. The exception was Major General J. F. C. Fuller, the British military thinker whose pioneering studies of tank warfare played an important role in the development of blitzkrieg. Fuller's understanding of Grant as both a strategist and tactician was remarkable, especially when one considers the paucity of important Grant material that Fuller had to work with in the 1920s.

It has only been possible to arrive at a full appreciation of Grant the man and Grant the soldier with the publication of the brilliantly edited Grant *Papers*, which have now reached the midpoint in Grant's first term as President. There has also been a flowering of Civil War scholarship in the last 20 years or so, the fruits of which have been numerous case studies of battles in which Grant played a role and solid biographies of people who either served under him, with him or against him.

Whatever natural aptitude he may have brought to a military career, Grant was like any other officer in that he had to learn his craft. His generalship was not acquired in grade school, or even at West Point. It was an organic creation, a mastery that evolved in the course of a wide and deep experience of soldiering. He made numerous mistakes, and some were undoubtedly serious blunders. Most of his errors, however, were fairly minor.

Grant studied failures as dispassionately and thoroughly as he examined his successes. Whatever insights he drew, and whatever new knowledge came his way, were absorbed quickly, for Grant was a remarkably intelligent man; probably one of the most intelligent men of his generation. He also possessed a powerful pictorial imagination, something that is rare in the professional soldier. Grant, in fact, had much of the temperament of the artist or writer, as the *Personal Memoirs* show.

No one would ever guess that Grant was exceptionally bright or naturally artistic from the way he is usually described. Sherman famously remarked that he had never understood Grant, and added "and I believe he is a mystery to himself." Even Bruce Catton, whose admiration for Grant was almost boundless, never claimed to have figured him out. On the contrary, he too felt it was virtually impossible to explain how Grant accomplished the things he did. When Grant was around, said Catton, "things happened." True enough, but that doesn't take us very far.

When Grant arrived, reluctantly, at West Point in 1839 he had just turned seventeen. He knew nothing but simple arithmetic, yet the academy expected new cadets to bring some knowledge of algebra and, if they were wise, a little geometry with them. The curriculum was based, after all, on mathematics and the physical sciences. West Point was, in fact, the only place in the United Sates at that time to offer an education in science. The role of all other colleges was to produce clergymen and lawyers.

Young men like Grant, who arrived poorly prepared, nearly always flunked out at the end of their first year, having been "found" (found deficient, that is) in math. Grant got hold of an algebra book and, as he said, it might as well have been a work in Greek. Nevertheless he taught himself freshman algebra in the space of a week or two. He later claimed he had simply "intuited" the

subject and shrugged off this intellectual feat as if anyone could have done it.

At West Point he put in a minimal effort and graduated in the middle of his class. There wasn't much point in making a serious intellectual effort, he had decided, when class standing was based on a cadet's demerits as well as his grades.

Many years later he decided that West Point was "the best school in the world," but he thought the attention paid to demerits was ridiculous. Sherman, he noticed, would have graduated third in his class on the basis of his academic work, but was ranked only sixth due to his demerits. To Grant, that was an injustice. Such a system was sure to discourage even very able people, himself included, from serious study. Grant had no military bearing whatever, and had no intention of trying to acquire some. Nor could he hope to give the same importance to dusting his room, buttoning his coat or polishing a pair of shoes that West Point did. So he read novels instead and while most of his classmates prepared carefully for class, he relied on innate cleverness to get him through.

Not that his intellectual abilities went completely unnoticed. The famous professor of math at West Point, Albert Church, wanted him to come back after he graduated and serve as an instructor. Think of a modern day parallel: untutored hick from the sticks arrives at Harvard, coasts through all four years, spends more time reading fiction than studying, aims at nothing higher than a gentleman's C, yet still shows so much ability that on graduation he is invited to join the faculty.

To his formidable powers of formal logic, Grant brought a memory that impressed nearly everyone who knew him. Sherman once remarked that it seemed to him "Grant knew every tin can in my army." He had only to a look at a map to absorb its details, and anyone who has studied Civil War maps knows how daunting—not to say mind numbing—they can be. Yet Grant could look at a map once and digest it at a glance, leaving his staff officers to pore over it for hours before they understood it as well as he did.

Grant's remarkable memory provided a solid foundation for his remarkable intelligence. It was also a manifestation of an artistic gift. Not only was West Point the nation's leading college for scientific and technical subjects, but it was also the only art school in the United States in the first half of the 19th century. James McNeil Whistler became a cadet in order to study painting and drawing. At the end of his first year, however, he was "found" in chemistry. "If silicon were a gas," Whistler used to joke, "I would have been a general!"

It was at West Point that Grant's artistic ability got its first chance to flower and anyone who has seen his drawings or paintings is almost sure to be impressed. They look like the work of someone who has studied and practiced for years. After he left West Point, however, he rarely drew or painted again. Something important remained, though: an imagination that was more graphic, more intensely pictorial than ever.

Grant went to Mexico in 1846 as a brevet second lieutenant in one of the Army's elite regiments, the 4th Infantry. It was there that he got the chance to study, at first hand, two approaches to generalship: the prosaic, slightly down at the heels style of Zachary Taylor, who commanded in a straw hat, scuffed boots and long, grimy duster; and the gold braided, gold buttoned, immaculate and majestic manner of Winfield Scott.

It was Taylor, who commanded in northern Mexico, who showed Grant how to fight a battle. It was Scott, who led an American army from Vera Cruz to Mexico City and brought the war to an end, who showed him how to conduct a campaign. Much as he admired Scott's achievement, Grant identified with Taylor, the heroic anti-hero. He also concluded that Taylor's orders were so clear that they were never misunderstood. He was wrong about that, but the important thing is that it provided Grant with the highest standard possible to aim for when he himself became a general.

Many years later he decided that West Point was "the best school in the world," but he thought the attention paid to demerits was ridiculous.

Courtesy USG collection of James A. Bultema

Von Moltke the Elder, one of Grant's contemporaries, formulated what became known as the First Law of Military Operations—"Any order that can be misunderstood *will* be misunderstood!" That seems to have occurred to Grant, too, because most of his Civil War orders are models of brevity and simplicity.

Early in the Mexican War he was made regimental quartermaster, to his intense disgust. Grant protested to his brigade commander that he intended to participate in the fighting even at the risk of a courtmartial. He was, throughout his 23 years as a soldier, an infantry officer by instinct and conviction.

As things turned out, he got to see more of the battlefield than almost anyone else, including the generals. The position of regimental QM was something new in the U. S. Army and it included bringing in the wounded. Grant thus found himself with what amounted to a license to ride anywhere he wanted on the field of battle,

The Richmond Photograph of Robert E. Lee



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

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and the place that had the most wounded was likely to be the place where the fighting was hottest and the outcome most likely to be decided.

By the end of the war he had participated in 10 battles, something of which he was immensely proud for the rest of his life. He drew attention to it in his memoirs. No officer had served in more and only a handful had been in as many.

Grant was recommended for three brevet promotions, and two of the brevets were awarded. The paperwork for the third brevet, in recognition of his feat in getting a howitzer onto the roof of a church during the fight for Mexico City, got lost in the War Department. Fewer than a dozen officers won three brevets in Mexico and these triple-award winners were all seen as eventual generals; they included Robert E. Lee, Braxton Bragg and Don Carlos Buell. It hurt Grant deeply that his achievements had not received their full recognition. Although he was an essentially modest man, even he had his limits.

In 1854 he resigned his commission as a permanent captain only a minute or so after the paper, signed by President Franklin Pierce, was handed to him. Grant had spent two and a half years in California, separated from his wife and children. Army rumor had it that he was forced to resign on account of drunkenness, but not one of those who claimed this was so happened to be present when Grant quit, nor had any of them seen the four letters Grant wrote in the year leading up to his resignation, in which he spelled out his intentions to his wife.

Certainly he was drinking during his time in California, and it showed. Grant could get drunk on two drinks. He drank because he was lonely and he quit because he was depressed. Only by resigning could he look forward to being reunited with his family and bring his depression to an end. He had chosen to wait until his promotion came through in order to make a point: it was the Army that had failed him, not he who had failed the Army. Few of his West Point classmates, including those who had graduated near the top, had made captain ahead of him and not one boasted a war record as impressive as his.

During the six years that followed he tried farming, but his health wasn't up to it. He tried rent collecting, but was too kind hearted to put the bite on deadbeats. Grant ended up in Galena, Illinois, working in his father's leather business and found that he had to take orders from his younger brother, something that was simply humiliating.

When the Civil War began, he could not wait to get back into uniform, and although he liked to believe he had relied entirely on due recognition of his abilities to bring him command of a regiment, the truth was Grant pulled strings and begged for favors like everyone else to win a colonel's commission. He wasn't a colonel long. After only two months back in uniform he was promoted to brigadier general.

There would be 60 engagements big enough to qualify as battles during the Civil War. West Pointers commanded on one side, or on both, in no fewer than 55. Little wonder, then, that nearly all these engagements proved inconclusive. At the academy, the study of generalship consisted of examining Napoleon's campaigns. Dennis Hart Mahan, who dominated the academic board, virtually worshipped the Corsican. The brightest cadets and most able members of the faculty were invited to join the Napoleon Club, which met once a month under a portrait of the Emperor, in a room that had maps of his campaigns tacked to the walls. George McClellan was invited to join, for example. Ulysses S. Grant was not.



Grant under fire at Fort Harrison. Reproduction of drawing by B.W. Clinedinst, in *Century Magazine. Library of Congress.*

One of the reasons Grant himself gave for his rise to the top in the Civil War was that he had not tried to refight Napoleon's battles. In Europe, there were good roads and thriving towns almost everywhere that Napoleon's armies traveled. By contrast, the United States was still virtually a wilderness and decent roads were rare. Grant was going to rely instead on railroads and rivers to take the war to the enemy.

In November 1861 he had orders from his commander, John Fremont, to prevent the rebels from shifting men from Columbus, Kentucky across the Mississippi and into Missouri. Grant used these instructions to

make an advance on the Confederate encampment at the steamboat landing at Belmont, Missouri. Grant justified the operation as a reconnaissance in force, but the truth was he knew exactly what he was going to find, namely, that the steamboat landing was militarily untenable so long as there was Confederate heavy artillery on the bluffs of Columbus, Kentucky, on the opposite bank of the river. What Grant was really doing was mounting a raid. He set off for Belmont with 3000 men, looking for a fight but, in the words of the editor of the Grant *Papers*, John Simon, "only a little one."

The result was a brush with disaster. Grant's troops looted the Confederate camp and for half an hour were completely out of control. Confederate regiments hurriedly ferried over from Columbus landed in Grant's rear, threatening to cut him off from his own steamboats. He had posted a reserve to cover his withdrawal if things went badly, but he had put it in the wrong place and failed to leave clear instructions. When Confederate fire



Grant and his staff at Bethesda Church.
From a wartime photograph. *Library of Congress.*

erupted nearby, the reserve force hurried back to the landing and sailed away. Grant then demonstrated his abilities by calmly managing a fighting withdrawal that saved his force from annihilation.

His next offensive move, against Fort Henry, in February 1862, was bungled. Grant failed to allow enough time for the infantry to cut the roads around the fort before the Navy made its attack. Some 2500 Confederates marched away, to fight another day, while fewer than 100 rebels surrendered to the Navy.

Two weeks, later, at Fort Donelson, Grant pushed the Navy into making a premature attack, which was rebuffed with severe losses. He would have been left to conduct a siege in bitter winter weather, had not the Confederate defenders attempted to break out. For a few hours they had a road open, a road that would allow more than 15,000 Confederates to escape to Nashville. Their commanders foolishly ordered the troops to return to the fort to collect supplies. Grant promptly counterattacked and forced a Confederate surrender.

After Fort Donelson Grant was overly confident, almost complacent. He had been in 14 battles by now and, he wrote to Julia, "it begins to look like home to me." That complacency rebounded on him at Shiloh on April 6, 1862, when a Confederate attack at first light took his army by surprise.

Following Shiloh, Grant would be severely criticized for not entrenching his troops when a Confederate army was known to be nearby. Nevertheless, the decision not to entrench was the right one. Most of Grant's Army of the Tennessee at this time consisted of raw recruits. They had only just received uniforms and muskets. Had they been told to start digging, their first lesson in field soldiering would have amounted to "safety first." What chance, after that, of turning them into aggressive combat troops?

Grant's big mistake at Shiloh wasn't the failure to entrench his army. It was the failure to demand that his division commanders aggressively patrol and dominate the space between themselves and the Confederate army.

Although the Confederates managed to achieve a tactical surprise when they attacked, Grant's position was secured on each flank by creeks filled with spring rain water, and a 60-foot ravine gave him a formidable position just behind the right- center of the Union line to deploy his artillery. The attacking force had no maneuver room, while Grant had two fresh divisions— one on each flank—that, had they been ably led, would have counterattacked around mid-afternoon. For a couple of hours he had the prospect before him of destroying the largest Confederate army in existence. As it was, a double envelopment proved beyond the capacity of his subordinates. But that great missed opportunity angered Grant long after Shiloh had passed into history. It also showed his instinct not only to fight back but to annihilate the enemy at a time when most other generals present, including Sherman, saw only that they were involved in a desperate struggle. Grant had the priceless gift of being able to look into the smoke and confusion of a battle and read the underlying pattern and latent possibilities as easily as he could read a book. That is the stuff that generals are made of, and what they are made for.

In the winter of 1862 he was moving towards Vicksburg when Earl Van Dorn led 2500 Confederate horse soldiers into Holly Springs, Mississippi. Each Confederate carried a bottle of turpentine and a box of

The Last Stand

The State Capitol at Columbia, South Carolina
by
Ron Cockerham

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The Civil War has been over for more than 100 years, but a controversial war still rages over whether the Confederate Flag should still fly. The State Capital building in Columbia, South Carolina is the last state capital building in the United States to still fly the Confederate Flag.
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Rex Younger Enterprises proudly announces its timely release of "The Last Stand" by master portrait artist, Ron Cockerham. "The Last Stand" is the result of an inspiration captured on canvas to depict and preserve the heritage of the South with its struggle for Southern Independence. Historians and Civil War enthusiasts will be stirred by its epic portrayal of the Confederate Flag, and it is sure to bring out the deepest passion of true Southerners everywhere.
As one views that glorious flag, unfurled and fluttering high atop the Capitol of South Carolina on a warm, Spring day, one's sense of the flag's true meaning is aroused. Descending from amidst the clouds of heaven, two of the South's most legendary heroes of the Civil War have ridden with calm grandeur into view. General Robert E. Lee, saddled upon Traveller, appears dignified and determined. With him, mounted upon Little Sorrel, is his most trusted Lieutenant, T.J. Jackson, better known as "Stonewall". Both gaze approvingly toward the Confederate flag's placement and proudly edify it with their allegiance. On closer examination, mighty Stonewall's face appears drawn and close to tears while Robert E. Lee still bears that authoritative look of a great commander. Seeing this makes one inquire, "Have they ridden out one last time to regard this flag as one that flew out of a holy and righteous cause? Are these two great men of valor taking The Last Stand?"
Without a doubt, it encourages one to consider the cause. What was the cause? It is best summed up by Robert E. Lee's own words, "All that the South has ever desired was that the Union, as established by our Forefathers, should be preserved."
Presently, the Confederate flag is flying majestically above South Carolina's Capitol, the last municipal building in the U.S. to fly it. By many, it is misunderstood. It does not wave in defiance nor is its purpose to be sinister or offensive. It is merely unfurled as a memorial to the Confederacy and it epitomizes the men in gray who fell to a lost cause.

Soon after Robert E. Lee's surrender, a young man clad in gray, by the name of Abram Joseph Ryan penned these words,

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Treat it gently -it is holy-
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matches. Within hours the mountain of beans and hardtack, bullets and pork bellies, that Grant had accumulated for the Vicksburg campaign went up in smoke. Only a few days earlier Grant had told his sister he felt like "a Peninsula [thrust] into an enemies country with a large Army depending for their daily bread upon keeping open a line of railroad running one hundred and ninety miles . . . through territory occupied by a people terribly embittered and hostile to us." With Holly Springs reduced to ashes he felt his situation was more precarious than ever and made one of the worst mistakes of his career— he went back to Tennessee. He was about to learn what commanders have learned in every war— although the cost is likely to be high, it is still cheaper to hold on to valuable ground than to abandon it under pressure then have to win it back later.

Grant spent the next five months on the western side of the mile-wide Mississippi trying to get his army back onto the dry, firmer ground on the eastern side. He eventually redeemed himself by landing his army below Vicksburg, advancing inland and fighting five battles in 18 days while marching his army nearly 200 miles. He won all five battles and cut off Vicksburg from hope of being rescued before he closed in on the town and besieged it. There are few comparable feats of generalship in the history of the world that compare with Grant's Vicksburg campaign.



Grant's army crossing the James River. Reproduction of drawing by B.W. Clinedinst, 1897, in *Century Magazine. Library of Congress.*

His next great battle was at Chattanooga, in November 1863. A Confederate army under Braxton Bragg occupied crucial high ground that allowed it to isolate the town, which was one of the most important railheads in North America. A trickle of supplies got through along a single narrow road that wound for 60 miles through the mountains northwest of Chattanooga, but when the winter rains arrived that road would become impassable. The Army of the Cumberland, commanded by George M. Thomas, could be starved into surrender.

Grant arrived in Chattanooga in pain from a crushed left leg and unable to walk without crutches after his horse fell on him in New Orleans. He reached Chattanooga the night of Octorber 23rd tired, cold and soaked to the skin Next day he mounted a horse and made a command reconnaissance with Thomas's chief engineer, a splenetic and controversial character by the name of William Farrar "Baldy" Smith. Grant returned to Thomas's headquarters with a plan for breaking Braxton Bragg's strangulating grip on the town.

After supper, Grant spent several hours at a small table in an upstairs room writing out orders for two night attacks that would win back some key terrain. Once he had control of it, he intended to patch up a ferry and restore a railroad connection that would allow him to bring in rations, munitions and Sherman's army.

Having achieved that much, most Civil War commanders would have then prepared to nibble away at Bragg through the winter, and hope to make a decisive move in the spring. Not Grant. He was going to attack Bragg as soon as he could and try to destroy his opponent's army before winter really set in.

As he wrote out these orders, Grant could see it all in his mind—what the enemy was doing, what the terrain was like, and just what he needed to do to break the stranglehold placed by man and nature on this rain-swept depressing place. In complete silence and without hesitation page after page flowed from his pen. As each page was finished, he pushed it off the small table, allowing it to fall to the floor. When he had finished he picked up the papers, arranged them neatly in a small stack, handed them to an officer to distribute to the designated recipients, and hobbled off to bed.

At that small table, writing silently for hours, the mechanism of Grant's military genius was put into motion. The ability to write clearly and effectively is one of the most useful talents an Army officer can hope to possess. It was his writing ability that helped make Douglas MacArthur Chief of Staff; it was the same talent that enabled Eisenhower to rise to the top. Grant got there before them and helped prepare the way.

He was a poor speller, but a superb writer, like F. Scott Fitzgerald. Grant's brilliance as a writer was es-

sential to his success as a general. His skill was such that it concealed both the artistry and the effort. It is the invariable signature of supreme accomplishment that it is the instrument—the pen or the paint brush, the piano or the military machine— that appears to do the work, rather than the individual who holds that instrument in his hands.

Grant's ability to achieve great results without fuss or ostentation or by doing anything to attract attention to himself was not, as most of the officers around him supposed, a sign that he was, after all, not so very different from themselves. It was proof, in fact, of complete mastery of an army command. Here is an instrument as complex and demanding as any that humanity has ever devised and he achieved that mastery within what is probably the most competitive profession on Earth.

After Grant saved Chattanooga, Lincoln decided to revive the rank of lieutenant general, which had been held only by George Washington, and award it to Grant. Winfield Scott had been made a brevet lieutenant general after the Mexican War, but brevet rank was honorary rather than real.

In being promoted to lieutenant general, Grant supplanted Halleck as General-in-Chief, but he had no intention of taking Halleck's place behind a desk in the War Department. On the contrary, he had every intention of not doing so. He made Halleck the first Army chief of staff, in which capacity he served as a kind of chief clerk while Grant got on with the fighting.

In the space of a few weeks in the spring of 1864 Grant reshaped the entire Army. Ever since its creation at the end of the Revolutionary War the United States Army had been organized as a constabulary, based on garrisons, outposts and military departments. When military action was needed, units from the widely scattered posts were brought together to fight a battle or campaign. Once the military challenge had passed, the troops were dispersed across the country once more. The huge Union army was organized along the same lines. The constabulary system had survived the War of 1812, the Mexican War, numerous clashes with the Indians and, until now, the Civil War. Halleck never did anything to alter it, because he couldn't see anything wrong with it.

Grant, however, had no time for antiques. He moved into a small brick house next to the railroad depot in Culpeper, Virginia, and began to demolish the constabulary method of making war. He was only the second truly strategic thinker the United States military produced, the first being Winfield Scott.

Although Grant always protested that he was not a Napoleonic general he nevertheless had a Napoleonic grasp of war. His constant goal was the destruction of the enemy's armies. Halleck and others preferred to pursue victory by capturing strategic places. When Grant threatened a strategic point, however, it was always as part of a larger design, usually to make the enemy come out and fight. Napoleon had revolutionized 18th century warfare by maneuvering between the huge fortresses of Western Europe and making his enemies fight

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

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

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in the open field, which allowed him to annihilate their armies. This was widely denounced as turning war into massacre, and Grant, who fought similar campaigns, was tarred with the same brush, for the same reason.

It seems almost inevitable, then, that when he became General-in-Chief he immediately set about turning the Union Army into something that bore a passing resemblance to Napoleon's *Grande Armée*. Out went the constabulary principle. In its place he created a large, mobile army prepared for a war of maneuver. It was free to move in any direction, for any distance, living off the land (*i.e.*, the enemy) where possible, and prepared to fight all year round. Its organizing principle was not fixed territories but powerful, converging columns, designed to apply pressure on the Confederacy from various directions, in season and out, with the movements of each column coordinated with the advance of the rest.

There would be five powerful columns, all advancing at the same time, all putting pressure on the beleaguered Confederacy, pinning its forces down while driving deep into its territory. Sherman instantly recognized the new design for the intellectual breakthrough it was. "That we are now all to act in a Common Plan, converging on a Common Center looks like Enlightened War," he wrote approvingly to Grant.

The largest of these five forces consisted of the 120,000-man Army of the Potomac, commanded by George Meade. As the Army of the Potomac advanced and attacked Lee, the 33,000-man Army of the James, operating from Fortress Monroe, was going to land somewhere south of Richmond. Its commander, Major General Benjamin Butler was a war Democrat whom Lincoln had seen fit to reward with two stars despite the fact that Butler had no talents as a combat commander. Once Butler's army landed it would pose a threat to the Confederate capital that Lee would not be able to ignore, at a time when Lee was expected to have his hands full fighting off the Army of the Potomac.

During previous advances by the Army of the Potomac, Lee had been able to regain the initiative by sending a force north, usually by using the Shenandoah Valley to outflank the advancing Federals. The alarm Lee's ripostes created in Washington would be hard to exaggerate. To prevent Lee from using the Shenandoah Valley again, Grant was going to have yet another political major general, Franz Sigel, lead a force of nearly 25,000 men through the valley to Lynchburg. Having seen John McClernand in action, Grant may have thought he had witnessed the nadir of military incompetence. Sigel was going to surprise him.

Courtesy USG collection of James A. Bultema

... superior firepower and greater mobility. That was what he was thinking about as he whittled and smoked or seemed to stare vacantly into space slumped in a folding chair next to his tent.

Grant installed Sherman in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi. Sherman would advance on Atlanta with an army of 100,000 men. His principal mission was not to take the city but to destroy the 65,000-man Confederate army assembled in Georgia under Joe Johnston. Meanwhile Nathaniel Banks, yet another political general, was ordered to wind up his futile campaign along the Red River and redirect his army towards Mobile.

Grant intended to command a total of 17 armies, comprising 500,000-plus troops deployed throughout the United States, from the field. Thanks to advanced technology, Grant informed his father, "in these days of telegraph and steam I can command whilst traveling and visiting about." It really did not matter, he said, where he put his desk. He expected, in that early spring of 1864, to move around the country, shifting from army to army, as the need arose. That, however, was not how it turned out.

While Grant was planning the campaign ahead, Lee's army was deployed along the south side of the Rapidan river, with two corps strung out on a roughly east-west axis, with a third in reserve to the rear. The first question Grant had to decide was whether to try to get around Lee's right flank or his left. From a purely tactical point of view, the best line of attack was to go around the left flank. That would provide Grant with terrain that was suited to his cavalry and artillery and offer the chance of closing rapidly on Richmond. But being in open country, it would be hard to protect his immense wagon trains, and if he tried to rely on the railroad, his army could easily get bogged down in guarding and rebuilding it rather than fighting the enemy.

The alternative, to go around the right flank, meant fighting in rough, densely wooded terrain, where there were no good roads and his cavalry and artillery would

be useless. Yet he would be much closer to the point where Butler would land the Army of the James, his supply line would be shorter, it would be easier to protect his wagon trains and it he would be almost certain to pin Lee down.

In the end, it was a question of how much confidence he really had in the Army of the Potomac— how good were its officers? How strong was its fighting spirit? This army had launched six offensives in its three year history, and all six had been repulsed. With Sherman, McPherson and a force of 120,000 Western troops, Grant later told a friend, he would have turned Lee's left flank and risked everything on smashing Lee's army in the open field. With the Army of the Potomac, he had little real choice. He simply did not trust the its senior officers to respond as western commanders would. Grant ordered Meade to cross the Rapidan by way of three fords to the east of Lee's right flank.

This plan lacked Grant's usual aggressiveness and daring. He was fearful, though, not only about how the Army of the Potomac would respond to his leadership, but he was worried about the safety of the huge and vulnerable supply train, consisting of 3500 horse drawn wagons, on which Meade's army was going to depend.

Grant expected to push his troops quickly through the 100-square miles of dense second-growth timber known as "the Wilderness" and have them emerge poised to strike Lee's right flank about six miles south of the Rapidan. He made a serious mistake in not thrusting far enough before turning west to pin Lee. He should have ordered the Cavalry Corps, numbering 12,500 experienced horse soldiers, to ride south and seize the vital crossroads at Spotsylvania Court House, 12 miles south of the Rapidan. From there, he would have adequate roads from which to attack Lee, would be in a better position to link up with Butler's Army of the James and would have the Wilderness well behind him. The cavalry force was strong enough to keep the Confederates at bay while the infantry marched down to Spotsylvania.

It is almost certain that Grant considered this possibility, or something much like it. But he handled the superbly equipped, magnificent looking Army of the Potomac with care. It was almost as if he felt he was teaching a spoiled, bad-tempered rich kid to walk.

He found himself drawn into a ferocious battle in the Wilderness and failed to turn Lee's right flank. He tried again at Spotsylvania, and was stopped once more. After that, he advanced on Cold Harbor and suffered one of the worst defeats of the war.

The essential Grant lived between the cigar and the ears, and in June 1864 he was thinking tenaciously. He hadn't turned Lee's right flank, and he was fast running out of room to maneuver Meade's army. Nor could he simply hold on and try to grind down Bobby Lee. That would only allow Lee to pull back into the trenches around Richmond and turn the campaign into a protracted siege which could only add to war weariness in the North and weaken Lincoln's chances of re-election in November.

Like a virtuoso musician, Grant was doing several things at once. He was trying to keep Lee out of those trenches; turn Lee's right flank and place himself between Lee's army and Richmond; all the while keeping Lee pinned down so that even if the turning movement failed Lee would not be able to pull most of his army out, head north and threaten Washington, forcing Grant to withdraw hastily and defend the capital.

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Every time Lee succeeded in preventing Grant from getting between his army and Richmond he made it less likely that Grant would ever be able to crush him in a head-on clash of arms. And by fighting on the defensive and mounting little more than raids and counterattacks, Lee had also come close to wiping out Grant's numerical advantage. Besides, the apparent two to one margin of manpower superiority that Grant possessed was something of an illusion. So much of his army was engaged in guarding his lines of communication, occupying conquered territory and handling his supplies that up front, where the fighting took place, he sometimes barely outnumbered the Confederates.

Grant's biggest advantages were not greater manpower or materiel but superior firepower and greater mobility. It was for him to turn these into the instruments of victory. That was what he was thinking about as he whittled and smoked or seemed to stare vacantly into space slumped in a folding chair next to his tent.

The 3500 wagons, the fleet of steamers and gunboats, the tens of thousands of modern repeating arms and the thousands of well-mounted cavalry under his command were what, in a later day, would be known as force multipliers. That is, if used properly they could make up for the fact that Grant did not have the three to one advantage in frontline manpower needed to crash through the defenses of a well-entrenched foe. Superiority in firepower and mobility might make his infantry as effective as if they really did have greatly superior numbers. He possessed advantages that would allow him to strike at Lee's flanks, rear and logistics. That was how he would ultimately prevail over a highly experienced commander like Lee who not only had fixed defenses to retreat into but also had the benefit of interior lines, knowledge of the ground and a local population eager to aid the Confederacy and harass the invaders.

Grant decided to bring the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James together by putting both of them south of the James and have them cut the railroad lines by seizing Petersburg. Richmond and Lee depended completely on the railroad links with the rest of the South. Grant hoped as strongly as he had ever hoped for anything that once there were Union troops athwart his railroad lines Lee would choose to fight a climactic battle rather than retreating into his trenches and pointlessly dragging out the war. A winter siege would exact a terrible toll in deaths from disease. On June 9, with these prospects teeming in his mind, Grant wrote to his Congressional patron, Elihu B. Washburne. "All the fight except defensive and behind breast works is taken out of Lee's army. Unless my next move brings on a battle the balance of the campaign will settle down to a siege."

First, however, he would have to disengage from Cold Harbor. Not easy, seeing that Union and rebel trenches were only 40-50 yards apart in some places. Even so, the night of June 12 the Army of the Potomac crept away. By dawn next day it was moving south in one of the most daring strategic moves in American history. When Lee's patrols reported the empty trenches, Lee was mystified. Had Grant and Meade given up, and retreated to Washington? Or had they gone south, to lure him into a hasty move in pursuit, which might allow them to double back and get into his rear?

While Lee wrestled with these questions the Army of the Potomac was hurrying south, crossing the Chickahominy river eight miles from Cold Harbor. Once across, Meade's soldiers pushed onwards, another 25 miles, until they reached the wide, unfordable James river. At its narrowest, 10 miles east of City Point, the James was 700 yards wide, and 80 feet deep. It had a tidal range of four feet, and no one knew whether a 2100-foot pontoon bridge could ride out that kind of buckling rise and fall. No army had ever built a pontoon bridge more than 1000 feet long.

There was another danger—the Confederate flotilla at Richmond. This force included three ironclads with long range, heavy caliber guns. They could shell the steamers that carried the infantry across and send fireships downstream to wreck the pontoon bridge on which the rest of the army—its cavalry, its artillery, its thousands of supply wagons and close to 4000 beef cattle—crossed the James. For two days and one night the Army of the Potomac would be wide open to a devastating attack during the most difficult operation in ground warfare, an opposed river crossing.

Nor could Grant count on the Union navy tipping the scales. Although Union sailors dominated the eastern seaboard, they did not control the James river much beyond the tidal estuary, because their most powerful vessels, the heavy and slow, low freeboard monitors, had trouble navigating the sharp bends and treacherous currents.

A few days earlier Lee had a hunch about what Grant might do and remarked to Jubal Early, commander of his Second Corps, "We must destroy this army of Grant's before he gets to the James river. If he gets there it will become a siege, and then it will be a mere question of time." Lee now had the chance of a lifetime, if he had the nerve to act on that hunch. The destruction of the Army of the Potomac at this stage of the war, when recruits were few and the deeply unpopular draft was about to go into force, would have been profound. It would probably have brought Lincoln's defeat that fall and assured the survival, in some form, of the Confederacy.

All Lee had to do was penetrate the thin cavalry screen deployed between the Chickahominy and the James to confirm Meade's movement south, wait until roughly at least half the Army of the Potomac was across the James, summon the Confederate navy to wreck the bridge and the ferries with long-range gunfire and fireships, then attack the surprised, and almost certainly demoralized, portion stranded without hope of rescue on the northern shore of the river.

The Union force that had reached the southern bank would then find itself trapped in Bermuda Hundred and

around City Point, with much of its artillery and cavalry now at the bottom of the James. Its evacuation by sea would be almost inevitable and virtually certain to unleash a political crisis that would threaten to overwhelm the government. Grant's shift to the James gave the South the chance to redeem every failure, every defeat and every setback since the death of Albert Sydney Johnston at Shiloh two years before.

The chance of the move to the James ending in failure was high. No one in the history of war had ever moved a force of 115,000 men up to 50 miles in three days, crossed two rivers deep in enemy territory and built a pontoon bridge more than 2000 feet long virtually under the guns of a hostile naval force. Grant, however, had a gambler's soul. He was willing to risk everything on a single throw. His cousin-in-law, William Smith, wasn't surprised. "He loved to gamble. He loved risks—chances—he liked to bet. He was not puritanical in that," said Smith.

There was more to it, though, than the thrill of defying the odds. Risk played an important part in the way Grant thought about war. In a discussion one evening that summer about the abilities of Don Carlos Buell, the general extolled by Grant's critics as the man who saved him at Shiloh, Grant expressed his own admiration for Buell. When it came to tactics, he said, Buell was easily his superior. The trouble with Buell was his reluctance to fight unless he was sure of the result. "No man ought to win a victory," Grant concluded, "who is not willing to run the risk of defeat."



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"No man ought to win a victory who is not willing to run the risk of defeat."

He was betting now that Lee would not take the kind of risk with Richmond that he was prepared to take with Meade's army and the outcome of the war. Lee's obsession with defending Richmond had tied his hands and dulled his edge. Although Lee had repeatedly succeeded in preventing Grant from enveloping his right flank, the old daring was gone. "Lee's great blunder," Grant remarked later, "was in holding Richmond."

While Meade's troops marched south, engineers were building the pontoon bridge and dozens of steamboats came upriver to act as ferries. The morning of June 15 dawned a brilliant blue, revealing the finished bridge, the 101 crude boats that held it afloat rocking gently on the moving waters, the steamers waiting to serve as ferries blew short blasts on their whistles, while Grant stood atop the riverbank on the north side of the James, hands clasped behind his back, as the head of a blue column 25 miles long marched past him, bands playing, banners snapping in the breeze off the river, the sun making the points of bayonets glitter like gold and silver, and the dull boom of cannon somewhere on the northern horizon drifted lazily down, announcing that Gouvernor Warren's corps, at the other end of the column, was fighting a rearguard action. Lee had regained contact, but was following rather than pursuing Meade.

When Meade's army linked up at Petersburg with Butler the Confederates were in a desperate situation. Grant had taken Lee so completely by surprise there were only a few thousand Confederates manning its miles of entrenchments, while Grant's maneuvers had put nearly 40,000 Union troops in the city's northwestern suburbs. All that was needed was for a determined advance and within 12 hours Petersburg and all its railroad lines would have been captured. The two principal commanders on he spot, however, were "Baldy" Smith who proved to be a timid and fearful man, and Winfield Scott Hancock, who allowed himself to be talked out of making a night attack by Baldy Smith.

Had this operation been entrusted to Sherman or Sheridan, the outcome would almost certainly have been different. As it was, Lee and Beauregard were given enough time to move more than 10,000 men down to Petersburg before the halted Union force got rolling again.

At the end of July Grant got another chance to bring the war to a swift end, when a huge mine was detonated under Confederate lines, opening a breach a mile wide. Once again his subordinates failed to play their proper part. The most brilliant generalship in the world can be wasted if its implementation is entrusted to fools.

That fall, Sherman took Atlanta, a victory that helped ensure Lincoln's re-election. Sherman's Atlanta campaign was a perfect illustration of Grant's strategy: he was holding Lee so tightly that Lee was unable to send reinforcements to block a Union advance in the deep South. Lee tried twice, to use the Shenandoah to threaten Washington, but Grant calmly dealt with each threat, even though those who ought to have supported him, such as Halleck, grew hysterical, and even Lincoln's faith seemed to waver.

Grant's riposte was to have Sheridan devastate the Shenandoah valley. Lee had always been able to seize the initiative in the Shenandoah, but now Grant was pinning him down so tightly that Sheridan was free to advance into it and take it away from the Confederacy.

Grant maintained the pressure through the winter of 1864, moving remorselessly across the railroad lines that kept Richmond fed and Lee's troops supplied. When spring came, Lee tried to break Grant's grip, by attacking Fort Stedman, and failed. He then tried to break out and link up with Joe Johnston, only to find Grant had blocked the way south. When Lee turned west, his army disintegrated. By the time he reached Appomatox he commanded a force of fewer than 10,000 men.

Lee had tried several times to regain the initiative in his 11-month struggle with Grant, but he had never even come close. Between receiving his commission as lieutenant general and mid-June 1864 Grant had smoked furiously, whittled countless sticks and torn a pair of fancy yellow gloves to shreds as he figured out how to defeat Lee and win the war. In those three months he also evolved the future of the United States Army, even though that was not what he was attempting to do. But this is the untold story at the heart of his Virginia campaign, the story that makes sense of what otherwise looks like a sequence of horrifyingly bloody battles, heart breaking disappointments, desperate improvization, high command failures, and ultimate success.

It began with Grant's strategic vision before he crossed the Rapidan, of five converging columns putting pressure on the Confederacy. Grant's strategy of converging columns did not need for all five to succeed. The design was sound enough that it would work even if some columns failed. After the war, converging columns were used—on a much smaller scale—to crush the Sioux. They were employed again in the Philippine Insurrection, in World Wars I and II, and in Korea.

Grant did not invent the idea of converging columns, or pincer movements as they are sometimes called. What he did was to reinvent them to suit American needs and capabilities. In doing so, he intended to give the two most important elements in the U.S. Army's way of making war—maximum firepower, maximum mobility—the central role that they deserved. He did this at a time when soldiers on both sides entrenched rapidly, skilfully and almost enthusiastically. In the spring of 1864 the Civil War seemed poised to descend into a struggle of sieges and trenches, of spades rather than rifles. Grant, however, never really stopped moving. It wasn't in him to do so.

The strategy of converging columns merged with what is sometimes known as grand tactics; the tactics, that is, not of a division or a corps but an army or an army group. At this level, Grant relied on the wide envelopment, a movement in which one part of a commander's force moves forward to pin the enemy in place, while the rest of his force maneuvers to attack a flank or get into the rear. He had attempted to envelop Lee's right in the Wilderness, and failed. He tried again at Spotsylvania, and failed again. Yet before the war ended, his approach to grand tactics would be vindicated.

When the Command and General Staff School was created at Fort Leavenworth following World War I, its students—all of them potential corps and army commanders—learned only one grand tactic, the wide envelopment. What's more, it is with us still. The wide envelopment was the army-level tactic used with devastating effect by American ground troops in the Gulf War of 1991. A strongly supported marine division advanced to apply pressure on Kuwait, thus pinning the Iraqis in place, while Allied armor and infantry divisions swung wide around Kuwait, advancing through the desert to strike the Iraqi army in the rear.

An Uncharacteristically Heroic Pose

Library of Congress

The small unit version of the wide envelopment is known as the holding attack. It became the only tactic taught at the Infantry School after George C. Marshall took control there in the late 1920s.

What both the Infantry School and the Command and General Staff School sought was a realization of

Grant's vision, which called for a systematic approach from strategy at the highest level to tactics on the lowest level that was so coherent and so simple that even an army of half-trained amateurs could soon learn to fight effectively. Like all truly imaginative and creative people, Grant was both a man of his time and at least one generation ahead of it.

His strategy and tactics both challenged one of the traditional principles of war—a commander does not divide his army in the face of the enemy. To fight as Grant did would only work if he grasped and retained the strategic and tactical initiative. If he did not relentlessly keep up the pressure on Lee, part of his command would probably suffer a major defeat. Only a truly aggressive and confident general could fight as Grant fought.

The intellectual pattern that he wove into the fabric of the American military tradition wasn't Napoleonic, even though it contains Napoleonic elements. It was quasi- Clausewitzian in its fundamental premise that only the offensive is decisive in war, but it isn't likely that Grant knew anything about Clausewitz. His way of fighting was essentially the expression of a singularly restless spirit, a spirit that since childhood had sought movement, drama, adventure. The result in maturity was a commander fighting battle after battle in a relentlessly aggressive campaign, forever wreathed in cigar smoke, puffing deeply on optimism and opportunism, at first trying and failing, then gradually trying and succeeding and, albeit unconsciously, sending a message.

A GENERATION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR ended, the Army took possession of that message. It did so not only by studying the headache-inducing old maps and reading the 100,000 pages of documents embalmed in the *Official Records*, but also by taking over many of the battlefields and using them as outdoor classrooms. That is why Shiloh, Donelson, Petersburg and others survive to this day, instead of being buried under housing developments called Grant Condo Towers or Rebel Retreat. Grant's clear, easily grasped strategy and tactics are still there, embedded in his battlefields as eternally as the rocks that trip up the unwary tourist on a hot summer's day.

This simple but powerful strategy, these simple but effective tactics, the whole geared to an army rich in firepower and mobility, are the context of Grant's Virginia campaign. But they offer something else, too— a window on an unusual mind and on the other side we can see something of Grant at his best, Grant as man thinking.

In the end, it was Grant's strategy and tactics that defeated Lee; not his superiority in manpower and materiel but the way he used his advantages in mobility and firepower to overcome Lee's advantages of fighting from entrenchments and with the benefits of interior lines.

From Belmont to Appomattox, Grant's victories were written off by the scoffers and doubters as mere luck. He got so used to it he even joked about it himself. After Lee surrendered at Appomattox, Grant went back to his headquarters and as staff officers crowded around in obvious excitement, he smiled and shrugged. "More of Grant's luck!" he said, making fun of his critics, of his fame, of military glory itself.

This modest and brilliant man was convinced that because no two wars are fought under the same conditions each conflict creates its own rules. It would never have occurred to him that after the Civil War, whenever the United States Army was able to fight as he had taught it to fight, it would prevail. And in those wars where Grant's lessons were ignored, such as Korea and Vietnam, it would be humiliated. He was not simply the finest soldier the United States has ever produced. Ulysses S. Grant was one of the greatest soldiers in history. ■

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Briefings *(continued from page 61)*

in the opening phase of the conflict on the Trans-Mississippi frontier, but Brown makes no effort to explain his sometimes erratic behavior or evaluate his checkered contribution to the Confederate cause. Consequently, this massive book should not be considered the last word on Albert Pike in the Civil War.

—William L. Shea

William Shea is coauthor of *Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West* (1992) and the author of forthcoming books on the Vicksburg and Prairie Grove campaigns.

STONEWALL OF THE WEST: PATRICK CLEBURNE AND THE CIVIL WAR

Craig L Symonds, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997. Maps, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index, 322 pages



Major General Patrick Cleburne was certainly the most famous Confederate division commander in the Western theater, and one of the very few foreign-born generals of any note in the Southern Army. Born of the Protestant gentry in Ireland, he served in the British army because of his failure to enter apothecary college. Cleburne came to the United States with his family at age 21, lived for a time in Cincinnati, then was lured to Helena, Arkansas by an opportunity to work as a chemist. The young Irishman was ambitious, eager to fit into his new society, but innately shy. He became involved in local politics and studied law before leading the 1st Arkansas Infantry at the start of the Civil War.

Cleburne's career shot upward from that point, his solid and dependable performances as a brigade leader at Shiloh and during the Kentucky Campaign led to his promotion to division command. He quickly became a rock upon which the Army of Tennessee depended in times of crisis, fighting well at Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, and particularly at Missionary Ridge. Throughout the Atlanta Campaign and the early stages of Hood's Invasion of Tennessee, Cleburne continued to impress hiss superiors. The Irishman's career was ended in the bloodbath at Franklin, on November 30, 1864, when Hood recklessly squandered the lives of six generals and more than a third of his attacking force in a rash assault against fortified Yankees.

This is not the first biography of this intriguing figure, who was the Western version of the legendary Stonewall Jackson, but it is by far the best. It is unlikely the anyone could write a better book on Cleburne in the future. Symonds does not overplay his subject. He correctly characterizes Cleburne as a solid division leader who probably had reached the upper limits of his ability. Cleburne lacked the ability to conceive and execute strategy of his own, he faithfully obeyed orders and got the best performance out of his troops. He was, ultimately, a perfect soldier's general, not a great commander. Cleburne's infamous proposal to free slaves and arm them for service in the Confederate army, made in early 1864 long before Southerners were willing to consider this revolutionary idea, earned him the enmity of many generals in the Army of Tennessee. But Symonds deemphasizes the role this incident played in preventing Cleburne from rising to command of a corps.

The book is excellently written, the style is evocative, and Symonds strikes a very good balance between the larger history that surrounded Cleburne's life and the personal details of his career. Cleburne the man is well fleshed out despite the very limited number of personal papers. There is hardly anything to criticize in this book. The maps are minimal but adequate. Also, Symonds mistakenly identifies the location of Arkansas Post, it is not on the Red River but on the Arkansas River, and the Confederate garrison did not surrender without a shot being fired. But these points are not relevant to the main message—Symonds has produced a superb biography that is the definitive book on Patrick Cleburne.

—Earl J. Hess

ULYSSES S. GRANT: SOLDIER & PRESIDENT

Geoffrey Perret, Random House, September 1997, 576 pages, photographs, index

GEOFFREY PERRET, whose previous book covered the life of General MacArthur, has written the first biography worthy of its subject since the Lloyd Lewis-Bruce Catton trilogy of 1950-1968. The first eight chapters cover Grant's life prior to the Civil War. Two of these detail Grant's outstanding record in the Mexican War (described as "undistinguished" in a recent article in *America's Civil War!).* Seventeen chapters are devoted to the Civil War, seven to the White House years, and two to the remaining nine years of Grant's life.

Perret's style is lively (though occasionally flip), and his judgments sound. Perret's admiration for the man he regards as America's foremost soldier is obvious. But it does not prevent him from criticizing him. Of Shiloh, for example, Perret writes, "Grant reacted fiercely to the charge that he had been taken by surprise not because it was false but because it was true."

Those who cut their eye-teeth on Catton's *Grant Moves South* and *Grant Takes Command* will miss the depth of treatment accorded the war years, but by way of compensation Perret presents Grant—not the nondescript of myth, but the vital, highly gifted individual—in a more three dimensional manner than Catton. It is unnecessary to compare the new volume with William S. McFeely's embarrassing travesty *Grant: A Biography* (1981). Anyone looking for a single volume life of Grant need look no further than this new treatment.

—Keith Poulter

A HISTORY OF THE CONFEDERATE NAVY

by Raimondo Luraghi, Translated by Paolo E. Coletta, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, hardbound, Illus, ppxx, 515. $45.00

This is Luraghi's Magus Opus. First published in his native Italian, the Naval Institute Press has made it available to the American market while it is handled in Great Britain and the Commonwealth by Chatham Publishing.

Semi-retired now, Luraghi taught at the University of Genoa for years and also was able to carry on much of his decades long research as a visiting professor to several American colleges and universities. He has also previously published a

popular one volume Italian language history of the American Civil War. As with many academic studies, he paints in broad strokes, but nevertheless misses little.

Luraghi shows us, in well written language ably translated into English (by one who is familiar with seapower and nautical terms), the sway of technology, the impact of the ironclad, the use and value of the commerce raider, and Europe's influence on the war. He does this while showing that essentially the Confederacy was an agricultural society at war with an industrial society in the first modern war of the industrial revolution.

One of the important values of Luraghi's work lies in his giving the American Civil War a larger context. Too often books on the American Civil War have almost a parochial point of view. It is not uncommon even today to read of a writer claiming the Union navy was the strongest in the world in 1865 - yet virtually lacked any sea-going ironclads common to the navies of contemporary Great Britain and Imperial France. Luraghi helps cure this by seeing the war from a European's eyes, though he also worked with and corresponded with many American Civil War experts such as William N. Still, Jr. and the late E. Milby Burton.

He allows us to see the impact of the Crimean War on military technology, and the development of rifled artillery both in Europe and by John Mercer Brooke in the Confederacy, the latter with his famous Brooke Rifles. He also elaborates on James P. Baxter III's discussion, first brought up in his *Introduction of the Ironclad* in 1933, that Sardinian General of the Artillery Giovanni Cavalli may have been the originator of the design of the CSS *Virginia*, better known to many as the *Merrimack.*

Luraghi points out that the Confederate Navy never surrendered up to Appomattox Court House and their fighting spirit was still alive, even then. In the end Luraghi's appreciation and sympathetic view of the effort by Confederate Naval Secretary Stephen Mallory and the Confederate Navy is probably too strong. Luraghi contends that of the major Confederate seaports only New Orleans fell to the Union Navy. While technically this is true, the Union Navy undertook actions that closed Mobile, Savannah, Charleston, and Wilmington as major blockade running ports, even if the Union Army was the arm that captured the cities.

But professor Luraghi has added an important book to the understanding of the American Civil War at sea and on the rivers. Well written, with a great deal of thought put into it, it is well worth reading.

—Jack Greene

CIVIL WAR BOOKS

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

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

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SOME CAME HOME:

The Story of the 2nd Illinois Cavalry

Lane, Ogle County, Illinois, July 22nd 1861. On Washington Street the sun beat down remorselessly on the heads of spectators and recruits alike, as the men of the local volunteer cavalry company prepared to depart for war. The local dignitaries had had their say, and a silk flag made by the ladies of the town had been presented to the company, and now the tension had reached unbearable proportions. A speech was called for from one of "the boys". Several names were called, and as many invitations solemnly declined. More as a joke than anything, some wag in the audience called out the name of Nick Hotaling, brother of the Captain and one of four siblings setting off this day for the seat of war. Nick was a short, broad shouldered man who gave off a sense of great reserve power. At the age of 12 he had run away from home and shipped on a Bedford whaler. Following the sea until a few years before the war, he had then purchased a farm near Lane and settled down to the life of a farmer. It was not known that he had ever uttered a word in public or could do so. Dismounting from his horse he mounted a wagon alongside a man holding a flag. Ignoring the cat calls and bantering, he waited for the crowd to quiet. Then slowly he reached out and grasped the flag staff beside him. In resonant, measured tones, he said, pointing to the flag:

"It is against *this* that they have made war. It is to defend *this* that we have come. It was Washington's flag, it is yours and mine. I have followed that flag over continents and seas - from the frigid zones to the equator. I have saluted it beneath every star that shines upon the earth. In all my wanderings it has floated over me. In strange lands it has been my friend and my pride, my guardian and my protector." He concluded, "That flag stands for humanity! I stand for that flag!" Then drawing it to his breast, he arose to his full height and holding his right hand aloft as if taking an oath, continued: *"And by the God who gave me breath I will fight for it now!"*

As one of the company recalled more than 50 years later, the response which followed was not so much a cheer, but a benediction. And those who parted from their loved ones that day felt a comfort and a resolution they would not have felt had it not been for those simple, lofty, burning words.

Similar scenes were being enacted in other parts of the State, where the other eleven companies destined to become part of the 2nd Cavalry were also assembling and bidding farewell to their loved ones and to their communities. The assembly point, Funk's Grove near Bloomington, was switched at the last minute to Camp Butler outside of Springfield. Old soldiers will not be surprised to learn that one company, Company F, failed to get the new order, and after a hot and dusty march from Monticello to Bloomington, found themselves farther from their destination than when they had set out!

Each company had been independently recruited on the initiative of some local community leader, who not unnaturally was then generally elected Captain, while other popular figures were elected 1st and 2nd lieutenants. It is a commonplace that this matter of the men electing their own officers produced a decidedly mixed lot, and that it had an adverse effect upon discipline. Perhaps because it was one of the earlier regiments recruited, this does not appear to have been the case with the 2nd Illinois. Of the company officers elected very few failed to measure up. Several of them were veterans of the Mexican war, three were county sheriffs, at least two had been regulars and one of these was described as a cavalry drill master without superior in the service. Others were attorneys, teachers, newspapermen, and farmers.

Any weakness to be found was in the field officers. These were appointed by the Governor, and they varied in quality from excellent to appalling. For Colonel of the 2nd Illinois Governor Yates chose banker, attorney, and former State Senator Silas Noble of Dixon. Born in Massachusetts in 1808, Noble moved to Illinois in 1841, and was well known to Abraham Lincoln. Widowed in 1857, Noble had married again a few months later, and family tradition has it that he nearly bankrupted himself spending lavishly on his young bride. Noble was 53 years old and had no military experience.

Col. Silas Noble

For Lieutenant-Colonel, Yates reached out to the youngest and perhaps the most popular member of the State legislature, Harvey Hogg. A native of Tennessee, Hogg was a strapping six-footer with looks reminiscent of Elvis Presley. As a young man Hogg attended school in Tennessee. His parents both died when he was quite young, and he was raised by

his step-mother, an uncle acting as guardian. Reared on tales of Murat and the Napoleonic cavalry, young Hogg wished to enter West point. But his elders disapproved, and instead he studied law in Lebanon, Tennessee, followed by two years at Emory and Henry College in south-west Virginia. Winner of the oratorical prize in his final year, he announced his intention to speak to the assembled school on "The Evils of Slavery". The faculty was outraged, but young Hogg stood firm, declaring he would speak on the subject of "his honest opinions or not at all." To their credit, the faculty allowed him to go ahead, though history does not record the reception accorded his speech.

Courtesy McLean Historical Society

Lt. Col Harvey Hogg

Studying law under Judge Carruthers (who in 1863 became Confederate Governor of Tennessee), Harvey met and courted Miss Prudence Alcorn of Clarksville. Upon marriage in 1855 the newly~weds removed to Bloomington, Illinois, Harvey freeing the last of his slaves as he did so.

Map by Joe Youst© 1997

In Bloomington, Harvey embarked on a very successful legal career, at one time in partnership with Ward Lamon, a former partner of Abraham Lincoln's. "Prudie's" uncle, James Miller, was State Treasurer, and young Harvey soon found himself embroiled in politics, being one of the founding members of the new Republican Party. His forthright yet unassuming ways soon secured for him the position of City, then District, Attorney. Abraham Lincoln habitually lodged with him when in Bloomington, and Harvey was a member of Lincoln's prosecuting team in the famous murder trial of Isaac Wyant in 1856. In 1857 and 1859 the Republican minority in the State House of Representatives unanimously backed him for Clerk of the House, but in each case the (majority) Democratic nominee was elected. In 1860 he was elected a Representative from McLean County, immediately becoming chairman of the committees on the militia and on education, a favorite of Governor Yates, and a leading member of the legislature. He was just 26 years old.

Courtesy McLean Historical Society

Lt. Col Harvey Hogg

Different again was Quincy McNeil. A cousin of the Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives, Francis A McNeil, Quincy was a character. Likeable, but weak and with a fondness for the bottle, he was employed as a clerk in the courthouse in Rock Island. He liked to give himself airs and be regarded as a full fledged member of the legal profession, once going so far as to describe himself in print as an "attorney at law". Perhaps he saw the war as his chance for social advancement. Certainly he was among the first twelve men to offer himself as a member of an infantry company forming in Rock Island, and cherished hopes of being elected Captain. The company was oversubscribed, with a total of no fewer than 180 volunteers. An election for officers was held, McNeil coming in third and securing the position of second lieutenant. This was not good enough for Quincy, and nothing daunted he organized the 80 surplus men into a second company, and was duly elected Captain. The army at this time, however, was not accepting infantry companies with fewer than 100 men, so once again his coveted comission as Captain was in jeopardy.

A lesser man might have given up. A better man would have found the extra men. Quincy did neither. The original company had by this time been mustered in, so Quincy cooly "borrowed" the names of 20 of them, and added them to his company roster, bringing the total to the required 100. The enrolling officer failed to spot the duplications and over the next several weeks, as new recruits rolled in, Quincy crossed out the names of the duplicates and substituted those those of the newcomers. No doubt he breathed a sigh of relief when his fraud was thus, as he thought, safely buried. Unfortunately for him, some conscientious officer in the War Department noticed the eliminated names and jumped to a conclusion: *what kind of leadership could cause 20 men in a single company to desert in their first 4 weeks of service?!* No doubt amid much embarrasment the whole story came out, and McNeil was lucky to keep his commission. In any case, his service with the 13th Ilinois was of short duration, as he was plucked from its ranks in August to become a Major of the newly forming 2nd Illinois Cavalry.

Colonel Mudd
Courtesy of U.S. Military History Institute, Carlisle

At Camp Butler, the men of the 2nd Illinois were fortunate to have several weeks of training before leaving on active service. Like all Union cavalry regiments mustered in prior to August 26th 1861, the men provided their own horses, being paid 40 cents a day by the government for their upkeep. The historian of company A has it that the horses were all hand picked, and the men"superbly mounted." On the other hand several horses in other companies gave out on the way to camp! Be that as it may, very nearly all the horses were accepted into the cavalry service, most being valued by the inspecting officer at around $120.00, which at that place and time implies a sound horse. In none of the surviving records of the company is there any reference to the trials of learning to ride, which might mean that the men were simply reticent on the subject, or that coming from a rural background all were familiar with horses. At Camp Butler the 2nd also acquired an additional major, John January Mudd, a businessman with interests in both St. Louis and Chicago, a Republican, patriot, and intimate of Governor Yates. And as it turned out a first rate officer and man.

Company F, recruited largely in Piatt County in east-central Illinois, may be taken as fairly typical of the regiment. The Captain, Reuben Bowman was a six foot tall native of Pennsylvania. County Sheriff at the outbreak of war, and a substantial farmer (owning 400 acres), Bowman had also served as an infantry officer in the regular army. For first lieutenant the men picked Melville H. Musser, a 39-year old native of Ohio and proprietor of the popular Musser House in Monticello. 2nd lieutenant Neil T. Shannon was a 28 year old farmer, and first sergeant Isaiah Stickel a 31-year old schoolteacher. Of the 85 members of the company whose prewar occupation I have been able to ascertain, 72 were described at enlistment as "farmers", a term which covered everything from the head of a household with a substantial farm, to teenage farm laborers. There were also 3 schoolteachers, 2 painters, 2 carpenters, and 1 each from the following occupations: lawyer, inn keeper, store keeper, wagon maker, bricklayer, and plasterer.

Their birthplaces reflected Illinois' place in the second wave of western expansion. Of the 81 whose birthplace is known, thirty-six were born in Ohio, seven in Indiana, six in Pennsylvania, and six in New York. Fourteen were born in Illinois, though only two were natives of Piatt County. Three hailed from Virginia, and one each from Vermont, Kentucky, and Massachusetts. Six were immigrants, three each from Ireland and England. Many of those from Ohio and Pennsylvania had family roots in Virginia. Ages ranged from 18 to 54, with an average of 24.8. At least two had radical backgrounds: attorney Watkins L Ryder had attended the abolitionist hotbed of Oberlin College, and Levi Leib had ridden with "General" Jim Lane in "Bleeding Kansas". Leib was also locally famous for his single-handed capture, in 1859, of a notorious fugitive wanted for murder.

All military formations have their characters, and Company F was no exception. There was short, dark, blue eyed Caleb Bradley. Footman to an Irish Lord, Caleb's grandfather had eloped to Massachusetts with his employer's daughter, and later joined Washington's Continental Army. His son in turn fought in the war of 1812, using his bounty to acquire land in Ohio, and *his* son Caleb in turn enlisted in 1861. Another young man of great promise was John Kirby. Brought to America from Ireland by his widowed father at the age of nine, John was later adopted by a family named McCoy and moved with them to Illinois. Aged nineteen at the outbreak of war, John was already respected by his peers for his industry and initiative. There was also thirty year old Isaiah Weedman, who had crossed the western plains in 1850 with four of his brothers, only to discover that there was more money to be made, or at least more *certain* money to be made, farming in Illinois than panning for gold in California.

Courtesy U.S. Military History Institute, Carlisle

Trooper, 2nd Illinois Cavalry

And no account of Company F would be complete without mention of James H. Hollingsworth. Jim hailed from Virginia, and was reputed to be the black sheep of a pioneering Quaker family (whose home, Hollingsworth House, is now the headquarters of the Winchester-Frederick County Historical Society). Hollingsworth was the proprietor of a grocery store in Monticello, owner of several large tracts of land, and his own worst enemy. Truculent, aggressive, and frequently drunk, he was forever quarreling with his neighbors and ending up in court, whether as plaintiff or defendant. Among other charges he faced were trespass, assault, illegally selling liquor, and running a brothel! Clearly, however, he believed in hiring the best, for he was defended no fewer than eleven times in the tiny courthouse in Monticello by one of the Eighth Judicial Circuit's best attorneys - Abraham Lincoln. Possibly he enlisted out of a feeling of personal obligation!

Company F is a striking illustration of the fact that when men enlisted in 1861 they were not joining some anonymous military machine. Particularly if drawn from a small community, the members of the company already knew one another. They were friends, neighbors, brothers, and intimates. At least eighty of the one hundred members of Company F were related, either by blood or by marriage. Captain Bowman had a son and three nephews in the company, and there were several sets of brothers and any number of in laws. This sense of community was a powerful bonding factor. And the plain fact was that if a soldier failed to measure up, his whole community would soon know.

As summer changed to fall, one company after another was sent to the "front". Typically they were not grouped as a regiment, but instead sent hither and yon, one company here another there. Many were armed only with a pistol or a saber, and some of the carbines issued were more likely to inflict harm to the owner than on the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Hogg was so incensed at the inadequate arms, that he proposed going to Washington to appeal personally to the President, but this idea was scotched by higher authority. Nevertheless by October most of the men had weapons of one sort or another, and were kept busy chasing guerrillas, scouting, and guarding vital locations such as bridges. Although they had not yet engaged in any major battles, the life of constant scouting and skirmishing was physically hard, and the weaker brethren, including the quarrelsome Hollingsworth, were soon weeded out. A member of company A, Harvey James, was detached to act as a scout, reconnoitering Confederate positions at Belmont,

WESTERN TENNESSEE

Map by Joe Youst© 1997

Missouri and Columbus, Kentucky on the opposite shore of the Mississippi. Using as a cover story a search for a missing brother, he was able to tour the Confederate camps without suspicion. Captured on his return journey, he was tried as a spy and sentenced to be shot the next morning. However, he was able to escape and return to his own lines. The information he brought back was of use when Grant pushed down the Mississippi to Belmont the following month.

In February 1862 Grant commenced one of the war's most significant moves, the attack on Forts Henry and Donelson. Two companies of the 2nd took part, reconnoitering the approaches to Fort Donelson and skirmishing with the cavalry of Nathan Bedford Forrest. In March a detachment of the 2nd Illinois, commanded by Harvey Hogg were the first Union troops to enter the abandoned Confederate stronghold of Columbus. The following month they were present at the Battle of Shiloh, though with little to do but try to stop skulkers from finding refuge under the bluffs along the Tennessee. They were part of a cavalry force ordered to pursue the retreating rebels at the end of the battle, and it was possibly a member of Company A who shot Forrest in the back as he conducted the Confederate rearguard. But the federal cavalry commander, Colonel T. Lyle Dickey, was a lukewarm warrior at best, and the "pursuit" (commanded from the rear) was called off before it had hardly got started. To their dying day members of the 2nd claimed they could have inflicted real damage on the demoralized Confederates if only they had been allowed to pursue in earnest.

Up until this time the regiment had been badly scattered. Two companies were with Grant, one in Missouri, others in Kentucky or at Cairo, Illinois. Colonel Noble, "so heavy he had difficulty mounting a horse", was rarely with the regiment, usually being assigned to duty as commander of some back area such as Paducah. Harvey Hogg, too, had been absent, tending to his wife, who was dying of tuberculosis. Refused compassionate leave, he actually tendered his resignation, but on his wife's death withdrew it. But now as many as five companies of the regiment operated together, as Union forces gradually extended their control of west Tennessee. That control, however, was never more than tenuous, amounting largely to the occupation of Memphis and of the towns strung out along the railroads - Union City, Bolivar, Trenton, Jackson, Grand Junction, etc. The area was one of mixed loyalties, the counties along the Tennessee, and Weakley county in the north, being generally Union in sentiment, other areas as heavily Confederate. The Confederates sent out recruiting parties, which the Union cavalry tried without much success to break up. Guerrillas sympathetic to the Confederate cause abounded, and the hot summer months of 1862 saw a constant round of hit and run raids and skirmishes, in which casualties steadily mounted.

On the 30th August near Bolivar a Union column under the command of Colonel M.D.Leggett of the 78th Ohio, was attacked by a large Confederate force. Leggett placed four companies of the 2nd Illinois under Harvey Hogg to guard his flank. The defenders drove back several rebel charges, but with the deployment of an additional Confederate cavalry regiment, the Union position became critical. Leggett asked Hogg if he could meet the enemy charge, or whether he should fall back.

"For God's sake Colonel, don't order me back," replied Hogg.

"Then meet them with a charge, and may Heaven bless you," responded Leggett.

With that Hogg ordered his men to draw sabers, and gave the order to charge. Conspicuous at the head of the charge, Hogg spurred his horse at the rebel commander, Colonel Bob McCullough, but fell pierced by seven bullets before he could reach his adversary. Lieutenant Shannon was also killed in the charge, which nevertheless helped save the day for the Union force.

The death of Harvey Hogg was an occasion for deep regret, but it was also an occasion for trepidation. Would Quincy McNeil, as senior major, move into the Lieutenant Colonel's slot? Major Mudd promptly fired off a letter to General McClernand:

Bolivar, Sept.10, 1862

General,

Will you see that an open field is left for the succession in our regiment. I believe there is but one voice among the eight companies here for Lieut Col and that is for myself, ...The Governor is so much pressed with business that too much authority in the matter may devolve upon subordinate officers.

Yours very truly,
John J Mudd

General McClernand endorsed this letter but the plea fell on deaf ears. In a subsequent letter to the Governor, Mudd poured out his woes:

Bolivar, Sept. 22, 1862

Governor,

I am just informed that McNeil will probably be appointed as Lieut. Col of this regiment. I trust this is a mistake. If not I know it is under a misapprehension of the facts. McN. would be preferred (as a commanding officer) to Col Noble, but to have two such ranking officers would ruin the best regiment in the world.....

Nevertheless, seniority was observed, and McNeil was promoted.

With the coming of September Grant was able to switch from defense to offense. He planned a double-pronged assault on the Confederate bastion of Vicksburg. While Sherman approached the city from the river, Grant planned to move down through Mississippi and take it in the rear. In November the army moved,

companies C,F,G,H,I, and K of the 2nd Illinois acting as part of the cavalry screen. Shortly before Christmas they were rotated back to the main federal supply base at Holly Springs, which must have seemed like a lucky break. But fate had decreed otherwise.

Casting about for some way to arrest the seemingly irresistible advance of the Union army, the Confederates had lighted upon the idea of breaking its supply line by means of a strong cavalry raid. The target was Holly Springs. Late on the 1 5th of December three brigades of rebel cavalry (some 3500 men) slipped across the Yalabusha River, to be joined the following morning by their new commander, Major General Earl Van Dorn. Van Dorn had not been having a happy war, but this raid was to do much to redeem his reputation. Deliberately crossing all the roads that led to Holly Springs, he created the impression that he was heading for Bolivar. By nightfall of the 1 9th he was within a few miles of his goal and ready to strike.

The Union high command was far from asleep, and the raiders had been spotted on their way north. Grant sent a stream of warnings to the Union outposts along the rail lines, and started reinforcements towards Holly Springs. Unfortunately the post commander at Holly Springs was Colonel R.C. Murphy of the 8th Wisconsin Infantry. Just weeks earlier he had been under a cloud for precipitately abandoning his post at Iuka when it was approached by a small Confederate force. He had gone to Grant with tears in his eyes and asked for a second chance. So here he was in what was about to become the most critical spot in the western theatre.

Holly Springs contained plenty of cotton bales, wagons, and so forth, out of which stout defensive breastworks could have been made in short order. The many substantial buildings would also have lent themselves to defense, particularly as the Confederate raiders had no artillery. There is little doubt that the garrison of twelve hundred infantry and six companies of cavalry could have held out long enough for reinforcements to arrive, with profound effects on the course of the war. But Murphy, on receiving Grant's warning, did *absolutely nothing* He failed even to pass the message along to his subordinate commanders!

As a result, when the raiders hit the town shortly after dawn on the 20th, they found a garrison woefully unprepared, many of the infantry tumbling out of bed to find themselves prisoners. For Murphy, captured sleeping off a drunk at the house of a citizen, promptly surrendered his entire command with hardly a shot fired. The cavalry, however, were camped just outside town on the fairgrounds. The men of the 2nd were told that they had been surrendered with the rest of the troops.

"Not by a damned sight," was the reply, "If they want the Second they must fight for it! "



At this point the raiders charged into the camp and began shooting down those who were saddling their horses. Quincy McNeil was almost immediately captured

Captain Marsh and Major Bush each organized parties for defense, but more and more rebels thundered into the camp, taking convalescents and stragglers prisoner. Marsh and Bush ordered saber charges which broke through the enemy lines at different points. Major Mudd had been waiting at the railroad station about to depart on leave, and like the rest knowing nothing of the impending attack. He promptly rounded up the men nearest to him and led them into action.

The detachments under Marsh and Bush joined up to the south of the camp and charged through the town fighting desperately. Realizing that many of their comrades must have been captured, Bush led a charge back into the camp, where many of the men were holding out, crouching behind their dead and dying horses which they used as breastworks. Many of these were able to mount up behind their comrades or catch loose horses, before smashing once more through the encircling enemy. Marsh was wounded three times, but kept on fighting. Meanwhile Major Mudd had broken through the enemy line to the west, though losing several

men in doing so. Seeing a group of the enemy in front of him he gave chase, though pursued himself at that time by a still larger number. Twenty four of the enemy were captured.

The performance of the 2nd Illinois was the only redeeming feature of the disaster at Holly Springs, where huge quantities of supplies were destroyed, bringing Grant's move on Vicksburg to a grinding halt. But the action cost the regiment dear. Of about 300 men present, 7 were killed, 43 wounded, and 150 taken prisoner. Among the dead were sergeant Isaiah Weedman and Levi Leib, who though mortally wounded twice fired his revolver into his assailant, who in turn fell dead. In his account of the battle, telegraphed to Washington on Christmas day, Grant stated: *Notwithstanding this surprise, many of the troops behaved nobly ... Conspicuous among the latter, was the detachment of the 2nd Illinois.*

The aftermath of the battle saw significant command changes. Quincy McNeil, submitted his resignation, which was immediately accepted. And on the 29th December Mudd and fourteen other officers of the regiment addressed a petition to General Grant:

In justice to our regiment and the service, we ask that Colonel Silas Noble may be dismissed from the service for incapacity, inefficiency, and indolence which is so notorious with yourself and all the old troops of this department that we deem it superfluous to give particulars.

Grant endorsed the petition, *Respectfully forwarded to Head Quarters of the Army - Washington, D. C., with the urgent recommendation that Col. Noble be mustered out of the service. Although a very clever old gentleman, he is entirely unfit for any Military position whatever.* In February John Mudd became Colonel.

In late March of 1863 Grant set his army in motion, with Vicksburg again the goal. This time the route was straight down the west bank of the Mississippi, and company F of the 2nd Illinois was part of the advance guard. Lieutenant Stickel at this time commanded the company, for Captain Musser was among the paroled prisoners still back in St. Louis awaiting exchange. Once across the river the men of the 2nd Illinois formed part of the cavalry screen which helped to mask Grant's movements from the enemy, as he struck first at Jackson and then at Vicksburg itself. Once the campaign settled down to a siege, the 2nd were employed in patrolling the vicinity of the Big Black River, to ensure that Joe Johnston did not come to the relief of the besieged Confederates.

With the surrender of Vicksburg on July 4th 1863 Grant's victorious army, which in truth could have gone just about anywhere in the South at that point, was broken up and scattered piecemeal . Part of it went to reinforce General Banks' Department of the Gulf, headquartered at New Orleans. Among the units sent south was the 2nd Illinois.

Throughout their service the 2nd had received nothing but praise from the senior officers they served under. In the Spring of 1864, however, occurred their one big clash with authority. It will be remembered that the men of the regiment provided and owned their own horses. Human nature being what it is, these horses were much better cared for than the average run of cavalry horses, and were widely admired. In fact they attracted the attention of General Banks and his "eastern officers", and a plan was hatched whereby the men were tricked into allowing their horses to be purchased by the government - for the later use of those self same eastern officers. The men were outraged As Samuel Fletcher of company A later wrote, "...the Government was the greater loser. Before, the horses were scrupulously cared for. At the end of a long march, the men might be hungry but the horses were fed; the men might be tired to exhaustion, but to groom their horses before sleeping was a duty never neglected. It was not uncommon for a soldier to take another horse or a mule and ride four or five miles at night to get forage for the tired one. All this ceased under the new order of things, and neglect and indifference was the rule."

Lt. Col. B.F. Marsh



Courtesy U.S. Military History Institute, Carlisle

Those who veteranized, that is reenlisted for the duration, duly went back to Illinois on furlough, and were given a reception in St.Louis, where Colonel Mudd proudly led them in review through the principal streets to the cheers of the onlookers. Mudd remained in Illinois for some weeks, recruiting new men to fill the ranks of the depleted regiment, before returning to New Orleans. Meanwhile the non-veterans were having a hard time of it as part of Banks' ill-fated Red River expedition. The Confederate forces were handled with considerable skill, and at Sabine Crossroads the Union forces were badly whipped. At one point under a heavy fire the men began to stampede, and a senior officer rode up to Lieutenant Colonel Marsh and said, "Colonel, can you hold this line for five minutes?"

"I can hold it until I die," replied Marsh.

Each color bearer was shot down the instant he raised the flag, until five had been shot down in succession. Thereupon Marsh grasped the flag and standing in his stirrups sang "Rally round the Flag Boys". He seemed as always to bear a charmed life. The line was held for an hour, giving the rest of the army time to pull back, but the price was severe. Of the 150 men of the regiment who were in the fight at Sabine Crossroads, more than a third were killed, wounded, or missing, and 86 horses were slaughtered.

Back in New Orleans Colonel Mudd had been ordered to report, with the rank of Brigadier General, as chief of staff to General McClernand. Mudd embarked on the steamer *City Belle*. Three days later on the Red River the boat was ambushed by guerrillas who opened fire with a masked battery at close range. The boat became unmanageable and when the senior officer on board, Colonel Marcus Spiegel of the 120th Ohio Infantry, was killed, Colonel Mudd assumed command. It proved impossible to run the boat ashore, so Mudd put a life preserver on one of the men who swam ashore with a line. At this juncture Mudd was killed by a shot in the forehead as he stood upon the boat giving orders. Once more the 2nd mourned a much loved leader.

Following the Red River disaster, the 2nd Illinois were based at Baton Rouge. The nearby country was swampy and a haven for guerrillas. These took to creeping up at night and shooting at the pickets. After one of their men was shot dead in this manner, the men of company D decided enough was enough. Company D had been recruited in Alton, on the Mississippi, and many were river men. It had also spent much of the earlier part of the war combating guerrillas in Missouri. Its Captain, Franklin B. Moore, was once described by one of the regiment as "Our Cossack", and the company were known as "The Alton Hell Hounds." It surprised no-one that when company D captured two of the guerrillas they were made to stand upon their own mules while picket ropes attached to a high branch were placed around their necks. The mules were then driven out from under them and their bodies left hanging for two days as a warning. The attacks on pickets ceased.

The last few months of the war were spent by the regiment mounting small expeditions in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The regiment continued to be one that senior officers naturally turned to when the going got tough. On one occasion, in a particularly tight spot, a harassed column commander asked the 2nd to lead the column and to form a rearguard. An irate Colonel Marsh responded that he didn't mind whether the regiment led the column or guarded its rear, but he was damned if it was going to do both!

Courtesy U.S. Military History Institute, Carlisle

AFTERMATH

With the Confederate surrender and after a spell of occupation duty in Texas, the survivors finally came home. Some who had served with the regiment did not long survive the war. Melville Musser died suddenly in 1868, and Silas Noble in 1869. Reuben Bowen, on the other hand, lived to the ripe old age of 90. A few came to a predictably sticky end. Quincy McNeil managed to wangle an appointment as Major in a colored regiment in 1864, a posting which lasted only until his court martial for drunkenness, the embarrassing details of which can be found to this day in the National Archives

("The duty of a soldier is to eat, to sleep, and to shit," was one his more colorful remarks). He died penniless in the Soldiers Home at Quincy. Illinois, deserted even by his children. Jim Hollingsworth came to an even worse end. To quote his obituary in the local newspaper (February 19th 1873): *James Hollingsworth died at the County Poor House on Sunday, the 8th inst. He has been in close confinement for several years on account of insanity, during which his life has been a wretched one.*

But these were the exceptions. Some settled back readily into their communities, married, built lives for themselves, and regularly attended reunions of the regiment. Others scattered far and wide. Many made their mark in civilian life. Colonel Marsh returned to Warsaw and was elected to Congress, serving in all seven terms. John Kirby, who ended the war as a lieutenant, returned to Monticello, became county sheriff, married the daughter of one of the first pioneers in the county, and became a successful and fabulously wealthy stock dealer and farmer. Trooper Calvin Steel of company A served as acting Governor of Nebraska. Regimental sergeant major Henry G Hicks became a Minnesota lawman and judge, Edward V. Miles of company F was the first Republican candidate for state office from South Dakota. Today their descendants are scattered throughout the Union which they fought so well to save.

Personal Note:

I hope this article has managed to convey a little of what it feels like to reach back and touch the lives of these men. The highpoint of my research was the day I had the privilege and the pleasure of talking to a grand old lady of 92 in Wessington Springs, South Dakota, who at the age of 2 had been dandled on the knee of her grandfather Edward V. Miles of Company F, 2nd Illinois Cavalry. At that moment, one hundred and thirty years seemed no more substantial than the blink of an eye. And sometimes on a quiet evening, I have a fancy. That in some far corner of Valhalla the boys of '61, in blue and grey, are once more bivouacked around glowing fires. And as we read of their deeds, and speak their names, they incline their heads and smile. For they too know that one hundred thirty years is not such a long time, and that in our hearts they are remembered, and they are honored, and they are loved.

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Group Reunion Photo, 1907

Brick Building in which Harvey Hogg's Office was located in Bloomington. It was recently saved from demolition.

The first (and only) house shared by Harvey Hogg and his wife, Prudence.

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

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

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The Many Stories of the Stonewall Jackson Medal

by Frank T. Wheeler
Assistant Director, Georgia Historical Society

Only the death of Robert E. Lee could have been more devastating to the morale of the Confederate soldier than the death of Lieutenant General Thomas Jonathan "Stonewall" Jackson. Jackson was mortally wounded by his own men at Chancellorsville, in 1863. His death was a major setback for the Southern cause, both literally and figuratively.

SHORTLY FOLLOWING JACKSON'S DEATH, a medal was commissioned to honor the fallen hero. There is debate over the origin of the medal. Some historians believe that the medal was commissioned by the Marquis de Lafayette the grandson of General Lafayette. The story goes that Lafayette was in the United States observing troops from both the northern and southern states. It is stated that Lafayette was so impressed with the soldiers under Jackson that he decided to commission the medal upon the death of the Southern hero. Lafayette reportedly had 5,000 medals cast at his expense that were to be presented to members of the Stonewall Brigade. This is an interesting story. However, it appears that the medal was not commissioned by Lafayette's grandson, but by someone with ties to General Lafayette. The general consensus is that the medal was commissioned in France by Lafayette's godson, Charles Augustus Lafayette Lamar of Savannah, Georgia.

Charles Augustus Lafayette Lamar was born in Savannah on April 1, 1824. He was the son of Gazaway Bugg and Jane Meek Creswell Lamar. By the late 1840s Lamar had become one of the leading businessmen in Savannah. His business interests were vast as he managed and owned extensive land holdings, warehouses, a gold mine, and a cotton press. Lamar also represented the Lamar Insurance Company of New York as their Savannah agent. In addition to his business interests, Lamar actively pursued political office. In 1855 he was unsuccessful in his

Gravestone of C.A.L. Lamar.

Laurel Grove, Savannah, Georgia.
Courtesy Georgia Historical Society

... it is no surprise that the image on the medal does not resemble that of Stonewall Jackson. Jackson's wife stated that the likeness was "miserable" and over the years several people have noted that the likeness resembles Abraham Lincoln.

bid as an American Party candidate for Congress, but he eventually held political office as an Alderman for Savannah and was active in state and local party activities. As interesting as this may be, Lamar is better known in Georgia history for his role in slave trade.

Lamar was very active in the 1850s in efforts to revive African slave trade to the United States. He was convinced that individuals possessed the right to import slaves directly from Africa, and he openly sought to have the laws prohibiting slave trade repealed. Lamar outfitted ships for the slave trade, invested heavily in the ventures, and formed several partnerships with other wealthy Georgians interested in renewing the lucrative venture. Lamar's best known ship, the *Wanderer*, was seized on November 28, 1858 as it landed at Jekyll Island, Georgia with 409 Africans. The government seized the ship and tried to convict Lamar with violating federal law, an effort that was unsuccessful as Lamar exercised his influence in both business and political arenas to thwart any attempts to convict anyone involved in the *Wanderer* case.

As one would expect, Lamar was an avid secessionist. Before Abraham Lincoln's election Lamar made plans to form a military company that would go to the aid of South Carolina should that state secede. Following Lincoln's election, Lamar led the group in an attempt to seize Fort Pulaski, but this effort failed due to severe weather. At the beginning of the war Lamar was granted permission to muster troops which entered Confederate service on October 9, 1861. His unit was the 26th Regiment (Lamar Regiment) Georgia Infantry. They were later designated 7th Battalion Georgia Infantry and finally 61st Georgia Infantry. Lamar was required to split companies from his command to supplement units heading for other battlefields. Ironically Lamar was placed in command of the defenses of Jekyll Island, the same site where his vessel the *Wanderer* had been seized in 1858. On April 2, 1862, Colonel Lamar resigned his commission in order to resume shipping for his company as well as for the state of Georgia.

Upon leaving military service, Lamar assisted his father and Georgia Governor Joseph E. Brown in the establishment of state subsidized blockade runners. Governor Joseph E. Brown chartered the steamers "Little Ada," Florrie," "Little Hattie," "Lillian," and an unnamed vessel under the direction of Lamar. These were for the use of the Importing and Exporting Company of Georgia, which became a major concern to the Federal blockade. It is reported that one of the Georgia vessels made sixty round trips. Through his responsibilities with the Importing and Exporting Company of Georgia, Lamar spent a substantial amount of time in Europe. His primary responsibility was securing funds in England and France, buying steamers that were able to outrun the Federal blockaders, and arranging for British agents to oversee the concerns in Europe. Lamar served in this capacity until Sherman captured Savannah in 1864.

After Savannah's fall, Lamar resumed his military service as an aide on the staff of Howell Cobb. Lamar was killed on April 16, 1865 in a clash with General James H. Wilson's Cavalry near Columbus, Georgia. His body was eventually moved to Savannah and buried in Laurel Grove Cemetery. The death of Lamar makes it extremely difficult to answer some of the questions that have arisen over the Stonewall Jackson medal.

There is no doubt that Lamar played a role in the history of the Stonewall Jackson Medal. However, there are several versions of how Lamar acquired the medals, with only two of these stories being remotely believable. One story states that the artist created the medal which Lamar took a particular interest in. According to Lamar's daughter, Mrs. C.M. Cunningham, Lamar was in France on official business for the Importing and Exporting Company of Georgia and saw the medal on display. He ordered an enormous number of these to sell throughout the South, because after all, Lamar was a businessman and this appeared to be a can't lose financial venture.

The other version of how Lamar became involved in the mystery of the Stonewall Jackson Medal states that Lamar conceived the idea of a medal with Jackson's bust on one side and a list of his battles on the other. Although it is uncertain whether or not Lamar com-

missioned the medal, it can still be deduced that Lamar returned from Paris with a few of the medals in hand. According to his widow, he paid for the remainder of the medals which were to be sent to him upon their completion.

The medal was designed by the French artist Armand Auguste Caque (1793-1881). Caque, a Parisian artist and medalist known for his work with royal themes, was the engraver to His Imperial Majesty Napoleon III at the time the Stonewall Jackson Medal was commissioned. Given Caque's tendency to work on royal themes, it is no surprise that the image on the medal does not resemble that of Stonewall Jackson. Jackson's wife stated that the likeness was "miserable" and over the years several people have noted that the likeness resembles Abraham Lincoln.

Photo of Stonewall Jackson Medals
Courtesy of the Georgia Historical Society, Savannah, Georgia

The Stonewall Jackson Medal

Additional Notes

by Peter Bertram
Editor, The Confederate MBR Newsletter

The exact origin of the Stonewall Jackson Medal is still uncertain. Whether the Medal was designed/commissioned by the Marquis de Lafayette, an artist, or the engraver is not known, but I do not believe it was the work of Lamar or the result of any collaboration between Lafayette and Lamar. As an ardent Southerner, Lamar would not have referred to First Manassas as Bull Run and to Sharpsburg as Antietam. I do believe that the Medal's reference to The Wilderness is for the Battle of Chancellorsville. Evidence seems to indicate the medals were executed in 1863, while the Battle of The Wilderness did not occur until May of 1864. Much of the area of Virginia where the battle of Chancellorsville was fought was covered with heavy timber and dense undergrowth and had been referred to as the Wilderness of Spotsylvania - or simply the Wilderness - since the earliest settlements.

HOW MANY OF THESE MEDALS were there and how many still exist? British author, researcher, and collector Tony Margrave suggests that Lamar originally brought six barrels through the blockade into Wilmington. About 1871 a Confederate veteran named Pitman reportedly took four barrels to Virginia to attempt to sell them. Pitman's venture failed because the Medal's bust looked more like Lincoln than Jackson. Nothing more seems to be known about Pitman's four barrels. Are they in musty storage somewhere in Virginia waiting to be discovered? The two remaining barrels in Savannah reportedly contained between 1,000 and 2,000 of the Medals. A discrepancy this large may be the difference between the original contents of the barrels and how many of the Medals were salvageable and saleable after discovery and cleaning in 1894. It is thus not unreasonable to arrive at about 1,000 medals per barrel in the original shipment, or roughly 6,000 medals originally struck. Discounting Pitman's barrels as lost and assuming about a third to one half of the Savannah Medals were lost to corrosion, theft, presentations, gifts, etc., Mrs. Lamar's organization possibly had 1,000 to 1,300 some odd of the Medals to sell. I believe that perhaps 750 to 1,000 survive today in private collections and museums.

In 1868, two specimens of the Stonewall Jackson Medal were described in the American Journal of Numismatics. One was made of lead and was believed to be a first proof from the original dies. The other was struck in tin and was in a glazed gutta-percha case. The vast majority of the Medals discovered in Savannah were made of a pewter like metal, possibly white metal - a fairly durable alloy of 2/3 copper and 1/3 tin. These were in paper wrapped rolls. Other Medals were found individually packed in plush presentation cases and small, glass topped metal boxes. I'm not aware of any of these individually packed specimens having survived. I have, however, examined the silver and bronze specimens in the collection of Mr. Everitt Bowles of Woodstock, Georgia. While certainly quite rare, I do not believe these last two examples to be unique.

The Georgia Historical Society has a gold wash specimen in their collection in Savannah and at the 1996 Civil War Show in Dalton, Georgia, I had the opportunity to examine an extremely fine gold wash example with the bottom half of its original gutta-percha case still intact.

So what are they worth? The pewter-like specimens of the Stonewall Jackson Medal are well known to collectors and may be found with reasonable regularity at Civil War Shows in the $300 to $400 range, although the unwary may be asked for more. I've never seen the silver or bronze specimens offered for sale. The gold wash example seen at Dalton had been sold by the time I saw it, but I was informed the sale price was around $650.

The Stonewall Jackson Medals,

illustrated above, were presented to the Ladies' Auxiliary to C. V. A., of Savannah, Ga., to be sold for the benefit of disabled Confederate Veterans.

As historic souvenirs of the war they are of great value, being the only medals that were made at that time, and commemorating all the victories of the great general. They were brought to the South through the blockade, and lay in an old Savannah warehouse nearly thirty years. The price of these medals is **One Dollar Each**, and all orders sent to S. A. Cunningham, Nashville, Tenn., or to

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will receive prompt attention. The medals are the size of engravings, and very handsomely executed.

Ad as run in the
Confederate Veteran Magazine
1894-1895

The diameter of the medal is 51mm. The obverse of the medal contains the "likeness" of Jackson. It also contains the text, LIEUT. GENERAL T. J. JACKSON. STONEWALL. BORN 1821, DIED 1863. In fact, Jackson was born in 1824. The reverse of the medal is bordered by a wreath of corn and tobacco stalks meeting at the base at the motto DEO VINDICE (God Our Vindicator). Wrapped around the wreath is a ribbon containing the names of nine battles. They are Bull Run, Sudley, Harpers Ferry, Shephardstown (sic), Fredericksburg, Chantilly, Martinsburg, Antietam, and The Wilderness. The center of the reverse contains the names of thirteen other battles. They are Kernstown, Front Royal, Middletown, Winchester, Strasburg, Harrisonburg, Port Republic, Mechanicsville, Cold Harbour (sic), White Oak Swamp, Malvern Hill, Cedar Mountain, and Manassas.

There are several errors with the listing of these battles which may possibly cast doubts as to whether or not Lamar did in fact commission the medal. Maybe there is some validity to the medals being commissioned by a European and Lamar was fortunate to be the first American to discover them.

The most glaring errors are the names used to refer to specific battles. For example, southerners refer to Bull Run as First Manassas. In addition, Southerners refer to Antietam as Sharpsburg. A few engagements were omitted while some questionable entries were included. The most interesting error is the inclusion of The Wilderness as Jackson had died one year earlier at the Battle of Chancellorsville.

As the story goes, upon completion, the medals were packed in barrels and ran the blockade arriving in Wilmington, N.C. in late 1864. It is unknown how many medals arrived in Wilmington with estimates ranging between 2,000 and 8,000. Once in Wilmington the medals were turned over to Antoine Poullain of Augusta to ensure their arrival in Georgia. When the medals reached Augusta, Poullain was unable to reach Lamar's family. Savannah was under siege by Sherman's troops and therefore Poullain decided to store the medals in one of his cotton warehouses until after the war. While stored in Poullain's warehouse, the medals were discovered by Union soldiers and numerous medals were stolen. According to Lamar's daughter, Poullain sent the remaining medals to Caroline Agnes Nicoll Lamar in Savannah in 1871. She was the widow of Charles.

Additional Sources:

- American Journal of Numismatics Vol. 2, 1868, pg 95; *Remarkable Confederate Medals.*
- Margrave, Tony; *Guest Comment on the Stonewall Jackson Medal;* The Confederate MBR Newsletter Vol. 2, No. 4, July/Aug 1997.
- Stackpole, Edward J.; *Chancellorsville (Lee's Greatest Battle);* The Stackpole Company; Harrisburg, PA; 1958.

The Confederate MBR Newsletter
(Medals, Badges, Ribbons)
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Once the medals arrived in Savannah, the Lamar's sold several barrels. They were not trying to keep the medals a secret and they thought interest would be high. One barrel was sold to a gentleman who traveled to Richmond with the medals where he expected to make a substantial amount of money. He was unable to sell many of the medals because the likeness looked nothing like Jackson. Based on the experience of this gentleman, the Lamars thought interest was low and placed the medals in a warehouse along the river that was used for storage by the Lamar Press which later consolidated with the Savannah Cotton Press Association, and forgot about them. Except for a brief period in 1878, the medals remained unknown until 1894.

In 1878, a drayman discovered one of the medals on Savannah's riverfront. Not knowing what he had discovered, he turned to the Georgia Historical Society. William Harden, Librarian of the Georgia Historical Society had never seen this medal and was unaware of its history. Harden created a wax impression of the medal and sent it to the Confederate Historical Association in Richmond hoping to receive any information that may explain the mystery medal.

In a reply to Harden's inquiry as to the history of this medal, Mr Robert A. Brock, Recording Secretary for the Confederate Historical Association wrote that shortly following Jackson's death, it was decided to memorialize him with a statue. It was quickly realized that a medal was more practical. Funds were raised and invested in cotton that was shipped to Europe. Once in Europe, the cotton was sold in an attempt to raise the funds necessary for the medal. The request for the medal was drawn and sent to an artist in Paris. Brock also said that it was unclear what happened to the medals and he assumed that they were captured by the Union blockade. This medal found in Savannah in 1878 was given to the Georgia Historical Society by the drayman. This response by Harden has some validity, but these flaws in his story may never be answered.

The medals remained in Savannah virtually unknown until January 1894 when the barrels containing the medals were discovered by T. N. West. He was in the seldom used storage warehouse assessing damage done by the August 1893 hurricane that caused extensive damage to Savannah. While in the warehouse, West discovered two barrels that were nearly rotten and that appeared to contain trash. Upon further investigation, West discovered that the barrels contained cotton, paper, rusty tin cases, and the medals. He took several of the medals and consulted numerous people including employees of the wharf and the Savannah Cotton Press Association. This inquiry was to no avail as no information on the medals surfaced. West decided to turn to the Georgia Historical Society. Upon talking with William Harden, West learned that Harden had been asked the same question in 1878. While West searched for information on the medals, and tried to determine their disposition, laborers and other workers along the river began taking the souvenirs and distributing them throughout Savannah. West decided to put the barrels under lock and key until it was determined what to do with them. As expected, the physical condition of the medals varied as water damage from storms and floods had corroded the medals making a large number of them useless.

Interest in the discovery of the medal was not only in Savannah. Not long after the 1894 rediscovery of the medal William Harden received a letter from Rowland S. Williams of Oak Ridge, North Carolina. Williams was a Captain in the 13th North Carolina which served under Stonewall Jackson. Williams and the 13th North Carolina were at Chancellorsville and Williams states that he was within one hundred yards of Jackson when the General was mortally wounded. Williams was unaware that the medal was ever created, however, his request to receive a medal was answered.

IN THE JANUARY 24, 1894, issue of the *Savannah Morning News*, it was reported that West intended to either give the medals to the Georgia Historical Society to sell for the purchase of new books or give them to the Confederate Veterans Association to be disposed of for their benefit. Apparently Lamar's widow consulted with West and it was decided to give the medals to the Ladies' Auxiliary to the Confederate Veterans to sell for the benefit of disabled Confederate veterans. The medals were sold to benefit that group at the cost of one dollar per medal. The sale of the medals was advertised in the *Confederate Veteran* in 1894 and 1895 and any interested party contacted Colonel Lamar's daughter-in-law Mrs. George W. (Dolly Blount) Lamar. It is believed that all of the medals were sold, even though it was reported that the remaining medals were given to the Savannah Chapter No. 2 of the United Daughters of the Confederacy which organized in 1893 and was chartered in 1894. ■

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Savannah Morning News, "Relics of a Brave Hero," 24 January 1894.

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Williams, R.S., Letter to William Harden, 30 January 1894, Georgia Historical Society Archives, Savannah, Georgia.

Do You Know? Answers

1. The 8th Wisconsin Infantry (whose Colonel Murphy figures in our article on the 2nd Illinois Cavalry).
2. Governor Louis P. Harvey led a party to tend to the needs of wounded Wisconsin soldiers after the battle of Shiloh (April 1862). On embarking for the return trip on April 19th he slipped in the darkness and fell into the river. His body was recovered some sixty miles away the following month. He was succeeded by Lieutenant-Governor Salomon.
3. Colonel William P. Sanders, for whom Fort Sanders was named. Sanders was a native of Kentucky, who moved to Mississippi at the age of nine.
4. Illinois. Attempts were made to grow cotton in the southern part of the State, using seed procured in the South, but without large scale success.
5. Colonel James Duff, who is reputed to have killed large numbers of German Unionists in and around Fredericksburg, Texas. As will be seen in our article in the next issue, *What Really Happened on the Nueces River?*, Duff was in reality an excellent soldier who has been the victim of war time propaganda.
6. The 8th Illinois. There was a standing joke in the army. Question: "What's the difference between a good cavalry regiment and a bad one?" Answer: "The difference between the 8th Illinois and the 8th Pennsylvania."

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Richard DiNardo—When Lee had to find new corps commanders for the Army of Northern Virginia, he had to consider more than their combat records.

GRANT AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

William B. Feis —Sherman once said of Grant, "He don't give a damn for what the enemy does out of his sight." The reality was far more complex.

WHAT *REALLY* HAPPENED ON THE NUECES RIVER?

Richard Selcer and Paul Burrier —The traditional tale has evil Confederate Colonel Duff massacring loyalist German settlers. New research suggests otherwise.

DECISION IN THE WEST

Keith Poulter —Napoleonic in both its conception and in its execution, the Vicksburg Campaign was arguably the most critical campaign of the whole war. Part One of a detailed analysis.

THE GREAT CAVALRY RAID

William R. Scaife—In July of 1864 Sherman launched his three divisions of cavalry on a wide ranging raid. The result was a disaster for the Union horsemen.

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

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

ON JUNE 30, 1862, near Glendale, Virginia, General Robert E. Lee and President Jefferson Davis observed the start of the *"Battle of Glendale"*. As Federal artillery fire began to fall into their area, General A.P. Hill came galloping up and state *"As Commander of this part of the field, I order you both to the rear! A single Yankee shell could deprive the Confederacy of its President and the Army of Northern Virginia of its Commander!"* Following General Hill's orders, General Lee and President Davis rode beyond the range of the Federal Guns and away from the front line.

SOUND OF THE GUNS

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ON JULY 1, 1863, Generals Robert E. Lee and James Longstreet were at the head of the first corps of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia crossing South Mountain, east of Fayetteville, Pennsylvania. As they approached the crest of the divide, the sound of artillery was heard. General Lee ordered General Longstreet to return to his corps, while he would ride forward to ascertain the cause of the artillery fire. Unknown to General Lee as he rode toward the sound of the guns was that the artillery fire he heard was the first shots being fired in the *"Battle of Gettysburg"*.

WHEELER AND FORREST

by Wayne Justus

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ON FEBRUARY 3, 1863, Confederate Generals Joseph (Fightin' Joe) Wheeler and Nathan Bedford Forrest discussed how best to attack the Federal garrison at Dover, Tennessee. General Forrest did not agree with General Wheeler's decision to attack. He felt that the losses incurred during the attack would not justify the gains. However, he stated *"that he and his men would do their duty as ordered"*. General Forrest led two assaults and on both occasions had his horse shot out from under him. He was preparing his troops for a third assault when General Wheeler ordered no further attacks be made.

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